280. Preliminary Notes on the Operations Coordinating Board Meeting, Washington, January 14, 19591

[Here follows discussion of items 1–3: Mikoyan’s visit, Geneva nuclear weapons talks, and Africa.]

4. Report on Antarctica

Present NSC policy on Antarctica, dated March 8, 1958,2 calls for implementation of the “current program reducing Antarctic activities in the post-IGY period to a minimum to support U.S. interests and to provide for a continuing U.S. presence in Antarctica.” The Working Group recommended a review of policy in view of developments since its adoption. The draft Report3 noted the evolution of political, psychological and scientific factors which project U.S. interests in the area beyond the IGY period and the need to re-examine the adequacy of U.S. organizational arrangements regarding (1) planning, (2) budgeting and (3) the need for a focal point for information on Antarctica.

The principal developments in the area relate to an extensive expansion of USSR activities beyond those in its plans published at the time of the U.S. policy paper. The increase in USSR polar stations will make its network the largest. Penetration is planned into the Unclaimed Sector where U.S. exploration has given it pre-eminence should it wish to claim. Ambitious USSR plans for traversing and mapping and the possible use of scientific submarines and atomic icebreakers by the USSR were presented in the Report as of a nature to leave the U.S. effort inadequate “to support U.S. interests” if we do not challenge and expand.

Governor Herter opened the discussion by stating the U.S. criteria to be our “real scientific interest” and, along with other overtones, the prestige of the U.S. Dr. Alan Waterman, Director, National Science Foundation, was invited to identify U.S. scientific interests. He [Page 516] stressed the importance of area meteorological data and study of the ionosphere; gravity, glacial and ice thickness research; and upper air and high altitude studies. The principal lacunas in the planned U.S. effort are those in the following fields:

1.
Oceanography—in contrast with the USSR the Navy has no specific vessels to do a systematic job.
2.
Traverses—although we have done many, none has been in the Unclaimed Sector.
3.
Observations by rocketry—the USSR has shot 22 on a systematic basis.
4.
Tracking system for a satellite polar orbit—U.S. orbits have been equatorial until now, while the scientific return from a polar orbit would be greater.

Much of the value of projects in groups 3. and 4. concerns itself with the radiation layer of electrified particles in the inter-polar area which taper off and cease to exist near the poles. Thus, polar launching would be less dangerous for man in space.

Mr. Wexler, Director, Office of Meteorological Research at Commerce, said he had made several trips to the area and thought the Soviet scientific work “superb”. He said that although their logistics base is less extensive than that of the U.S., their vessels are specially equipped for scientific work while much of our research is carried out on vessels designed for other purposes. As an example of Soviet thoroughness, he said the USSR had built ships for oceanography which carried men and supplies to the site, then executed the scientific work and stopped on the return voyage to pick up bulk grains and the like for commercial sale before reaching the home port. They have been generous in giving out their meteorological findings but few have been furnished in oceanography which, of course, take longer to develop. In his view, USSR readiness to map aerially one-third of Antarctica, do extensive traverses and assist other nations evidences its desire to take the leading role in the area. Mr. Wexler referred to dry valleys in the area no colder than 31 degrees F. where important agricultural and pollination studies could be carried out.

Asked by Mr. Herter, a representative of Interior said his agency’s scientific interest included mapping of Antarctica but that, with a large part of the U.S. still not adequately mapped, Interior’s problem is more one of appropriations rather than of science. He suggested Congress would allot no money to his agency for Antarctic mapping unless it could be presented as supportive of the balanced national policy and supported by other interested agencies. International cooperative Antarctic map-making will be discussed at the next meeting of SCAR in March.

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Captain Kefauver, Chairman of the Working Group, emphasized that the group has been a semi-administrative agency and the closest approach to a place in Government where planning, budgeting and operations can be discussed and agreed on although without directive authority. He underlined the Navy’s problem as the logistics agency in being able to plan only after common agreement had been reached by the interested agencies on the scope of Antarctic projects which might be approved for funding. He noted that the USSR has a Polar Agency responsible for both Poles. Naval resources are being called on oftener for DEW line operations, thus impinging on Antarctic capabilities. Governor Herter noted that the lack of a central point of responsibility for Antarctic affairs created an unfair burden on Defense.

Mr. Herter reviewed some of the evidence of past national and Congressional interest in some type of polar commission but underlined the difficulty of finding a “logical” place in Government for a single operative agency, particularly since U.S. interests were many-sided, included that of prestige. To over-simplify the present procedure, he said, the National Science Foundation adapts its plans to what the Navy can furnish logistically, while the latter can plan only when it knows the scope of the scientific plans.

Under Secretary Herter suggested that the science chapters of the Report were the “key” ones and thought the Report should not go to the NSC before an evaluation had been furnished to the Board by Dr. Killian’s office. He also suggested that the Budget Bureau should advise on the establishment of a place of responsibility for Antarctic affairs within Government. Such agency, commission, group, etc., would be charged, among others, with a unified presentation of the Budget to Congress. Vice Chairman Harr thought the “only thing new” in the Report is the Soviet Union’s expanded effort and he doubted that this was enough for a policy review. Mr. Dulles (CIA) countered with his view that the expansion was a “most important” element, although he was not prepared to say that at this time it was planned for other-than-scientific reasons. Mr. Herter recalled that in his briefing for the meeting, he thought it appropriate to cite “Seward’s Folly” as a bench mark in U.S. thinking on near-pole geography. He said he realized that the citation and his view on the potential importance of Antarctica might let the area come to be known as “Herter’s Folly”.

Governor Herter proposed that the Report be looked at by the OCB after consideration by Dr. Killian’s office and the Budget Bureau. The Board agreed with his suggestion.

  1. Source: Department of State, OCB Files: Lot 62 D 430. Secret. No drafting information appears on the source text.
  2. Document 269.
  3. Not found. Presumably this is a preliminary draft of Document 282.