Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, United Nations and General International Matters, Volume II

187. Memorandum From the Secretary of State’s Special Assistant (Bohlen) to the Secretary of State¹

New York, September 23, 1960.

SUBJECT

• Possible Meeting between the President and Khrushchev

Following Khrushchev’s arrival statement and the President’s speech² there has been a great deal of speculation and, in some quarters, expectation that the President and Khrushchev will meet while they are both in New York. I suspect in part some of this is being fed from Soviet sources, particularly via Asiatic members—I have heard of at least two such suggestions from Asiatics in close touch with the Soviet delegation.

Quite apart from the undoubtedly adverse domestic reaction, I believe it would be a very great mistake in connection with our future relations with the Soviet Union if the President were to see Khrushchev without the Soviets at least having done something to rectify the recent record of their past behavior through some action such as release of the two fliers or some form of retraction of the missile threat in regard to Cuba. If Khrushchev were to be received by the President without some demonstration in action of a changed attitude, it would merely convince the Soviets and a large portion of the world that the Soviet Union was so powerful that it could behave with contempt towards the United States through insults, threats, etc., and that at any time of their choosing return to the “spirit of Camp David.” In short, it would mean in the eyes of many uncommitted nations that the Soviet Union was, in fact, calling the tune in international affairs.

In present circumstances as outlined above, therefore, the reception of Khrushchev would be a net advantage to the Soviet Union and, in my opinion, a definite loss of standing by the United States. If Khrushchev genuinely wishes to see the President and should make a specific request to that end, this would require some very definite handling. I would suggest that if such a request is received, someone should go to see Gromyko and point out that the President could not receive Mr. Khrushchev as long as he illegally holds the US airmen; that if the Soviets would announce that, after investigation, the fliers were to be released without trial, it would then be possible for the President to see him. Short of this, I believe that any such request should be turned down on those grounds, and most certainly no hint on the US side of a willingness of the President to receive Khrushchev.

1. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 59, Conference Files: FRC 83–0068, CF 1772. Confidential. Drafted by Bohlen, sent to Herter through S/S, and initialed by Herter.
2. For text of Khrushchev’s statement upon arriving in New York, see The New York Times, September 20, 1960, p. A14. Regarding Eisenhower’s September 22 statement before the U.N. General Assembly, see Document 180.