431. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, June 6, 19601
SUBJECT
- Law of the Sea: Multilateral Convention
PARTICIPANTS
- Douglas Dillon, Under Secretary of State
- Ambassador Heeney, Canadian Embassy
- Jim S. Nutt, First Secretary, Canadian Embassy
- R. Gordon Arneson, U/LS
Ambassador Heeney said he was under instruction to express Canadian disappointment at the negative response of the United States to the Canadian suggestion that the United States join Canada and the UK in taking soundings with other countries as to their interest in signing a multilateral convention embodying the provisions of the Canadian-US proposal at Geneva.2 His Government believed that unless the United States expressed a willingness in principle to sign such a convention (given the requisite widespread support of other countries) and unless it were willing to participate in the canvass, the project was doomed to failure. Canada felt that initial soundings with Western European countries would, in effect, result in a veto on the whole project.
Mr. Dillon said that the United States had vigorously pressed for Conference adoption of the Canadian-US proposal at Geneva primarily for security reasons and had been willing to accept fishery provisions less than ideal from the United States point of view in order to achieve agreement on a 6-mile territorial sea. In examining the post-Geneva situation, there appeared to be considerable doubt whether a multilateral convention as suggested would, in fact, advance United States and free-world security interests. The Navy, which was executive agent for the Department of Defense on this matter, believed that United States security interests would not be advanced by such a convention. Unless there was some change in this security assessment of the problem, the United States would not favor the multilateral approach.
Ambassador Heeney expressed some skepticism as to whether the current security assessment was accurate. He thought that if as many as 45 representative countries would adhere to such a convention the project would have positive security value for the free world. Mr. Dillon replied that the question of numbers was the key question and that in the absence of soundings it would be difficult to say just how many countries would be willing to sign up. He understood that the Navy believed that no more than 32 would be interested and that among these would be countries representing parts of the world where naval mobility was not a problem, whereas the non-signers would represent more critical parts of the world from this point of view, e.g., Indonesia, the Philippines, the Middle East. The Navy was also concerned that a move to open up a multilateral convention for signature might well lead to counteraction by the 12-milers so that the end result would be two competing norms, neither one of which having greater weight than the other.
[Page 817]Ambassador Heeney noted that the United States seemed to have lost its “evangelistic zeal” on this matter. In response, Mr. Dillon said that our “evangelism” at Geneva had been based on security considerations. If the security reasons disappeared, “evangelism” disappeared too.
In a general discussion of the problem of counteraction on the part of 12-milers, Ambassador Heeney expressed doubt whether the Soviet Union would want to bind itself to any particular agreement in this field. Mr. Arneson suggested that the Soviet Union might prefer, in order to leave itself uncommitted and free to act in any way it chose, to persuade other countries to move unilaterally to 12 miles with resulting disadvantage to the free world.
As to the primary objective motivating the various countries in this matter, Mr. Dillon reaffirmed that the security interest was paramount as far as the United States was concerned, and inquired what the Canadian interest was. After some hesitancy, Ambassador Heeney said that he thought Canada’s prime interest was in the codification of international law in this field. In response to a question from Mr. Dillon, Mr. Arneson expressed the opinion that the British interest seemed to be centered primarily on a desire to solve fishing problems.
Ambassador Heeney, in citing possible support for the convention, said he understood that Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay would be interested. Mr. Arneson said that according to information available to the Department from the Embassy in Buenos Aires, the Argentine proposal was, in fact, quite different from the Canadian-US proposal at Geneva. It could be more aptly characterized as the original Canadian proposal plus; not only would it provide no phase-out period in the outer six but it would also give preferential fishing rights to coastal states beyond 12 miles in the first instance. He went on that the Argentine case indicates a danger to be reckoned with; various states might be willing to sign a multilateral convention, subject, however, to certain changes being made either in favor of coastal states or in favor of fishing states, with the result that we would be faced with a problem of endless renegotiation. Ambassador Heeney stressed that it would be essential, if a joint canvass were to be undertaken, that it be understood that the Canadian-US proposal was being offered without modification. Similarly, it would also be essential that the United States, UK and Canada agree in advance on the minimum number of signatories required, as well as their representative character, before any one of them would be committed to sign.
Mr. Dillon said that he was seeking at an early occasion to reexamine the security aspects of the problem with Admiral Burke and that as soon as he had had occasion to do this he would be in a position to talk further with the Canadian Ambassador.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 399.731/6–660. Secret. Drafted and initialed by Arneson on June 7, and approved in U on June 10.↩
- On May 18, Cadieux and Nutt had approached the Department of State about pursuing a multilateral convention along the lines of the U.S.-Canadian proposal. (Memorandum of conversation, May 18; ibid., 399.731/5–1860)↩