Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, United Nations and General International Matters, Volume II

355. Telegram From the Delegation to the Conference on the Law of the Sea to the Department of State¹

Geneva, April 1, 1958—9 p.m.

1031. Law of Sea from Dean. Arranged with head UK delegation to meet with Drew, head Canadian delegation and ourselves 3:00 o’clock.²

Head UK delegation opened by stating he had specific instructions from his government to file British proposal before 1800 tonight and to explain it at the beginning of the debate on Articles 3 and 66 but he believed Indian delegation would support UK proposal 6-mile territorial limit with right of innocent passage and to overfly outer three with no further request for contiguous fishing zone. We showed him Indian proposal under yesterday’s date giving coastal states exclusive 12-mile jurisdiction over fisheries, which he had not known about when he saw Sen, head Indian delegation yesterday.

Drew presented reasons for Canadian proposal clearly and forcibly and why tabling of British proposal would undermine support for Canadian proposal. At conclusion head UK delegation said nothing could change his instructions and that he would have to proceed. Drew urged him to telephone his government. Head UK delegation obviously disconcerted by Indian proposal for 12-mile exclusive fishery jurisdiction and with our consent telephoned Sen. Sen joined meeting and stated his government had not made any decision support Canadian proposal [or?] to support British proposal and that he had cabled his government with respect British proposal yesterday but that if British proposal as outlined above were to be adopted by conference they would not continue support joint Indian-Mexican flexible proposal for territorial sea of 3 to 12 miles (see our telegram 1019³) and would withdraw Indian proposal for 12 miles exclusive fisheries. Sen stated he understood British proposal with right innocent passage and right overfly outer three was satisfactory to Americans and they might support as possible compromise.

We made abundantly clear all present British proposal could not be satisfactory to US delegation under any circumstances and that if Canadian proposal were defeated, under our instructions we would have to vote against British proposal and attempt defeat it. Head UK delegation and Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice seemed considerably taken aback and head UK delegation pressed us at some length whether we would risk conference failure assuming Canadian proposal not passed rather than support British proposal. Stated clearly and unequivocally we could not accept any proposal under any circumstances which changes 3-mile territorial limit. Head UK delegation then asked if conference failed whether we were prepared run risk of unilateral action after conference by substantial number of countries on basis Soviet proposal of straight 12-mile limit territorial sea with no right of innocent passage and no right to overfly and whether we were prepared to bear such consequences of failure conference.

We replied their failure to support Canadian proposal might be greater contribution cause to failure conference, if that should occur, but wanted no question in anyone’s mind our position and stated again we would not consent any modification 3-mile territorial limits under any circumstances and that if conference failed at least change in limits territorial sea would not be brought about by any voluntary action on our part. Stated any extension territorial sea beyond 3-miles was not consistent with obligations we had assumed.

Sen also appeared surprised and quite disturbed at this statement.

Drew again made very forceful plea to UK delegation their failure to support Canadian proposal would bring about failure of conference and announcement their proposal and explanation would cause wide split. Head UK delegation said considered unfair our asking them not to table proposal.

We stated we wanted to make our opinion as to result of tabling their proposal explicitly clear, but also wanted to make clear we were not asking them not to table their proposal as we did not want them to be able to say results of conference might have been different if we had not made such request.

Drew expressed considerable resentment on behalf of his government against British failure to support their proposal and of tabling British proposal.

Believe British had clearly banked on our supporting their proposal and iterated their suggestions we would be responsible if conference failed by our not agreeing and believe considerably dismayed our firm attitude in stating no change in any event in our position on 3-mile limit.

Committee I debating Articles 15, 17 and 18 at night session and debate on Articles 1–3 and Article 66 cannot, therefore, commence before tomorrow at earliest and see little possibility debate on these articles being concluded this week.

Had earlier informed head UK delegation, Chairman Committee I confirmed to me deadline for filing amendments Articles 1–3 and 66, 1800 Tuesday April 1 provisional only and he would accept amendments these Articles prior to commencement of taking of vote thereon.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 399.731/4–158. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to London, Ottawa, and Reykjavik.
2. On the night of March 31, the head of the British Delegation, who had just returned from London, called on Dean and said that he would have to present the British proposal by April 1. Dean stressed the serious effect this would have on the Canadian compromise and that the U.S. Delegation could not support a 6-mile sea. Early in the morning of April 1 Dean talked with Drew who asked him to arrange a U.S.-U.K.-Canadian meeting as soon as possible. (Telegram 1023 from Geneva, April 1 (3 p.m.); ibid.)
3. Dated March 31. (Ibid., 399.731/3–3158)