Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, United Nations and General International Matters, Volume II

354. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom¹

Washington, March 30, 1958—5:42 p.m.

6943. Law of Sea. Re Geneva’s 996 to Department, 100 to London and Deptel 995 to Geneva, Deptel 6873 to London.² Department concurs Delegation assessment and therefore hopes UK can be induced defer switch to six miles. Accordingly deliver following Aide-Mémoire FonOff soonest:

“The United States Government regrets the United Kingdom Government’s decision to put forward early next week the United Kingdom compromise, involving a six-mile territorial sea, with rights of passage for warships without prior authorization and for aircraft between three miles and six miles.

At the time the United Kingdom Delegation informed the United States Delegation of the former’s intention to make this compromise proposal, the United States Delegation was informed that the United Kingdom compromise would be advanced when failure of the Canadian compromise proposal seemed clear, but that in the meantime, the United Kingdom Delegation although opposing the Canadian compromise would give it a fair trial before advancing a six-mile territorial sea. It is the view of the United States Government that the Canadian proposal is still gaining favor. The United States Government trusts that the United Kingdom Government will at least delay advancing the United Kingdom proposal until the effect of a specific draft of the Canadian proposal, which it is expected will be put forward this weekend, has been fully absorbed.

The United States Delegation is seeking western Europe support for the Canadian proposal, or at least non-opposition, and met with the Canadian and western European Delegations on Friday³ for this purpose.

It is the further view of the United States Government that if the United Kingdom Delegation puts forward the United Kingdom proposal at or about this time, there is a likelihood that a ‘compromise’ proposal covering both a six-mile territorial sea and six or nine-mile contiguous zone for fishing will result. This, of course, would combine the disadvantages of both the Canadian and the United Kingdom proposals. In this connection, it should be noted that the Indian Delegation, which originally favored a six-mile territorial sea, but is presently attempting to obtain authority to support the Canadian proposal, would be most likely to seize upon the argument that compromise on a six-mile territorial sea plus a contiguous fishing zone of six or nine miles is the only means of averting a failure of the Conference.

While a number of Asian and Latin American nations, who are reluctantly responding favorably to a three-mile territorial sea as part of the Canadian proposal, may welcome the United Kingdom compromise, they, also, would very likely insist upon an additional six or nine-mile contiguous fishing zone.

Accordingly, in the light of the circumstances now existing at the Conference, the United States is of the view that if the United Kingdom proposal is put forward at this time, its primary effect will be to increase the likelihood of adoption by the Conference of a ‘compromise’ proposal more disadvantageous than either the Canadian or the contemplated United Kingdom compromise. The United States, while it is fully aware of the reasons why the United Kingdom Government believes that it cannot support the Canadian compromise, nevertheless, urges the United Kingdom Government to defer advancing its compromise at this time.”

Copy of above will also be furnished British Embassy here earliest opportunity Monday morning.⁴

Dulles

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 399.731/3–2858. Secret; Niact. Drafted by Pender and Becker; cleared with BNA and SOA/NEA; and approved by Pender who initialed for Dulles. Repeated to Geneva.
2. Telegram 996 from Geneva, March 28, reported Dean’s regret at the British decision to advance their proposal and suggested that they be asked to delay it. (Ibid.) Telegram 995 to Geneva, March 27, reported the British decision to advance their 6-mile proposal and inability to support the Canadian compromise. (Ibid., 399.731/3–2758)
3. See telegram 1005, supra.
4. On March 31, the Embassy in London reported that it had delivered the aide-mémoire and that the British had agreed to leave the timing of their introduction to be worked out by the U.S. and U.K. Delegations at Geneva. (Telegram 5740 from London; Department of State, Central Files, 399.731/3–3158)