Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, United Nations and General International Matters, Volume II

202. Memorandum of a Conference With the President, White House, Washington, October 2, 1960, 9:30 a.m.¹

Washington, October 2, 1960, 9:30 a.m.

OTHERS PRESENT

• Prime Ministers Menzies and Macmillan; Ambassador Beale, Lord Home, Mr. de Zulueta, Secretary Herter, General Goodpaster

The President, after greeting Prime Minister Menzies, said he could not understand why the rest of the world had not reacted with shock and resentment to the resolution by the five neutral nations calling upon Khrushchev and himself to meet.² He was especially surprised at Nehru joining in this, since Nehru certainly understands the Communist tactics. However, Nehru had said that his mind was confused regarding the situation that has developed.³ The President said he does not have much use for the others (Nkrumah, Nasser, Tito, and Sukarno).

Mr. Menzies said that it is an old trick of Nehru’s to sit silent, not giving his views on matters up for discussion, in order to embarrass the other man. He recalled that Sukarno had objected to a summit meeting of four people, noting that he was now joining in proposing a summit meeting of two people.

The President said that he has been working hard on a reply to the five neutral leaders. The key point is that the problems are not problems of the United States and the USSR alone, but affect the whole of humankind. Mr. Menzies noted that in Cabinet meetings, when he has a problem it seems impossible to solve, a good technique is to refer it to a committee. He thinks the action of the neutral leaders is of this character—they don’t know how to deal with the problem themselves so they want to turn it over to a committee of two. He observed that in Paris, the four nations were ready to meet, and thought that the West should go back to that conference.⁴

The President, in discussing Khrushchev’s actions said that perhaps his purpose is to break up the United Nations. At this point Mr. Macmillan, Lord Home and Mr. de Zulueta joined the meeting.

The President told the group that he had been considering how to reply to the neutral leaders. He thought that Khrushchev’s public statements attacking the proposal gave the West somewhat more latitude in drawing up its position.⁵ He thought he would urge again that the Assembly get down to serious business. He was troubled because he did not see how he could rescue the Neutrals from the foolish position they got themselves into. Mr. Macmillan agreed that this is the first problem to be dealt with. A second is how to counter Khrushchev’s attack on the UN Secretary-General. The President said he thinks Khrushchev came here to break up the United Nations, or to change it to suit his purposes. Mr. Herter said that the UN people are very disturbed over Nkrumah’s suggestion for three Deputy Secretaries-General who would have power of veto over the Secretary-General.⁶Lord Home said that the Secretariat is simply an international civil servant, and Mr. Macmillan observed that all members of the Secretariat should simply serve the Secretary-General. Mr. Herter commented that there are more than three Assistant Secretaries-General at the present time.

Mr. Macmillan then asked what procedure the group thought should be followed both as to the President’s reply to the Neutrals and as to action to be taken on the resolution now before the UN. The President thought that the Neutrals might withdraw their resolution in view of Khrushchev’s “blast” against them. Mr. Menzies asked as to the terms of the Neutrals’ letter to the President, and the President read the text of the letter to him. The President said he had been considering putting out a public statement on the matter, with a very brief reply to the Neutrals. The public statement would explain the reasons behind the reply. Mr. Macmillan thought that the response should recall that Khrushchev had broken up the discussion in Paris. He had a copy of a statement that might be used for this purpose, calling for a resumption of four-power discussions. The President said he is bothered by one feature of the four-power proposal—that the four powers met simply because of their participation in the war. They cannot speak for other nations of the world. It is therefore necessary to distinguish between the totality of questions concerning us and those that just affect the four powers. Lord Home said that another basis is that the four powers possess the bulk of the armaments of the world. Mr. Menzies observed that the four powers meet as a volunteer body, but the Neutralists’ proposal is to make a two-man UN committee. The President recalled that Khrushchev had had the Russians walk out on the ten-power disarmament talks. He also noted that news reports state that he is in a difficult position—that he doesn’t want to say yes to Khrushchev and can’t say no. He said that the fact is that he can very easily say no. He read the part of the draft of the reply which he had prepared.

Mr. Macmillan returned to the two questions of the statement and the method of handling the resolutions. He thought that there was need for a substitute resolution, and recommended that it be based on resumption of the Paris meeting. Lord Home suggested that this be qualified by adding “at an appropriate time.” Mr. Macmillan observed that each suggestion had referred to the statement regarding a four-power meeting. Mr. Herter said he does not have any enthusiasm for another summit meeting, but favors our making clear who broke up the last one. Mr. Macmillan asked that we should, at the least, not close the door on the future. Lord Home suggested that the phrase “after due preparation” be included in any statement regarding a summit meeting.

