Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, United Nations and General International Matters, Volume II

213. Telegram From the Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, October 5, 1960.

893. Subject: Five-Power Res.

This morning we met with UK Reps to discuss question of how to deal with Five-Power res calling for mtg between Pres and Khrushchev and with Australian amendment submitted yesterday. It was agreed that best possible outcome would be if neither Five-Power res nor Australian amendments were pressed to vote and no res adopted. We agreed that UK would approach Nehru to seek his agreement to this. We and UK reps also agreed that it was necessary to develop amendment to Five-Power res which would broaden res to include UK and France and include idea of progress necessary before mtg. We worked out following revision of operative para of Five-Power res:

“Expresses the hope that every effort will be made, both within and outside the UN, to bring about the improved circumstances which would make possible an early renewal of fruitful negotiations at the highest level so that the declared willingness of the great powers to find solutions of the outstanding problems by negotiation may be progressively implemented.”

Above language was subsequently approved by Secretary and Prime Minister Macmillan.

African-Asian group met this afternoon and heard statements from Nehru, Sukarno, Nasser, and Nkrumah. Hoshi (Japan) informed US that Nehru made statement in which he emphasized that it was even more important now to press forward on Five-Power initiative. In these circumstances, Hoshi said, intention is to press Five-Power res to vote. Lord Home also met with Nehru and was told India thought res should be put to vote.

In view of clear intention of Nehru to press Five-Power res, we met with reps of Norway, Greece, and Argentina with view to encouraging them to submit an amendment to Five-Power res containing language given above. After lengthy conversations following revision of above language agreed to ad referendum:

Expresses the hope that every effort will be made, both within and outside the UN, to bring about the improved circumstances which would make possible early and fruitful negotiations at the highest level among the reps of the major powers to find solutions of outstanding problems.

We found great reluctance among group to sponsor foregoing amendment, although they concur in what it seeks to do. Clearly, small powers reluctant to oppose initiative of 5 chiefs of state. Amadeo (Argentina) said that he would wish to check language with Slim (Tunisia) and that he would be reluctant to put forward amendment unless he is assured that at least moderates in African-Asian group would be willing to support revision. Slim said later he did not believe he could cosponsor amendment. Norway felt that above language takes into account changed situation existing today following responses of Pres and Khrushchev but was non-committal as to willingness to cosponsor, pending reactions from others. Greeks agreed to bring above revision to attention of Averoff but expressed serious doubts that he would wish to cosponsor in light of pressures on Greece from Yugoslavia on one hand and UAR on other. We also made above language available to Hoshi (Japan) requesting that they cosponsor along with above group. Hoshi later informed US that Matsudaira had wired our suggested revision to Tokyo requesting instructions. He told US he doubtful whether Japan would wish to be sponsor.

In view of foregoing, we seriously doubt that above group would be willing to sponsor suggested revision. In such circumstances, we believe we should pursue following course of action:

(A) US submit above amendment on its own and to campaign on its behalf;

(B) If such amendment should fail, to oppose Five-Power res and press others to do same in order secure its rejection. We likely need more time to assure sufficient support to reject Five-Power res and may have seek further delay in vote tomorrow morning.

Above course of action approved by Secretary.

Wadsworth

1. Source: Eisenhower Library, Staff Secretary Records, International Series. Confidential; Priority. Received at 1:02 a.m. The source text bears the handwritten notation by Goodpaster: “President has seen G”.