Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, United Nations and General International Matters, Volume II

84. Circular Instruction From the Department of State to Certain Diplomatic Missions¹

Washington, August 7, 1959.

CA–1258

[Here follow the Table of Contents and a Summary of Action Requested.]

Introduction

The fourteenth regular session of the General Assembly (GA) is scheduled to convene in New York on September 15, 1959. Such issues as Disarmament, Outer Space, Algeria, and the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, will command widespread attention to the work of the GA. Moreover, a number of key items will arise in the economic, social, and colonial fields, reflecting the increasing interest of the General Assembly in these areas.

A. Composition

When the 14th GA convenes, it will comprise 82 members, an increase of one over last year, reflecting the admission of Guinea as a new United Nations member in December of 1958. Since its founding, the United Nations has increased its membership from 51 to 82 members. The increase reflects for the most part the admission of new nations in Africa and Asia emerging from colonialism, as well as the admission of a number of traditional European states. At present the United Nations is composed of thirty members from Africa and Asia (four African, ten Arab, and sixteen Asian), nine Soviet, sixteen non-communist Europe, four old Commonwealth (Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and South Africa), twenty Latin American, and those otherwise unclassified, three (Yugoslavia, Israel, and the United States). The growing membership has tended to (1) render the UN a more representative organization (2) increase the role and importance of smaller powers, particularly, the African and Asian (3) make more difficult the attainment of two-thirds majorities on controversial issues (4) intensify pressure for progress toward self-government or independence (5) strengthen the demand that economic and social progress be attained through the UN system (6) increase the difficulty of Free World Members in focusing the attention of the GA on Soviet abuses of the purposes and principles of the UN.

The United States has welcomed the expansion of membership and particularly the admission of new states. It regrets the failure of the UN to admit two qualified candidates, Korea and Viet Nam. It believes the Organization provides an appropriate platform for its expanding community of Members from which to make their views known and give voice to their aspirations. It thereby encourages the growth of mutual understanding between States. The Organization also provides a framework in which its Members can work to gain objectives through common action they cannot achieve themselves. Thereby it promotes the growth of moderation in the presentation of demands and of cooperative action necessary to secure their fulfillment.

B. Bloc Voting

While recognizing the common interests of Member States of a particular area, history, or stage of economic development, the United States believes that each Member State has its own peculiar problems and interests which require individual consideration, and that therefore we should not base our dealings with Member States primarily on the concept of blocs and bloc membership. To do so, we believe would (1) encourage the tendency of some groupings of Members to pressure individual nations to relinquish their genuine national interests to those of the group majority (2) severely restrict the freedom of voting of Members in disagreement with their group (3) encourage the development of large unwieldy voting blocs in the UN whose private interests might well be detrimental to the growth of respect for and practice of UN Charter principles. With the exception of the nine members of the Soviet bloc, the United States primarily attempts to deal with each Member as an individual nation.

C. The Issue of Parity

The 13th GA witnessed the renewed insistence by the USSR on parity in the composition of GA bodies. This was highlighted in the negotiations leading to the establishment of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, where the Soviets insisted that the composition of this body should be such as to give the USSR and its satellites percentage representation which would be completely disproportionate to their nine votes in the GA. The USSR has also espoused the parity concept in connection with disarmament negotiations, and there is every likelihood that parity will continue to be a major Soviet objective within the UN.

Actually, the USSR has suggested two forms of parity. The first is based upon the concept that there are “two sides” in the world—the Communist bloc and the remainder of the UN—and that UN organs should reflect this division by providing equal representation to the Communist and non-Communist worlds. The major variation on this concept, also suggested occasionally by the USSR, is the idea of “three-cornered” parity, by which UN organs would be constituted of equal representation from the (1) Soviet bloc (2) non-aligned countries (3) countries aligned with the United States. This “three-cornered” parity would serve Soviet purposes in two ways. It would give the non-aligned countries disproportionate representation vis-à-vis the United States and its allies and would simultaneously give the Soviet bloc disproportionate representation vis-à-vis both the non-aligned nations and the free world allies.

The United States fully recognizes Soviet eminence in the field of outer space and is equally aware that on certain other matters, such as disarmament, Soviet cooperation is essential to any kind of successful results. However, the US continues to oppose firmly the application of the parity principle within the UN or any of its subordinate bodies. In our judgment, parity would (1) tend to subvert underlying premises of the UN system, in which all member nations are regarded as sovereign equals; (2) destroy the principle that UN bodies should reflect the interests and views of different geographic areas of the world; (3) provide representation to the Soviet bloc far out of proportion to the number of Soviet bloc states in the UN; (4) ignore the fact that both the non-aligned nations and the free world allies, unlike the Soviet bloc, maintain a high degree of individuality in their voting behavior and do not act as rigidly disciplined units; (5) subject independently-minded nations to the necessity of declaring themselves as members of a particular “bloc”; (6) help the USSR to achieve a de facto veto over the actions of UN subsidiary bodies, thus rendering some of these bodies wholly impotent.

Because of its failure to obtain acceptance of the parity concept, the USSR continues to boycott the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. This Committee has notwithstanding done a great deal of useful work and has largely avoided controversial political issues. The US hopes that the USSR will eventually modify its position and agree to participate actively in UN studies and activities related to outer space. The US is convinced, however, that non-Communist nations, allied and neutral alike, cannot afford to purchase Soviet cooperation by accepting the parity concept, since this concept threatens the basic structure of the UN system.

