432. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, June 16, 19601
SUBJECT
- Law of the Sea: Prospects for a Multilateral Convention
PARTICIPANTS
- The Acting Secretary (Mr. Dillon)
- Admiral Arleigh Burke
- Mr. Arthur H. Dean
- Mr. Eric Hager (L)
- Mr. R. Gordon Arneson (U/LS)
Admiral Buke said that the chances of getting a sufficient number of signatories to a multilateral convention (embodying the provisions of the final Canadian-US proposal at Geneva) were so slight that he was against initiating the project. The Acting Secretary commented that the important question was what constituted success and what constituted failure. In his view, if a sufficient number of signatories could be obtained it would be worthwhile to proceed from the security point of view even though the fisheries provisions would cause some unhappiness. Admiral Burke’s estimate was that a multilateral would attain 30 to 40 signatories at most and there was danger that the Soviet Union and others would drum up sentiment in favor of a 12-mile territorial sea convention. Moreover, there would be difficulties with Indonesia and the Philippines, which would want special consideration for their archipelagoes. As a result, the chances of holding to the 3-mile limit would be diminished.
The Acting Secretary said that an estimate of 45 might well be on the optimistic side and that the Soviet Union, Mexico, and others might be able to garner as many as 30 votes for a 12-mile regime. The many newly emerging countries, especially in Africa, might well opt for 12 miles, so that in the end the proponents for the 12-mile sea might be greater than those favoring a six-plus-six formula.
Admiral Burke was also worried that a program to establish a multilateral treaty would have the effect of establishing the validity of such an instrument, upon which, of course, the 12-milers could also capitalize. To this point, Mr. Dean said there was no magic about a convention signed at Geneva as opposed to a multilateral treaty of the sort envisaged provided it got a majority vote. He pointed out that Oppenheim, whose works he had just consulted, maintains that a [Page 819] multilateral treaty signed by a majority of the countries would have the same force as a convention signed at Geneva. The theory behind requiring a two-thirds majority under United Nations rules was that there was inevitable shrinkage between signature and ratification and that experience had shown that a majority of ratifications was likely if only as many as two-thirds of the countries signed the convention.
Mr. Dean reported that the Australians, the Canadians, and the South Africans all seemed to have strong desires to move along with the multilateral. Mr. Bailey (Australia) was particularly concerned that Mexico and the Soviet Union might well introduce the ten-power proposal of Geneva in the General Assembly this fall. Mr. Dean said that according to the UN Secretariat there would be sixteen new nations eligible for membership in the United Nations by the end of 1961. Bailey had also pointed out that the Chicago Convention on Civil Aviation which was signed in 1944 started out with only 20 ratifications; it now has more than 70. Mr. Hager said the Chicago Convention had no rival convention in the field to contend with. As to the new nations coming along, Mr. Bailey believed that if they had a six-plus-six standard to which they could repair they would be less likely to go to a 12-mile regime. Mr. Dean thought it would be useful if the US would sound out the sentiment of some of its closest friends in this matter, such as Professor Gros of France and Riphagen of the Netherlands. He believed that we could probably get some 40-plus countries to sign. He agreed with Admiral Burke that anything less than 40 plus, i.e., 30 to 35, would not be enough. Admiral Burke expressed concern that if on taking soundings there was not enough support, where would this leave us: would we be in a stronger or a weaker position? He believed that the latter would be the case.
The Acting Secretary thought that France was probably a key country and that it would be useful to take soundings with France to find out its attitude concerning the prospects of getting widespread support and also to get from it some idea of other criteria to be applied in determining whether the project was worthwhile. He said that his own guess was that France would probably not be interested. Admiral Burke also thought that France would say no. On the other hand, if France did express interest, what happened then? Would one then wish to sound out Belgium?
Mr. Dean said he understood from Hare that the UK was actively negotiating with Belgium and Iceland concerning fishing problems. If these negotiations turned out favorably, he thought that there was some hope that Belgium and Iceland might go along on a six-plus-six multilateral. He thought that countries in Latin America would be favorably disposed, with the exception of Mexico, Venezuela and Panama. In his considered view, the 3-mile rule probably cannot be maintained for more than another two or three years. In this regard, the ILC [Page 820] statement about territorial seas from 3 to 12 miles was not, in fact, very helpful. He believed that our position on the 3-mile limit was subject to disintegration in a very short time. Admiral Burke agreed that the disintegration process was inevitable. The real question, therefore, was which way do we lose least, i.e., by holding firm to the 3-mile rule as long as possible or by seeking to establish the six-plus-six regime by multilateral convention. Mr. Dean thought that the multilateral convention might well attract the support of a number of new nations. On the other hand, he realized that one could not recapture the enthusiasm which had been capitalized on at the Conference. He reported that Mr. Drew, of Canada, estimated that as many as 48 countries might be interested but he had not seen the details on this estimate. The Acting Secretary asked why Canada, the UK and Australia felt so strongly on this issue and at the time were unwilling to take soundings with France. Admiral Burke said that he was clear in his own mind that the UK interest was on the fisheries aspect. He understood that the British Admiralty was opposed to present UK support for a six-plus-six convention.
