379. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, August 26, 19591
SUBJECT
- U.S. Position During Anticipated Discussions With Canada Regarding 1960 Law of the Sea Conference
PARTICIPANTS
- The Acting Secretary
- Mr. Arthur H. Dean
- Defense—Capt. L.R. Hardy, USN
- Defense—Capt. W.A. Hearn, USN
- Defense—LCdr. H. Hoag, USN
- Interior—Arnie J. Suomela
- Interior—William M. Terry
- L—Col. Raymond
- L/SFP—Mr. Yingling
- U/FW—Mr. Herrington
- H—Mr. White
- U/LS—Mr. Richards
- U/LS—Mr. Wright
The Acting Secretary stated, as he understood it, we faced something of a dilemma in our preparations for the 1960 Law of the Sea Conference: while it was desirable tactically our first position at the [Page 728] Conference not be our last, on the other hand, having a complex or difficult formula to sell, it was desirable we do this as much in advance as possible.
Mr. Richards agreed with this statement. Specifically, the issue before the group, he said, was whether, since in our estimate the present US-UK proposal to win needs affirmative votes from virtually all of the 14 countries un committed to one or another position, we therefore should “offer more fish” to improve the likelihood of conference agreement. And if so whether we should do so now or later. (On a subsidiary issue, whether agreement at the Conference was desirable, that such agreement is desirable for defense purposes was accepted by the group as not disputed, but as regards fishing interests, the industry, Mr. Herrington said, felt agreement was desirable only if the contents of the agreement were favorable.)
Mr. Dean stated an important factor to be considered was the duration of the Conference. At the last Conference, which lasted 10 weeks, he found that having to work with our embassies to get the facts put across to Foreign Offices had proved extremely difficult. The reasons for our shifts of position were not well understood and caused confusion. If our approach is to “trade” at the Conference it will take time to do this; he understood the second Conference was expected to last however only three or four weeks. If the considered opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was still that 12 miles would harm our security, Mr. Dean said he felt we would have the best chance of preventing this if we could get together before the Conference with the Canadians and the UK. Capt. Hearn assured Mr. Dean the views of the Joint Chiefs were unchanged and that, further, Defense was seriously worried that unless we came up with an attractive proposal to put forward at the Conference the Mexican 3-to-12-mile proposal would win.
The Acting Secretary asked whether we would lose, rather than gain, votes for our proposal if we went too far with fishery concessions. At this point Mr. Herrington distributed a paper listing considerations against abandoning the US-UK position at this time.2 Among the considerations was that those in favor of abandonment were proceeding on the assumption the Western European fishing states would follow along; he questioned this assumption. In concluding several other points as well, he stated while it was true this Conference would be shorter than the last, its issues would be fewer. Much educational work besides had already been done, he said. Col. Raymond stated he had observed the last Conference closely from Washington and he had been impressed with how complicated it was to get votes shifted and delegation instructions changed. He doubted if there would be time for [Page 729] delegations to seek and receive revised instructions at the next Conference. Therefore issues and positions should be clear in advance of the Conference.
The Acting Secretary remarked it appeared to be a question of judgment how the votes of the Western European states would go at the Conference. There was, in any case, he felt, not too much difference in basic position in the group. Even the fishing industry spokesmen who had called on him yesterday,3 he said, indicated they appreciated the defense arguments and would not be uncooperative— though the paper they left was “tighter”, he had noticed. Mr. Dean remarked the fishing industry people had been helpful in the past and he was confident they would continue to be. The Acting Secretary noted, continuing, U/FW and Interior were willing to explore possibilities with Canada and make soundings in Western Europe. In reading over the “recommendations”, L, U/LS and Defense appeared to be asking for immediate agreement with the Canadians, which we would then take to other countries. The Acting Secretary felt that an ad referendum basis would be sounder. Mr. Yingling said L’s position was not meant to exclude an ad referendum basis, which in fact he approved. The issue, however, was whether we would have anything to say to the Canadians when we went. Purely exploratory talks would be useless if we were not prepared to be forthcoming. If we were not, we could hardly expect the Canadians to be.
Mr. Terry said he wished to disassociate himself from Mr. Richards’ remarks made at the beginning. In his view the US-UK proposal, as it presently stood, had a reasonable chance of winning. As long as it did, it would not be defensible for him to agree to further fishery concessions, which, further, he said, would be politically unwise. He argued that five of the 28 countries regarded as opposed or probably opposed to the US-UK formula might be persuaded not to oppose (identified as Norway, Ecuador, Morocco, Tunisia, and Jordan) which would change the picture considerably. So far as congressional pressure went, Mr. Dean interjected, it was to be found on both sides. Several congressmen had remarked to him, after the last Conference, fish should not be allowed to obstruct security. Capt. Hardy stated if the validity of 28 countries in the “against” column was to be challenged the validity of 44 in the “for” column could be challenged as well. Many of the countries listed as now supporting the US-UK formula were simply not going to do so, he said.
The Acting Secretary concluded he was in favor of “talks” with the Canadians but did not like the U/LS, L, and Defense recommendations. He said he felt we would want to be able to say to the Canadians “this has to be sold to the Western Europeans”. Capt. [Page 730] Hearn suggested we would not want to lose sight of a need for the proposal being supported by the Afro-Asians and Latinos. The Acting Secretary agreed we would also, of course, want to keep this in mind. But in his view it was desirable at this time to go up and explore, to make only tentative concessions to be checked with the Western Europeans—that we should enter into no agreement with the Canadians until we found out how Western Europe would act.
Mr. Suomela said he had spoken to Secretary Seaton only a few minutes earlier and had been authorized to say that the Secretary concurred in the view that we should not enter into concessions, for the moment, beyond our present position. Secretary Seaton had invited Mr. Dillon to discuss this matter with him if he wished. The Acting Secretary said he felt it would not be necessary at this time since a “consensus” had been reached at the meeting.
To clarify the decision, Capt. Hearn asked if it was understood that we would not “just talk” but that the discussions with Canada would be seriously directed at achieving an early common position. “Between the US, UK and Canada”, the Acting Secretary added, agreeing. Upon mention of “phasing out” by Mr. Dean in connection with the attitude of the Portuguese, the Acting Secretary stated he could not see that this was any good, that it was in effect the same as the Canadian proposal. Capt. Hearn said he wished it to be recorded, though he would not press the point at the moment, that the Defense view was that nothing less than phasing-out had any hope of adoption at the Conference. As the meeting was ending, Mr. Yingling asked if the decision was to be taken as meaning that “anything pertinent” could be discussed with the Canadians. The Acting Secretary agreed.