D. Major Contingencies

The major unknown factor which will affect the atmosphere of the 14th GA is the outcome of the conferences currently in progress at Geneva, the nuclear test talks, the Foreign Ministers meetings on the problem of Germany, and the possibility of a meeting at the “summit.” Any prediction however at this time as to their specific influence is obviously premature. (FYI There should be no suggestion that the Western powers are planning to bring the German problem itself into the 14th UNGA, but it is always possible that discussions among foreign ministers or among heads of governments might involve other questions which could affect both the atmosphere and the activities of the 14th GA. End FYI)

[Here follow Sections E, “Agenda;” F, “Consultations;” and G, “Specific Instructions.”]

H. United States Views

1. 13th GA Presidency

The Peruvian Ambassador was informed by the Department on July 17 that the United States will support the candidacy of Dr. Belaunde for President of the 14th General Assembly. Dr. Belaunde’s candidacy was first advanced in 1957 for the presidency of the 13th Assembly session but was postponed that same year until the 14th session in the interest of avoiding a contest between Sir Leslie Munro (New Zealand) and Dr. Charles Malik (Lebanon) for the presidency of the 12th session (1957). Dr. Belaunde’s candidacy has received the unanimous endorsement of the Latin American caucus and we do not expect it to be contested.

2. The Election of Other Officers Comprising the General Committee

The Assembly at its 12th session increased the size of the General (steering) Committee from 16 to 21 by adding five vice-presidencies. The Committee is therefore now composed of the President, 13 Vice-Presidents, and the chairmen of the seven main Committees. The Assembly also provided in the same resolution [1192 (XII)]² for the geographical allocation of these seats, which has heretofore been a matter of accepted practice rather than written stipulation. The allocation in the enlarged committee varies somewhat, the area from which the President comes losing a vice-presidency, but in general it is as follows: Vice-Presidents—Republic of China, France, United States, United Kingdom, USSR, four from Asia and Africa, one from Eastern Europe, two from Latin America, two from Western Europe and other States, and one from Eastern Europe. We attach special importance to the election of the Republic of China to a vice-presidency pursuant to the principle that the five permanent members of the Security Council are always represented among the vice-presidents. The “slate” for the General Committee, which is developed by the Secretariat in consultation with the various UN delegations in New York, customarily is not finally determined until just before the Assembly convenes. Candidacies so far advanced are Matsch (Austria) and Nosek (Czechoslovakia) for Committee One, King (Liberia) for the Special Political Committee, Tamayo (Bolivia) for Committee Two, Ciselet (Belgium) and Lopez (Philippines) for Committee Three, Palar (Indonesia) for Committee Four, and Herrarte (Guatemala) for Committee Six. Brazil, Burma, and Morocco are announced candidates for vice-presidencies. The Bolivian, Guatemalan, and Brazilian candidacies have the endorsement of the Latin American caucus. We have taken no final position on any of these candidacies except that of Nosek, which we cannot support.

FYI. The increased size of the General Committee and the geographical allocations approved by the Assembly have complicated the problem of obtaining a satisfactory committee from the standpoint of US interests. We hope through early and close consultations with the UN Secretariat and friendly delegations in New York to obtain a General Committee at the 14th GA more favorable to US interests, particularly on the Chinese representation issue, than at the 13th session. Particularly do we hope to see a sufficient number of desirable candidacies advanced early enough to be effective, and sufficient flexibility maintained by interested friendly delegations with respect to the particular offices desired so that the possibilities available to us are not wasted by competition or by candidacies that cannot hope to succeed. End FYI.

3. The Representation of China

India has again proposed for inclusion on the Agenda an item on the representation of China. In accordance with our policy of strong support for the Government of the Republic of China in international organizations, we shall again propose that the Assembly decide “not to consider” any proposals to exclude the representatives of the Government of the Republic of China and/or to seat Chinese Communists. FYI By taking such procedural position and avoiding a vote on the substance, we expect to be able again to achieve our policy objective with maximum free-world support. Furthermore, the UK has advised us that it will, as in the past, support the moratorium formula. End FYI.

At your discretion, you may point out that the Chinese Communist regime (1) does not meet the standards for international behavior set by the Charter and continues to show nothing but contempt for the principles for which the UN stands; (2) its action in Tibet is but the most recent example of the regime’s shocking disregard for human life and liberty; meanwhile it continues to disturb the peace in the Taiwan Strait; and (3) is a condemned and persistent aggressor against the UN in Korea.

For your background, the breakdown of the vote on the US-sponsored resolution “not to consider” Chinese representation at the 13th General Assembly, taken on September 23, 1958,³ when the UN membership stood at 81, was as follows:

a. 44 states in favor: Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Ethiopia, France, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Iran, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Lebanon, Liberia, Luxembourg, Malaya, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Spain, Thailand, Turkey, Union of South Africa, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, and Venezuela.

b. 28 states against: Afghanistan, Albania, Bulgaria, Burma, Byelorussia, Cambodia, Ceylon, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Finland, Ghana, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Ireland, Morocco, Nepal, Norway, Poland, Rumania, Sudan, Sweden, Ukraine, United Arab Republic, USSR, Yemen, and Yugoslavia.

c. 9 states abstaining: Austria, Greece, Iceland, Israel, Laos, Libya, Portugal, Saudi Arabia, and Tunisia.