Admiral Burke said that as far as the US Navy was concerned, it would of course go along with the multilateral proposal if it were possible to make it stick. The Navy agreed that it would become increasingly difficult over the years if we do nothing. On the other hand, in the present situation, Navy could keep forcing the issue of the 3-mile limit, recognizing no other breadth, and do its best to hold the line.
The Acting Secretary said that if the multilateral convention showed a fair chance of success he would be willing to undertake the project and be prepared to deal with the opposition that would be engendered from fisheries interests. On the other hand, if the prospects of success were poor there would be no point in stirring up a “ruckus”. He favored a discreet and confidential sounding out of the French, making it clear that US interest was heavily dependent on the number of countries that might be induced to support such a convention. He would leave the decision as to whether to proceed further dependent on the reaction we get and the amount of likely support. He would favor a program of sounding out certain key and representative countries. On the specific question of soundings with France, Mr. Hager asked with whom we should be in touch. Was Professor Gros good enough? Mr. Dean thought that soundings should be taken with Professor Gros in the first instance, with further soundings up the line if they seemed indicated.
The Acting Secretary suggested that two alternatives might be put to Canada and the UK. One would be that the UK and Canada approach the French indicating that US interest was dependent on a sufficiently large amount of support from other countries. Under this [Page 821] course of action, the US itself would want to double-check the Canadian report of French reaction. The other alternative was for the US to approach the French, in keeping with the Eisenhower–De Gaulle understanding2 to be in touch on matters of common concern. It might be best to approach Couve de Murville first on a completely frank basis, mentioning the Canadian and UK interest in the project and our concern that the present 3-mile position will erode unless something is done. We should say that we would be interested in going forward only if a majority of the countries represented at Geneva proved interested, that the project obviously had certain disadvantages from the point of view of fisheries interests, but that in any case the US would like to know what the view of France was. The consensus of the meeting was that a direct approach by the US to France would be preferable.
The Acting Secretary said there seemed to be no difference as to objective among those represented at the meeting, i.e., that the multilateral convention would be desirable if it got sufficient support.
Admiral Burke said the issue of soundings would be easily resolved if we got a definite indication of no interest from France. In that case, the matter should be dropped. On the other hand, if France indicated support, it would be necessary to sound out other countries and he feared that each additional step would amount to more and more commitment on the part of the US to go ahead. In response to an earlier question from Admiral Burke, Mr. Dean agreed that the sounding-out process might leave us worse off than if we had taken no step in the event it showed that we could get the support of no more than 30 to 35 countries. He was, however, still of the opinion that we can do better with something than with nothing.
The Acting Secretary urged that a limited program of soundings be undertaken with certain key countries. The important question, of course, was how to lay out the steps in the most effective way. Mr. Dean thought that the sounding-out process might well take the following countries, in order: France, West Germany, Belgium, Holland, Spain; then certain key Latin American countries and certain countries in the Far East, Southeast Asia and Africa. As regards Latin America, he believed that if some crack could be made in the united CEP front (Chile is particularly anxious to break away from the 1952 Declaration), he thought the chance of carrying Latin American support would be greatly enhanced. He mentioned that the Latin American countries were very much pleased with the provisions of the final Canadian-US proposal at Geneva which provided machinery for adjudication of [Page 822] preferential rights beyond 12 miles. He thought this aspect of the proposal would go a long way to bring the Latin American countries along.
The meeting concluded on the following suggestions of the Acting Secretary: 1) that the Navy review the situation once again (in Admiral Burke’s absence Admiral Lee would come up with the Navy point of view), 2) that we hold off sounding out the French until we had a better idea of what we would do next, and 3) that Navy should, in addition to making its current assessment of the number of countries likely to be interested, suggest the sequence in which countries would be sounded out. Pending the results of the Navy resurvey, no further action should be taken at this time.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 399.731/6–1660. Secret. Drafted by Arneson on June 20 and approved in U on July 2. A memorandum for the record of this meeting, which is the same in substance but arranged differently, is in Naval History Center, Burke Papers, Originator’s File.↩
- Documentation on the Eisenhower–De Gaulle understanding is scheduled for publication in volume VII.↩