Prime Minister Menzies said that the resolution is a very dangerous one. It is drafted in a very cunning way, putting the President and Khrushchev on the same basis. It amounts to very clever propaganda, saying that the only conflict in the world is between the United States and the Soviet Union. Mr. Herter said that some other countries are suggesting changes in the Neutral leaders’ resolution. Lord Home thought the best way to kill the resolution would be to put something out later the same day. The President said he thought that Khrushchev had inspired the whole operation. He added he did not think the United States should be in the position of putting in the substitute resolution. Mr. Herter thought it was probably better not to stress too strongly the resumption of the four-power meeting. He thought that matters which trouble us should be considered in the General Assembly of the United Nations. The President said that a legitimate action for the UN would be to say that it was hoped the four powers would meet to consider problems of special interest to them.

Mr. Herter asked Mr. Macmillan what attitude Khrushchev had taken in his talks with him.⁷ Mr. Macmillan said that, on disarmament, he could see no progress whatever. Mr. Macmillan is unable to judge whether Khrushchev wants disarmament or simply wants to keep an issue over disarmament alive. Regarding Germany, Khrushchev wants to have all the nations that were at war with Germany meet early in the year. He says they will make peace together, or he will act alone. Khrushchev favored a renewed meeting of the four, providing there is no “provocation” regarding Berlin in the meantime.

Regarding the United Nations, Khrushchev said there are now in the world one billion Communists, one billion Neutralists, and 700 million capitalists, and he thought the UN should be converted into a three-bloc organization.

Mr. Menzies said that to him this is a rather quaint idea and he plans to say so publicly. The charter of the UN was designed for the preservation of peace by negotiation or, should this fail, by world force. Each member as an individual member has a role to play in this regard.

The President said that in his view there are two places where contacts with the Russians could go forward, either in the United Nations or in a meeting of the four powers. Mr. Herter commented that the President could not of course make a binding agreement for his successor. The President agreed that it would be necessary to leave the door open.

Mr. Macmillan thought that action should be in two parts, first a denunciation of the implication that the West has been opposing the resolution of problems, and second, agreement for a meeting on the basis that it would be a meeting of the four. The President said he had a great deal of doubt as to what any meeting could accomplish, since Khrushchev may simply be trying to see how far he can push us. Lord Home said he saw value in a reply by the President. This may itself stop the Neutrals in their proposal. However, he thought that Menzies should have a substitute resolution ready. Mr. Menzies agreed, commenting that the resolution should indicate the discussions would be limited to matters of concern to the four powers. The President said that the discussion had suggested to him that it would be well to shorten the letter that had been drafted. It should, however, recite the Soviet action in breaking off the disarmament and summit conferences. Lord Home asked whether a reply would be sent to Nehru. The President said he would be agreeable to doing this. Mr. Menzies suggested sending a reply to each one of the five “Neutrals” and the President agreed.

The President than asked as to the best time to send the letters and make the public statement. Mr. Herter thought this should be done before Nehru speaks, and thought the letters should be delivered a short time before they are made public. The President added that he would like Mr. Herter to check the letters with both Macmillan and Menzies after they had been redone.

Lord Home said that Mr. Macmillan was seeing Nehru later the same day. He suggested it might be best to try to avoid this subject. Mr. Macmillan said his main purpose will be to influence Nehru on the question of the UN Secretariat. He thought that if the Soviets are able to drive out Hammarskjold, they will wreck the UN and make themselves appear to the rest of the world like the masters of the UN. The President said we will stand completely firm on this. Hammarskjold is impartially carrying out the instructions of the Security Council and the General Assembly.

If Hammarskjold, as well as the Western nations, were going to be kicked around in the UN, then he thought those doing the kicking should be allowed to go ahead and break up the UN, since there would be no point in pretending that we have anything of value in those circumstances. The President concluded by saying that there is one Khrushchev recommendation he favored and that is to get the United Nations out of New York City. Having the United Nations there imposes a great burden on a free country, with a free press that people like Khrushchev and Castro can exploit for their own purposes.

Lord Home brought up one additional point—Khrushchev wants to add five “Neutrals” to the Disarmament Committee which now consists of ten members. He said his thought was to say that the Soviets may propose the addition of five, but we would like to add five also. Lord Home said it would be very difficult and undesirable to vote against the addition of Mexico, the UAR and one or two of the other nations proposed by the Soviets. Mr. Herter pointed out that the twenty-member committee would be getting quite unwieldly and discussion brought out that it is not desirable to approach this problem on a two-party basis.

G
Brigadier General, USA

1. Source: Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower Diaries. Secret. The time of the meeting is from Eisenhower’s appointment book. (ibid., President’s Daily Appointments, 1960–1961)
2. Regarding this resolution, see Document 197.
3. For a memorandum of Eisenhower’s September 26 meeting with Nehru, see Document 191.
4. Reference is to the summit meeting; see footnote 3, Document 141.
5. Not found.
6. See footnote 2, supra.
7. A memorandum of Macmillan’s September 29 conversation with Khrushchev is in Washington National Records Center, RG 59, Conference Files: FRC 83–0068, CF 1772.