Posts in those countries which voted in favor of the resolution should express appreciation for support on this question, which the US believes continues to be one of paramount importance to the entire Free World, and solicit continued support for a like US position at the 14th GA. Posts in those countries which voted in the negative should, in their discretion, solicit support for adoption of the moratorium resolution or possibly an abstention, instead of a negative vote. Posts in those countries which abstained should, in their discretion, endeavor to obtain assurance for support of the moratorium resolution and if this is not forthcoming, at least continued abstention in preference to a negative vote.

Attention Athens: The Greek Delegation in New York has indicated to USUN that Greece will support the moratorium resolution, as it did at the 12th and previous GAs.

Attention Addis Ababa, Baghdad, Benghazi, Conakry, Dublin, Jidda, Reykjavik, and Vientiane: Await receipt of special instructions from the Department before approaching the Foreign Office on the Chinese representation issue.⁴

All posts including those listed in the preceding paragraph, are requested to report the outcome of this representation by cable.⁵

4. Elections to UN Councils and the International Court of Justice

Elections will be held at the 14th GA, for three seats on the Security Council, six seats on the Economic and Social Council, two seats on the Trusteeship Council, and one seat on the International Court of Justice. To date, relatively few candidacies for these seats have been advanced and we are following our usual practice of not making commitments so far in advance of the elections. (For the present composition of these organs, see US Participation in the UN, 1958.)

Security Council—The seats currently held by Canada, Japan, and Panama will be vacated at the end of 1959. So far the only announced candidate is Ecuador to succeed Panama. Ecuador’s candidacy has the endorsement of the Latin American caucus.

Economic and Social Council—Finland, Mexico, Pakistan, Poland, the United Kingdom, and the USSR retire from ECOSOC at the end of 1959. The United Kingdom and the USSR may be expected to be reelected pursuant to the generally accepted practice that the five permanent members of the Security Council are always represented on all major UN bodies. Brazil, with the support of the Latin American caucus, is a candidate to succeed Mexico. Denmark, with the support of the other Scandinavian countries, is a candidate to succeed Finland. Japan (which declared its candidacy in 1958) and Ceylon are announced candidates, and India a possible candidate, to succeed Pakistan.

Trusteeship Council—Bolivia is the Latin American choice to succeed Haiti on the Trusteeship Council, and India is a candidate for reelection.

International Court of Justice—The election of one judge to the Court is necessary to fill the vacancy created by the death of Judge Guerrero of El Salvador. The Latin Americans are supporting Dr. Alfaro of Panama to succeed Judge Guerrero. Other candidacies so far advanced are those of Mr. Truong Cang (Cambodia), Dr. Milan Bartos (Yugoslavia), and Justice Kuriyama (Japan).

5. The Situation in Hungary

The inscription of an item on the situation in Hungary in the agenda of the 14th GA has not yet been requested. However, in view of the action taken by the 13th GA,⁶ and the continued defiance on the part of the USSR and the present Hungarian authorities of all UN resolutions and efforts concerning Hungary, the situation in Hungary will certainly be discussed in some connection at the forthcoming session of the Assembly.

Prior to the convening of the 13th GA, Australia, in its capacity as chairman of the UN Special Committee on Hungary requested inscription of “The Situation in Hungary” on the agenda. In the Assembly, the United States joined with 36 other nations to introduce a resolution which deplored the continuing refusal of the USSR and the present Hungarian regime to cooperate with the UN Special Committee and the Special Representative on Hungary; denounced the execution of Imre Nagy, Pal Maleter, and other patriots; condemned the continued defiance of the resolutions of the General Assembly; and again called upon the USSR and the authorities in Hungary “to desist from repressive measures against the Hungarian people and to respect the liberty and political independence of Hungary and the Hungarian people’s enjoyment of fundamental human rights and freedoms.” The resolution further declared that the United Nations would continue to watch the situation in Hungary in view of the fact that the General Assembly’s resolutions are being disregarded. After thanking the UN Special Committee and the Special Representative, Prince Wan Waithayakon, for their efforts, the resolution appointed Sir Leslie Munro to report on significant developments relating to the implementation of the Assembly’s resolutions on Hungary. The 37-power resolution was adopted on December 12, 1958, by a vote of 54 to 10 with 15 abstentions.

As the result of a motion introduced by the United States, the Assembly again voted to take no decision on Hungarian credentials. FYI. As a minimum, the United States will again request that the General Assembly take “no decision” (neither accept nor reject) with regard to the credentials of the Hungarian representatives, which would continue to demonstrate that a serious question exists about the status of the present Hungarian regime. No decision has been taken regarding the possible submission of a separate Hungarian item on the agenda.

6. Enlargement of UN Councils

Three items concerning enlargement of the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council and the ICJ, respectively, appear on the agenda of the 14th GA by reason of action taken by the Assembly at its 13th session.⁷ These items were originally introduced at the 11th session by a varying number of Latin American members and Spain, and arose out of the new situation created by the enlarged membership of the UN. The first two involve amendment of the Charter and the third, amendment of the Statute of the Court. The first of these items—increasing the number of non-permanent members on the Security Council—was discussed inconclusively at the 11th GA. It was decided to postpone further consideration of all three items until the 12th GA after it became apparent that there was no consensus either on the number of seats that should be added to the Security Council or the geographic allocation of the additional seats and after the USSR had made its agreement to any increase conditional on the settlement of the Chinese representation issue in its favor. (The USSR has a veto over any necessary Charter amendments.)

