191. Memorandum of a Conversation, Waldorf Towers, New York, September 26, 1960, 3 p.m.1
SecDel/MC/108
PARTICIPANTS
- US
- The President
- The Secretary
- Lt. Col. John Eisenhower
- Mr. G. Lewis Jones
- India
- Prime Minister Nehru
- Mr. Subimal Dutt, Foreign Secretary
SUBJECT
- Conversation with Prime Minister Nehru
Prime Minister Nehru opened the conversation with the question, “How are you keeping, Mr. President”?
The President began by saying that Nehru was here at a time “when calm voices are needed”. He said he had been astonished by the virulence of Khrushchev’s attack on the Secretary General.
Nehru said, “Most of us were astonished; it almost appeared as if that section were added on to Khrushchev’s speech at the last minute. It did not appear to be an integral part of it.”
The President said it would be a terrible disaster for the world, particularly to small nations, if the UN were to disappear. He said that originally he had been opposed to locating the UN in the United States. He thought it might be more appropriate to have it in a smaller country.
Nehru said that at one time there was a proposal that it be located in San Francisco.
The Secretary said, “or Geneva”.
The President said, “or Stockholm”.
The President then made the proposal, smilingly, that it might be a good idea to move the UN to West Berlin.
[Here follows discussion of the Congo, Togolese President Olympio, the Indus Water Treaty, location of the Pakistani capital, and the death of Nehru’s son-in-law.]
Turning to a new subject, the President inquired whether Nehru had any “convictions or opinions” as to how this session of UNGA will end.
Nehru said he had come because he had been pressed to come by many friends. He had found the situation worse than he had expected. It would be a catastrophe for the UN to break up since it is the one thing which holds the world together.
The President said he thought he had made a conciliatory speech.2 It clearly indicated that aid to Africa should all come via UN.
Nehru (without displaying much confidence) wondered aloud whether, after all the fireworks, Khrushchev “would cool down”.
The President said he thought that all the African nations were for the UN. The Secretary said Hammarskjold had spoken that morning.3 Nehru said he had heard Hammarskjold who made a “good and clever speech” which had pleaded that personalities be kept out of the controversy.
[Page 359]The President said that from our point of view “he had found nothing constructive in Khrushchev’s speech”. He had not expected him to be so completely negative. He seemed to be trying to find out how many new countries he could alienate. Khrushchev’s speech was “bleak” from the point of view of constructive action.
Nehru asked the President what topics he thought the General Assembly should consider.
The President replied quickly “disarmament”. The U.S. was anxious to stop nuclear testing and nuclear production. There was “nothing so important as disarmament”.
Nehru said that in his view there were two topics that must be considered—first, disarmament, and second, the new situation which has arisen in Africa. Khrushchev’s proposal for a triumvirate to replace the Secretary General was “wholly impracticable”. However, he wondered how the Secretary General can manage to deal with all the new African developments.
The President suggested the possibility of giving him some assistance.
Nehru said that at one time there had been three Assistant Secretaries General, but these posts had not been filled lately. If they were filled, the Secretary General would have a small Cabinet with which he might consult.
The Secretary said that the character of the Assistant Secretaries General has changed, now there are so many separate UN agencies.
The President thought that regional assistance, i.e., from the African countries, might ease tension. One thing was sure: “Powerful nations should be kept out of the central African area”.
Nehru agreed and said that if the larger powers intervened, this would cause chaos.
[Here follows discussion of Africa, Berlin, and India’s relationship with the People’s Republic of China.]
The President inquired how long Nehru thought he would stay.
Nehru replied he had in mind 10 days or two weeks, but he could stay on a few days longer if this were necessary.
The President said that he had initially planned to speak later in the Session, but the toughening of the Communist line had caused him to speak early. He thought he had been smart to do this because he was not in a position of answering the Soviet charges. He said the UN part of the speech had been drafted by himself. He felt with all his heart that unless the UN is supported chaos will result.
[Here follows discussion of disarmament and a U.S.–U.S.S.R. summit meeting and termination of the meeting.]
- Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 59, Conference Files: FRC 83–0068, CF 1767. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Jones on September 27, approved by S on October 5, and approved by the White House on October 11. For Eisenhower’s account of this conversation, see Waging Peace, 1956–1961, p. 585.↩
- See Document 180.↩
- Regarding Hammarskjöld’s statement, see Document 189.↩