287. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Murphy)1
SUBJECT
- Status of Informal Discussions on Antarctica
Representatives of three FE countries (Australia, Japan and New Zealand) are participating in the current informal discussions on Antarctica. Of these, Australia and New Zealand have asserted formal claims, while Japan worked actively in the IGY Antarctic program. Australia and Japan differ with important aspects of the draft working paper now under discussion.2 Certain parts of that paper also cause me concern for reasons both of policy and precedent.
It has been my understanding that one of the major U.S. objectives in seeking the proposed treaty was to obtain a freezing of the legal status quo of Antarctic claims (Article IV of the draft working paper). The Soviet representative has, however, held that this Article should be eliminated from the draft. I believe that we should consider [Page 562] whether, if this proves to be the definitive Soviet position, we are prepared to conclude the treaty without attaining this objective. The Australian representative has expressed doubt on this point.
A second main U.S. objective is to prevent the use of the Antarctic for military purposes. In this connection the Articles on inspection (Articles VI and VII) present several problems:
- 1)
- Principles relating to inspection (Article VI) are stated in broad terms which are susceptible of more than one interpretation.
- 2)
- The administrative measures to ensure the accomplishment of these principles (Article VII), including such matters as logistic support, are to be agreed upon only after the treaty has come into force and are subject to vetoes by all parties including the USSR (Article VIII).
- 3)
- The parties agree to accord equal treatment to non-parties so long as the latter act in accordance with the principles of the treaty, but the non-parties assume no commitments (Article VIII).
- 4)
- There is no provision for dealing with treaty violations beyond consultation or a reference to the International Court of Justice. The Australian, Japanese and New Zealand representatives agree that as many of the details of the inspection system as possible should be worked out in advance of the conference. I concur strongly in the light of my experience in witnessing Communist techniques of evasion under the Korean Armistice of 1953 and the Geneva Accords of 1954.
Article VIII would also obligate the parties to extend equal treatment in the treaty’s benefits to the unrecognized Communist regimes, so long as they respect the treaty principles. This proposal would be contrary to the U.S. policy of avoiding steps likely to increase the status of these regimes. It would weaken our position in opposition to these regimes in the UN and other international bodies. It would create an impression of a softening of our policy toward the regimes. It would also act as an inducement for these regimes which have heretofore shown no interest in the Antarctic to become active there. These effects would be felt even if no treaty were eventually concluded.
Japan has proposed handling the whole question of non-signatories through an accession clause open only to members of the UN or the Specialized Agencies (subject to approval by two-thirds of the signatory states). This formula would exclude the unrecognized Communist regimes. The UK has proposed a protocol likewise based on the formula of members of the UN or of the Specialized Agencies. I believe that we should take advantage of these initiatives by our friends to solve this problem in accordance with customary U.S. policy.
There is no apparent evidence that the USSR is prepared to enter into any treaty on the Antarctic which would effectively meet our objectives. In this situation it would seem to be all the more important that we avoid proposals which might be interpreted as a change in U.S. policy on essential matters, or which might be cited against us as precedents in other negotiations or in UN bodies.
[Page 563]So far as the date of the proposed conference is concerned, we need before the conference, first, a fully agreed Departmental position and second, an understanding on essential points with our friends. These two steps cannot be quickly taken. I believe, however, that it is more important to enter the conference at a later date in a strong position than to have an early conference without a united front with our friends on essential matters.
Detailed comments on certain problems are attached (Tab A2).
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 399.829/4–2259. Secret. Drafted by Bacon on April 22 and initialed by Robertson. Copies were sent to Daniels, S/AE, EUR, IO, NEA, ARA, and SPA.↩
- Reference is presumably to the draft articles submitted at the 26th (November 11, 1958) informal meeting; see footnote 2, Document 284.↩
- Not printed.↩