The 12th GA decided unanimously and without discussion to postpone consideration of these items until its 13th session on the ground that political conditions were not favorable to any general agreement on this matter. At the 13th GA the enlargement of the Economic and Social Council was discussed, primarily in connection with the Assembly’s consideration of the Council’s report, which included a recommendation that the Council be increased in size. The United States was one of the co-sponsors of the Council’s recommendation and strongly supported it in the General Assembly. The Assembly adopted two resolutions—one postponing consideration of the three enlargement items until its 14th session since the necessary amendment of the Charter would require “a larger area of agreement than prevails at present”; and the other recognizing the desirability of enlarging the Economic and Social Council. The first resolution was adopted by a vote of 65 to 0, with 9 abstentions (Soviet bloc) and the second, by a vote of 52 to 9 (Soviet bloc), with 17 abstentions (Afghanistan, Burma, Cambodia, Ceylon, Ghana, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, United Arab Republic, Yemen, and Yugoslavia).

The Department continues to favor the enlargement of the two Councils, and has under current review whether in view of the Soviet position (described below under the discussion of Charter review), there is any constructive action, particularly with respect to enlargement of the Economic and Social Council, that can be taken at the forthcoming GA. In this connection, we would be much interested in any thoughts others may have.

7. Review of the UN Charter

The Committee of the Whole established by the 10th General Assembly to consider the “question of fixing the time and place” of a Charter review conference must under the terms of a 12th GA resolution report again to the 14th General Assembly.⁸ In recommending to the 12th GA that a decision on the time and place of a conference be deferred, the committee took the position that the “appropriate time” and “auspicious international circumstances” referred to in the 10th GA resolution “had not yet materialized.” The 12th GA adopted this recommendation by a vote of 67 to 0, with 9 abstentions (Soviet bloc). The GA Committee of the Whole is tentatively scheduled to meet to prepare its report to the 14th GA shortly before the 14th session convenes.

Led by the United States, the great majority of UN members at the 10th and 12th GA’s supported the holding of a review conference under circumstances conducive to maximum accomplishment at such a conference. At the same time no pressure for an early conference was evident, and we have had no indication that there is currently among UN members generally any increased desire for an early review conference. To us the “international circumstances” appear no more “auspicious” now than in 1955 and 1957 for the holding of a fruitful conference. However, we do not wish to take a position on this matter until we know the views of the UN membership generally. We are therefore most interested in learning the thinking of others on this matter.

FYI. The lack of pressure for an early conference may be attributed to 1) a general realization that any shortcomings of the Organization result more from the policies of individual member states than from defects in the Charter; 2) a general skepticism that any agreement could be reached in the existing international climate on amendment of the Charter; and 3) a general fear that a review conference in these circumstances would only serve to increase tensions—between the “have” and “have-nots,” between the “colonial” and “anti-colonial” powers, and with the USSR. The latter has consistently opposed any review conference, which it regards as aimed primarily at undermining the principle of great-power unanimity as embodied in the Charter.

No government, so far as we are aware, is advocating an early review conference, and the only interest observed recently in a conference has been that displayed by those that advocate drastic revision of the Charter toward “world government” in one form or another. The prospects for a successful conference have been decreased by USSR’s introduction of the Chinese representation issue. In connection with the 13th GA’s consideration of the three “enlargement” items on its agenda, the Soviet representative declared Chinese Communist participation “a prerequisite to examining the question of any amendment whatsoever to the United Nations Charter.” The Soviet representative also maintained that ratification by Communist China is necessary to bring an amendment of the Charter into force and stated that the USSR “and many other countries” would never accept a decision that ratification “by the other China” is sufficient. Earlier at the 11th GA the USSR had categorically stated that it would not ratify any amendments of the Charter to enlarge the principal Councils of the UN so long as the “legitimate rights” of a Communist China in the UN “had not been restored.”

We are not therefore currently disposed to favor a decision by the 14th GA on the date of a review conference. However, should there appear to be substantial support for holding a review conference in the near future, we would wish to reconsider our own estimate, as outlined above. End FYI.

8. Disarmament

13th GA consideration of the question of disarmament resulted in one of the longest debates in the history of the UN on this subject. The scheduled tripartite conference on the discontinuance of the nuclear weapons tests which was to begin in Geneva on October 31, 1958, as well as an impending conference of experts to study possible measures which might be helpful in preventing a surprise attack which was scheduled to begin in Geneva on November 10, 1958, resulted in the GA adopting three resolutions aimed primarily at expressing the GA’s hope that these talks would be successful.⁹ The US, along with fifteen other nations, sponsored a resolution which: (1) urged early agreement on the suspension of nuclear tests under effective international control; (2) urged the parties to the Geneva talks not to undertake further testing of nuclear weapons while these negotiations were in progress; (3) called attention to the urgency of reaching agreement on measures which might be helpful in preventing surprise attack; (4) urged that other initiatives be continued looking toward a balanced and effectively controlled world-wide system of disarmament; (5) reaffirmed the responsibility of the UN in the field of disarmament; and (6) invited the states concerned to invest any disarmament savings in economic development in the less-developed countries.

This resolution was passed by a vote of 49 to 9, with 23 abstentions, the Soviet bloc alone voting against it.

A resolution introduced by Japan, Austria and Sweden, expressing the hope that the Geneva talks on the discontinuance of nuclear weapons tests would be successful was also adopted by the General Assembly, by a vote of 55 to 9, with 12 abstentions. Here again only the Soviet bloc objected.

An Indian-Yugoslavian resolution urging success for the meeting of experts on surprise attack was adopted by a vote of 75 to 0, with 2 abstentions.

