Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, United Nations and General International Matters, Volume II

34. Telegram From the Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, September 24, 1958—7 p.m.

Delga 37. Reference: Chinese Representation.

1. The debate on Chinese representation this year was the most difficult one which has been held in my service at the UN.²

2. We received numerous indications this year of distaste for the moratorium from among the LAs, several of whom expressed their reluctance to go along with us any further, one of whom said immediately after the vote that his country considered our policy a “disgrace” and constituted extremely abusive treatement of LAs. He said our position was “humiliating” to the LAs and served only to give the impression they were US satellites. This morning he said a new approach to the ChiRep question must be found which will make it possible for LAs to continue to support US. A member of the Chinese Delegation said he had asked among others Cuba and Peru to speak in support, but they both declined. A member of the Argentine Delegation reported congratulated the Swedish Representative after her statement in plenary while another member of that same delegation told us a majority the LA Delegations were personally opposed to the US position. Another LA Delegation told us it “out of the question to use the moratorium again”. He pointed out if one LA deserts moratorium, another ten or fifteen will also desert it. The Chinese Delegation has already questioned Belaunde’s candidacy for GA Presidency in the light of Peru’s abstention on moratorium.

3. Similarly we had reports of dissension within Pakistan Delegation and, although Japan supported us, they refused outright to speak in favor of our resolution in plenary. Department aware New Zealand’s problem.

4. We understand Canadian Cabinet had lengthy touch-and-go session in deciding what to do on moratorium, and decision support this year based solely on ChiCom use force. Emphasis in Smith’s speech³ and as described beforehand to USDel made clear this was last year they could be counted on to back US.

5. Also understand Belgium too has decided this is last year they can go along, and for same reasons as motivated Canada.

6. Unfavorable changes in the voting as compared to last year were as follows: Austria, Greece, Iceland and Libya changed from support to abstention on our resolution as a whole while Iraq changed from support to opposition, and Cambodia from abstention to opposition. Additionally, Malaya and Peru abstained on our second paragraph while Ethiopia, Mexico and New Zealand abstained on our first paragraph. On the first paragraph of the Indian amendment Austria, Iceland, Liberia, New Zealand changed from last year’s opposition to abstentions; Libya from abstention to support and Iraq from opposition to support. Although opposing the Indian first paragraph, Malaya and Peru abstained on the Indian second paragraph. A full analysis of the vote will be pouched Department.⁴

7. Our support came almost entirely from loyalty to the US as free world leader. There was no discernible evidence that it was based on the view that our policy is right. Many members feel that we have pursued a course of action with respect to China which inevitably leads to situations like that in the offshore islands. When it becomes in their minds a question of choice between following US policy out of loyalty and avoiding the possibility of a major war, many of them will decide that, in this particular case, avoiding such major war is paramount to follow US. It is at this point that their support for the US begins to fail. We have seen this attitude developing on this question this year.

8. There is widespread support at the UN for the proposition that we cannot and should not allow Formosa and the Pescadores to fall into unfriendly hands; that there must be no appeasement of Communist imperialism; and that we must draw the line somewhere and say: “This far and no further.”

9. But the fact the US appears to be so deeply committed in a place which seems so clearly disadvantageous as Quemoy, deeply perplexes representatives of governments here and leads them to wonder whether we have not somehow fumbled and whether we have not been dragged into following policies which are not in our own best interests. This largely accounts for our unprecedently low vote and the total lack of enthusiastic support in speeches.

10. If it were possible to spell out our case in a logical, common sense way so that governments friendly to us can put our case effectively to their own public opinion, explaining the favorable factors which outweigh the military drawbacks in connection with Quemoy, our position would be different. On no other issue are we unable to back up our position with arguments that answer all questions in the minds of our friends. Yet no issue affects us more vitally. Even on disarmament we finally thought out language which enabled us to persuade others. But on the China question, which means so much to us, we fight with one arm tied behind our back and with the other in a sling.

11. In saying this I do not necessarily advocate substantive argument in public, which, of course, cannot be used under the moratorium procedure although we may come to this. But we must have a more persuasive basis for private conversations and private responses to questions which are so helpful in a government’s determination of its position, conversely, inability to answer questions injures US.

12. As nearly as we can judge, public opinion in countries generally friendly to us is not moving towards our stand on the question of Chinese representation or China generally, but it might do so if we were able to eliminate from the problem of ChiRep situations like that in the offshore islands which appear at the UN to threaten to bring about a general war. How to isolate ChiRep from the offshore island is admittedly a complicated task. But surely one essential is to be able to give a common sense, clear reason for our stand in Quemoy which would eliminate the current atmosphere of mystery which is really pernicious. If these friendly countries were not preoccupied with the possibility of war resulting from Quemoy, it would very much increase our chances to continue to keep the Chinese Communists out in the future. It is our failure to hold out a solution to this and related problems after so many years which leads people to feel that there must be a change even though it is a change unacceptable to us. We can count on wide support in the UN even on an issue which could involve war if our friends are convinced that the issues justify it. As they see the present issues, they are not convinced.

13. Under present policy we must deal with all these questions on a procedural basis and avoid discussing what is in most people’s minds. This tactic in the present circumstances is the best we can do. I cannot believe it will be enough in the long run.

14. If we want surely to succeed in the future in keeping the Chinese Communists out, we must have a better position.

15. It seems from here that some brand new factor should be brought into the whole subject.

16. But an unchanging adherence to the tactics used at the last three general assemblies may well not be enough in the future. If the offshore islands question comes to the UN in circumstances appearing to threaten war, the Chinese representation question may again be raised at this very same GA in a matter of weeks and we may then not be able to hold our position. Without the LAs we obviously cannot even be sure of a blocking third.

17. It appears clear today that we should maintain the moratorium as long as we can, but everything else related to the ChiRep question, both as to short range tactics and as to what can be said to delegates, should be restudied.

18. The whole purpose behind the above observations is to make it possible for us to continue to keep the ChiComs out the UN. As things are now going, this in very serious danger.⁵

Lodge

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 320/9–2458. Secret; Priority.
2. The General Assembly discussed Chinese representation in the United Nations, September 22–23. On September 23, it adopted Resolution 1239 (XIII), which rejected India’s request to place the question of Chinese U.N. representation on the General Assembly agenda and stated that the 13th General Assembly would not consider any proposal to exclude representatives of the Republic of China or to seat representatives of the People’s Republic of China. For the record of the debate and vote on this issue, see U.N. docs. APV.753–755; for text of Resolution 1239 (XIII), see U.N. doc. A4090.
3. For text, see U.N. doc. APV.753.
4. Not found. An October 17 memorandum from Wilcox to Dulles, however, analyzed the vote on the moratorium resolution in the 11th, 12th, and 13th sessions of the U.N. General Assembly. (Department of State, Central Files, 320/9–2458)
5. Gadel 30, October 2, acknowledged that the debate on Chinese representation in the United Nations had been difficult, but noted that the final vote was better than expected. The Department, however, agreed with Lodge that tactics on this issue needed revision, suggested some changes, and solicited further input from Lodge. (ibid., 320/9–2458)