Office of the Historian

62. Telegram From the Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State1

New York, February 10, 1959—7 p.m.

646. Re: Hungary (Deptel 6999 to London2). Herewith my comment on Dulles letter to Lloyd February 2, 1959 contained in Deptel 6999 to London.

1.
Steps (1) through (4) inclusive may be a logical approach to doing something about credentials in GA, because they seek to create an urgency and immediacy to Hungarian problem which it does not now have in minds most delegations.
2.
Rejecting credentials in GA is at best, however, questionable from a legal as well as political standpoint. No one seriously questions that Hungarian credentials are technically and legally in order, and this is only ground on which, under present practice, UN considers question of credentials. Credentials of Republic of China are approved each year on this basis and to upset this practice could have serious effect on ChiRep issue. A political action on credentials would undoubtedly also raise fears among LAs as to their own credentials in the future. For these reasons and as result of my assessment of continuing opinions among UN delegations, I continue to doubt feasibility of taking action to reject Hungarian credentials.
3.
If, however, it is still felt that this is action we should take in Assembly, I question whether we should move for expulsion in SC. It is entirely possible that moving in SC for expulsion, with inevitable Soviet veto, would increase our difficulties in getting support from other delegations for further action in GA. It seems to me highly doubtful that Munro’s activities, however active he may be, can or will produce enough of a new situation to justify in the minds of most delegations going into SC at this late date. I fear that most delegations, including some of those on SC, will regard this as an unnecessary straight cold war action because it cannot result in expulsion but only in a veto and, if we pursue it against their opposition, they will be even more opposed to further action at a later date in GA.
4.
As noted in reference letter our relations with Communist bloc would have to be examined before proceeding in SC. In this vein an aggressive US posture on Hungary in UN in coming months might jeopardize voting support for US position on Berlin if, as appears possible, this question were brought to UN.
5.
An alternative to SC action and rejection of credentials in GA might be resolutions which, in light failure Hungary to heed GA resolution or cooperate with UN Reps, recommends to member governments that they not elect Hungary to any UN or specialized agency bodies, and that they oppose any allocation of UN funds for expenditure in Hungary. Such action would raise problem of Article 5 of Charter,3 which deals with suspension of “rights and privileges”. But formula of recommendation to Member States or some other method might get around this problem.
Lodge
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 310.2/2–1059. Secret; Limit Distribution.↩
  2. Supra.↩
  3. See footnote 5, Document 16.↩