India and Yugoslavia introduced a fourth resolution designed to reactivate the UN disarmament machinery which had not been able to function due to Soviet insistence that it be granted so-called parity in the Disarmament Commission in 1959 to include all of the members of the UN on an ad hoc basis. Although it was recognized by many members that such an organization probably would not prove to be a useful forum for meaningful disarmament negotiations, the resolution was passed by a vote of 75 to 0, with 2 abstentions.¹⁰

During the debate some nations, particularly India and Yugoslavia, made strenuous efforts to evolve a compromise resolution which would produce big power agreement concerning the discontinuance of nuclear weapons tests. In every case, however, these efforts were frustrated by unreasonable Soviet demands, most of which were aimed at the formulation of a resolution which would serve as a Soviet propaganda platform but which would not in fact give any impetus for an agreement to discontinue nuclear weapons tests with effective controls.

The unequivocal US and UK announcement that we would not test nuclear weapons for one year after the beginning of the Geneva Nuclear Test Talks, on October 31, 1958, if the USSR also did not test during this period,¹¹ is believed to have had a salutory effect, particularly in negating the effectiveness of Soviet-inspired “ban the bomb” campaigns. Moreover, our expressed willingness to continue to refrain from nuclear weapons testing has contributed to a lessening of public preoccupation with the present dangers from radio-active fallout.

President Eisenhower, noting the protracted nature of the Geneva Nuclear Test Talks, recently suggested that the parties to the talks agree to a ban of nuclear weapons tests in the atmosphere as a first step which might give impetus to reaching agreement on a cessation of all nuclear weapons tests.¹² This proposal was useful in putting pressure on the Soviets to loosen their position on controls and demonstrated the strength of our determination to take any beginning step possible in arms control.

It is difficult to indicate even in broad outline the scope and nature of the US position on the question of disarmament during the forthcoming GA. Presently unforeseeable developments in the Geneva Nuclear Test Talks and disarmament discussions at the reconvened Foreign Ministers’ Meeting and possibly at a meeting at the Summit can be expected to affect our position. These developments should also effect the positions which may be taken by other members of the UN.

It is clear however that the question of disarmament has a high priority in the minds of many Member States. Already some of the smaller nations have begun initiatives. Ireland has indicated that it will reintroduce its resolution calling for the prevention of the dissemination of nuclear weapons. Both Mexico and Indonesia are candidates for the Chairmanship of the Disarmament Commission. We have informed them that we consider it premature to convene the DC while the nuclear talks continue in Geneva.

9. Outer Space

At the 13th GA, a US initiative led to the passage of a 20-power resolution establishing the Ad Hoc Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space.¹³ The Ad Hoc Committee was established to report to the next GA on (a) the activities and resources of the UN, its specialized agencies and other international organizations involved in the peaceful uses of outer space; (b) activities which the UN might usefully engage in to further the peaceful uses of outer space; (c) organizational arrangements which the UN might wish to establish to facilitate international cooperation in this area; and (d) the nature of legal problems which may arise as a consequence of the exploration and exploitation of outer space. The Soviet Union boycotted the Ad Hoc Committee due to its failure to gain acceptance of parity of representation.

It is expected that there may be extensive discussion of the peaceful uses of outer space at the next GA. New technical achievements in this area by the US and/or the USSR prior to or during the GA session may be such as to further stimulate public and government interest in working out some kind of UN machinery which will be useful in furthering the peaceful uses of outer space. The GA will have before it the report prepared by the Ad Hoc Committee. This report is scientific and technical in nature and it is understood that the Soviet Union has not found it objectionable. It is to be expected, however, that the Soviet Union will continue to attempt to use its obvious technological achievements in this field to further its political objectives of gaining parity on UN committees and specifically in any organization established by the UN to handle outer space matters. Although the final US position has not been established, it is hoped that it may be possible to work out this question in such a way that the UN will continue to play a constructive role in this field.

10. Algeria

A group of 25 African and Asian countries decided on July 4 to request that the 14th GA again consider the Algerian problem.

During the 13th GA, this question was debated at some length, but a resolution on the subject failed by one vote to obtain the two-thirds majority necessary for adoption.¹⁴ The resolution as put to the vote in plenary session, in its preamble recognized the right of the Algerian people to independence, expressed concern at the continuation of the war, considered that the situation in Algeria constituted a threat to international peace and security and, in its only operative paragraph, urged “negotiations between the two parties concerned with a view to reaching a solution in conformity with the Charter of the UN.” The French did not attend the Committee or plenary sessions when this item was being considered. The US abstained on this resolution and did not speak in the debate.

It is anticipated that the Algerian question may prove one of the most troublesome items for the United States at the coming GA. The French Government can be expected to continue to maintain that since Algeria is an integral part of France, it is a domestic problem and that the UN is therefore barred from considering it under Article 2(7) of the Charter.¹⁵ Moreover, the present government has indicated that it considers the stand of her allies on the Algerian question to be the acid test of friendship with France. The sponsors of the Algerian item, on the other hand, are anxious to demonstrate that a majority of the UN, particularly the US, do not support the French policy on Algeria.

Developments between now and the time the GA again considers the problem will necessarily affect our views on the best manner of handling the Algerian item.

11. South Africa

A. “The Question of Race Conflict in South Africa resulting from the policies of Apartheid of the Government of the Union of South Africa.” This item has been included on the agenda of every regular GA session since 1952, and on July 15, a group of 12 African, Asian and Latin American countries decided to request its inclusion on the agenda of the 14th GA. In the 13th GA, the United States joined 69 other nations in voting for a resolution which (1) reaffirmed that in a multi-racial society harmony and respect for freedoms were best assured when patterns of legislation and practice were directed toward insuring equality before the law of all persons; (2) noted that policies designed to perpetuate or increase discrimination were inconsistent with pledges of Member States under Article 56 of the Charter; (3) called upon all members to bring their policies into conformity with their human rights obligations under the Charter; and (4) expressed regret and concern that the Government of the Union had not yet responded to the 12th Assembly’s appeal that it reconsider policies which impaired the rights of all racial groups to enjoy the same fundamental freedoms.¹⁶ The US voted in favor of the foregoing resolution and will be guided by the principles contained therein with respect to any resolution submitted at the coming Assembly.

FYI. The Union asserts that the matter is entirely a domestic one, and because of this declined to participate in the United Nations from the 11th GA in 1956 until July 1958. At that time the Union announced its return to full participation in the work of the UN, but opposed the inclusion of the apartheid and the treatment of Indians (see below) items on the agenda of the 13th session and remained away from the Special Political Committee when these controversial issues were under discussion.

The US favors the expeditious disposition of the apartheid item in the least contentious manner possible. We would hope for a moderate resolution similar to the one passed by the 13th GA. Our view is that the discussion of such matters or general recommendations on carrying out Charter obligations if the field of human rights do not infringe the limits set by the Charter on intervention in matters essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of a state. End FYI.

B. Treatment of Indians in the Union of South Africa. This item has been considered by the GA every year with one exception since 1946. In its 12th session the GA appealed to the Union to negotiate with India and Pakistan on the treatment of people of Indian origin in the Union in accordance with the principles of the Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.¹⁷ In the 13th GA, 62 nations including the US passed a resolution which (1) noted the readiness of India and Pakistan to negotiate; (2) expressed regret that the Union had not responded to communications giving evidence of this readiness; (3) again appealed to the Union to enter into negotiations without prejudice to its juridical position on the issue; (4) invited Member States to use their good offices to bring about negotiations; and (5) invited the parties to report on any progress made.¹⁸

This item has again been included, and we would hope for a debate with the minimum exchange of acrimony. While we do not intend to take any initiative on this issue, if there is widespread support for a resolution similar to that of last year, we would support it.

12. The United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF)

It is anticipated that the Secretary General will recommend that the United Nations Emergency Force be maintained at its present strength and that the members of the Organization give urgent attention to providing adequate financial support to the Force. UNEF was established in 1956 to secure and supervise the cessation of hostilities in the Middle East and to assist in the scrupulous maintenance of the Armistice Agreement between Egypt and Israel. It presently consists of about 5,000 men from India, Canada, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Brazil and Yugoslavia. It is stationed along the border between Egypt and Israel and near the entrance to the Gulf of Aqaba.

The US continues to support strongly the maintenance of UNEF as a means of contributing to peace and stability in its area of operations. With the exception of the Soviet bloc, there is general agreement among the members of the United Nations as to the importance of continuing UNEF.

On the other hand, the cost of maintaining UNEF presents considerable financial difficulties for some members. The General Assembly authorized the expenditure of $30 million for UNEF in 1957, $25 million in 1958 and $19 million in 1959, as compared to a regular UN budget of about $55 million annually. Despite steadily decreasing costs, some members have not met all their UNEF assessments, while the Soviet bloc has refused to pay its share of UNEF’s costs, claiming that the Force is illegally constituted and that “the aggressors” should pay for it.

The US has made voluntary contributions totaling $13 million to UNEF during its first two years. In 1959 the US expects to contribute $3.5 million voluntarily in addition to its assessment of $4,943,146.

Efforts are now underway by the Secretary General and a number of interested members of the UN to obtain additional financial support for UNEF. The US hopes that these efforts will be successful and that UNEF will continue to be a bulwark for peace in the Middle East. The US hopes further that free-world members of the Organization will support the maintenance of an effective UNEF, thereby frustrating what in effect is a Soviet attempt to exercise a veto on the decisions of the General Assembly.

13. Standby Arrangements for a United Nations Peace Force

At the 13th GA the Secretary General submitted a summary study of the experience derived from the establishment and operation of the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF), (Doc. A/3943), as a basis for consideration by member Governments, not permanent members of the Security Council, of possibly participating in the establishment of standby arrangements under which personnel of their armed forces could be made available upon a specific decision of the United Nations General Assembly or Security Council for service with a United Nations Force for pacific settlement. Included in the Secretary General’s study was a series of principles, which were designed to protect the interests of the Organization and the potential contributing and host governments under which such a Force could be established.

On the basis of these principles, the Secretary General is now consulting with the twenty-three member Governments who contributed military personnel to UNEF and the United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon (UNOGIL) as to what action they are taking or would be willing to take to assist in the establishment of such standby arrangements. These members are Afghanistan, Argentina, Brazil, Burma, Canada, Ceylon, Chile, Colombia, Denmark, Ecuador, Finland, India, Ireland, Indonesia, Italy, Nepal, the Netherlands, Norway, Peru, Portugal, Sweden, Thailand, and Yugoslavia. It is likely that the Secretary General will report to the 14th GA on the results of his consultations.

Since the United States has consistently supported practicable proposals for making the United Nations a more effective organ for pacific settlement, the Secretary General’s efforts are being followed with great interest.

14. United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA)

A. Proposals by the Secretary General and a Report of the Director. On June 15, 1959, the Secretary General released a document, “Proposals for the Continuation of United Nations Assistance to Palestine Refugees,” (A/4121) for consideration by the 14th GA. (For over 10 years UNRWA has been caring for the basic needs of the almost one million Arab refugees, most of whom are in Jordan, the Gaza Strip, and Lebanon, who left Palestine during the hostilities attendant to the creation of the State of Israel.) In this report, the SYG recommended the indefinite continuation of UNRWA, the mandate of which is due to expire on June 30, 1960, and development projects to assist in “the reintegration of the Palestine refugees into the surrounding economic life of the area.” He also called for the transfer to the Arab host governments of the administrative responsibility for educating the refugees. The Acting Director of UNRWA will also present a report to the 14th GA covering the Agency’s accomplishments during the last year.

The position of the United States on the future of UNRWA is now being formulated in the light of the SYG’s recommendations, about which we are not enthusiastic. We consider that the proposal to transfer educational responsibilities to the host governments is a step in the right direction, though we prefer to have additional administrative responsibilities of UNRWA transferred to the Arab states. At the same time, we believe that Israel should be encouraged to acknowledge responsibility for the repatriation of those refugees who wish to return to their former homes, and for just compensation to those who left behind identifiable property. The final position adopted by the US, and public expression thereof, must be geared to the tactical situation at the time of GA consideration. In the meantime, posts may on appropriate occasions take the general line outlined above, stressing that the United States is actively reviewing the Palestine refugee problem as a whole.

The Department would be particularly interested in reports on pertinent reactions of Governments and of interested foreign groups to the SYG’s proposals, as well as any indications of possible initiatives towards a solution of the problem outside the framework of these proposals.

B. Voluntary Pledging of Contributions. The financial resources available to UNRWA have enabled the Agency to provide essential relief services to the Palestine refugees. However, lack of funds has unfortunately necessitated a marked reduction in UNRWA’s modest but effective rehabilitation program, which included the making of individual grants to enable some of the refugees to become self-supporting. As UNRWA’s mandate is now due to expire next June, the Department’s precise tactics vis-à-vis the Palestine refugee item are still being formulated. This matter may be the subject of a subsequent instruction to the field. We shall still seek broader and more extensive support for the Palestine refugee program during the pledging meeting of the ad hoc Committee of the Whole Assembly. Whatever the fate of UNRWA, we shall continue to stress the necessity for continued international aid to Palestine refugees until the problem is permanently settled.

15. Good Offices Committee on South West Africa

GA Resolution 1243 (XIII) of October 30, 1958,¹⁹ invites the Good Offices Committee on South West Africa to renew discussions with the Union of South Africa to find a basis for an agreement which would continue to accord the mandated Territory of South West Africa an international status and to submit a further report to the General Assembly at its Fourteenth Session. At the 12th GA, the Assembly adopted Resolution 1142,²⁰ drawing the attention of “member states to the failure of the Union of South Africa to render annual reports to the United Nations, and to the legal action provided for in Article 7 of the Mandate read with Article 37 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice.”²¹ This resolution was a clear warning to the Union that legal action might be forthcoming if the attempt at conciliation represented by the creation of a Good Offices Committee failed.

16. Cameroons Under United Kingdom Administration

The GA, at its resumed session in February–March 1959 recommended that the United Kingdom, under UN supervision, organize separate plebiscites in the northern and southern parts of the Cameroons under British administration, in order to ascertain the wishes of the inhabitants regarding their future.²² The plebiscite in the north will be held in mid-November 1959 and is expected to confirm the desire of the overwhelmingly Moslem population to remain an integral part of the northern region of Nigeria. In the south, the outcome is in considerable doubt, in as much as there is widespread sentiment in favor of some form of association with French Cameroun, which will become independent on January 1, 1960. The southern plebiscite will be held during the next dry session between the beginning of December 1959 and the end of April 1960. The alternatives to be put to the voters, which are now under discussion between the Governor General and the local political leaders, and the manner in which voting registers will be drawn up, may become major issues at the 14th session.

In view of the controversial nature of the British Togoland plebiscite—where a majority of the voters elected to join Ghana despite the opposition of the important Ewe minority—we believe considerable care should be devoted both to the phrasing of the questions to be put to the voters and to the organization of the plebiscite.

17. Cameroun Under French Administration

The General Assembly, at the resumed session this year, also endorsed the recommendations of the 1958 Visiting Mission to French Cameroun (United States, Haiti, India, and New Zealand).²³ The Assembly voted 56–0–23 in favor of the French and Cameroun plan to grant independence to Cameroun on January 1, 1960, without the holding of national elections prior to that date. We agree with this decision and continue to believe that the present Cameroun Government and Legislative Assembly (elected on the basis of universal suffrage in December 1956) are fully representative, having demanded and received from France the commitment to grant independence next January.

In recent weeks we have been approached by Ghana, Guinea, and Liberia to reconsider our opposition to new general elections in Cameroun prior to independence. As explained to Ghana’s External Affairs Minister, Ako Adjei, and to the Liberian Ambassador in Washington, we are opposed to reconsideration by the forthcoming GA of a problem which was fully discussed at the resumed session last February and March. We believe that Guinea, for reasons which have more to do with that country’s African policies than with the merits of the case, is probably the only non-Communist country genuinely interested in reviving debate on this subject. Guinea is expected to press for support at the current meeting in Monrovia of nine independent African states in its efforts to have the Cameroun issue inscribed on the 14th UNGA Agenda as a separate item. However, even in the unlikely event the GA decided to reverse itself, there would be insufficient time to prepare and carry out UN-supervised elections prior to independence.

For the reasons outlined above, and particularly in the light of the definitive decision taken on this question by the resumed session of the 13th UNGA on March 11, 1959, we intend to oppose inscription. Posts should discourage inscription and explain the arguments against it when discussing this matter with local officials.

18. The Future of the Trusteeship Council

A difficult legal and practical problem is posed by the situation, unforeseen in the Charter, that will occur in the Trusteeship Council during 1960, when France and Italy will cease to be administering authorities upon the scheduled attainment of independence by French Cameroun (January 1), French Togo (April 27) and Italian Somaliland (December 2). In order to maintain the Council’s prestige as long as possible, as well as the Charter requirement of true “balance” between administering and non-administering members, certain administering authorities, especially the United Kingdom, have recently been active in trying to develop general sentiment to “freeze” the Council at its present membership of 14 until December 31, 1961, when the three-year terms of three of its five elected non-administering members expire. To achieve this France and Italy would remain on the administering side until that date, at which time Italy would leave the Council and France would move over to the non-administering side to take a Charter-alloted seat as one of the permanent members of the Security Council that are not administering any trust territory. If the “freeze” proves impractical, we would then seek to assure our primary objective of never having an “unbalanced” Council. We would in this case favor the idea that the General Assembly at its annual sessions adopt a procedure that will assure the maintenance of a balanced Council by elections adjusted to bring about this result.

19. The Korean Question

At the 13th General Assembly a resolution was approved setting forth again the determination of the United Nations to bring about by peaceful means the establishment of a unified, independent and democratic Korea under a representative form of government, and the full restoration of international peace and security in the area.²⁴ The resolution reflected the fundamental principles for unification set forth by the nations participating on behalf of the United Nations in the Korean Political Conference held in Geneva in 1954 and subsequently reaffirmed by the General Assembly. The resolution of the 13th General Assembly was adopted by a vote of 54 (US)-9 (Soviet bloc)-17. The Korean question will be discussed at the 14th General Assembly in connection with the report of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea and it is anticipated that a resolution likewise reflecting the UN objectives and the fundamental principles as announced in 1954 will again be proposed.

Herter

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 320/8–759. Confidential. Drafted by Eisendrath; cleared with Monsma, Westfall, Spiers, Ludlow, Bacon, Green, Kerley, Nunley, Driscoll, and OES; and approved by Cargo. Sent to 74 missions and repeated to 25 diplomatic and consular posts.
2. Brackets in the source text. For text, see U.N. doc. A3805.
3. Regarding this vote, see Document 34.
4. These telegrams are in Department of State, Central Files, 320/8–2459 through 320/9–859.
5. Responses from all posts are ibid., 310.2 and 320.
6. See Document 57.
7. For texts of U.N. General Assembly Resolutions 1299 (XIII) and 1300 (XIII), adopted December 10, 1958, see U.N. doc. A/4090.
8. For text of U.N. General Assembly Resolution 136 (XII), adopted October 14, 1957, see U.N. doc. A/3805.
9. For texts of U.N. General Assembly Resolutions 1252 (XIII) A, B, and C, adopted November 4, 1958, see U.N. doc. A4090.
10. Reference is to U.N. General Assembly Resolution 1252 (XIII) D; ibid.
11. For text of the U.S. statement, issued August 22, 1958, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1958, pp. 530–531. For text of the British statement released the same day, see U.N. doc. A/3896/Rev. 1.
12. For text of Eisenhower’s April 13 letter to Khrushchev, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1959, pp. 331–332.
13. For text of U.N. General Assembly Resolution 1348 (XIII), adopted December 13, 1958, see U.N. doc. A/4090.
14. Regarding the December 13, 1958, debate and vote on Algeria, see U.N. doc. A/PV.792. For text of the draft resolution, see U.N. doc. A/4075.
15. Article 2(7) of the U.N. Charter enjoins the United Nations from intervening in matters which are “essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state.”
16. For text of U.N. General Assembly Resolution 1248 (XIII), adopted October 30, 1958, see U.N. doc. A/4090. Article 56 of the U.N. Charter reads: “All members pledge themselves to take joint and separate action in cooperation with the Organization for the achievement of the purposes set forth in Article 55.” Article 55 addresses economic and social problems and universal respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms for all.
17. For text of U.N. General Assembly Resolution 1179 (XII), adopted November 26, 1957, see U.N. doc. A/3805.
18. For text of U.N. General Assembly Resolution 1302 (XIII), adopted December 10, 1958, see U.N. doc. A/4090.
19. ibid.
20. For text, see U.N. doc. A3805.
21. For text of the Mandate for South West Africa, see U.N. doc. A70. For text of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, see A Decade of American Foreign Policy: Basic Documents, 1941–1949 (revised edition), pp. 110–118.
22. For text of U.N. General Assembly Resolution 1350 (XIII), adopted March 13, 1959, see U.N. doc. A4090/Add.1.
23. Reference is to U.N. General Assembly Resolution 1349 (XIII), adopted March 13, 1959, ibid.

24. For text of U.N. General Assembly Resolution 1264 (XIII), adopted November 14, 1958, see U.N. doc. A4090.

    An enclosed checklist was not found with the source text, but is printed in U.N. doc. SD/A477.