186. Memorandum of a Conversation, New York, September 23, 1960, 8 p.m.1
SUBJECT
- Discussion at Dinner Meeting of the Three Foreign Ministers—Soviet Aggressive Tactics
PARTICIPANTS
- US
- The Secretary
- Mr. Livingston T. Merchant
- Mr. Foy D. Kohler
- Mr. Theodore C. Achilles
- Mr. Edward T. Long
- UK
- Lord Home
- Sir Frederick Hoyer Millar
- Sir Harold Caccia
- Mr. Peter Ramsbotham
- France
- M. Couve de Murville
- M. Charles Lucet
- Ambassador Alphand
- M. Pierre De Leuses
Mr. Ramsbotham said that the UK paper2 had been written about a fortnight ago and of course there had been some developments since then. Nevertheless, the provocative Khrushchev speech of that morning3 fitted in very well with the prognostication of the UK paper. The paper itself started by observing that since May there has been a dramatic change in Soviet tactics and the reasonableness arising particularly out of the Camp David talks has disappeared, especially in light of the airplane incidents. Increased Soviet aggressive tactics have been noted in Berlin in conjunction with the GDR, in Cuba, the Congo, etc.
Nevertheless, it appears that the Soviets have refrained from carrying their provocative campaign too far, not appearing to wish to force Soviet-Western relations into a dangerous state. Even with the current tension in Berlin, it seems that Khrushchev is avoiding taking irrevocable steps. The Geneva walk-out evinces a changed tactical position on the part of the Soviets, not a complete change in their disarmament position. The door has not been closed by Khrushchev [Page 352] on future Summit talks. Cultural exchanges have continued. In other words, it doesn’t appear that the Soviets at this point in time want to bring things to a head.
As to immediate Soviet aims, it appears likely that Khrushchev wants to isolate and discredit the U.S., to extend Soviet influence in the underdeveloped countries, to stir up opposition to Western bases by a mixture of cajolery and threats, to win the support of neutral countries for Soviet initiatives, to prepare the ground for a propaganda offensive at the UNGA and to stimulate opinion against NATO. There was a slight difference of opinion between the U.S. and the UK on another Soviet immediate aim, with the UK feeling that the Soviets wished to keep the pot boiling on Berlin while avoiding a showdown and the U.S. feeling that the Berlin crisis was being built up as pressure against the new U.S. administration. Another agreed Soviet aim was that of stopping the West from continuing its intelligence gathering activities.
The paper went on to relate several imponderable factors in the situation. In the field of Sino-Soviet relations, it seems probable that one of the factors leading Khrushchev to adopt more militant tactics toward the West has been the desire to defend himself from accusations of softness in the showdown with the Chinese. Another imponderable is Khrushchev’s own personality and position in the Soviet hierarchy. He often misjudges the effects on others of his behavior and he tends to overplay his hand when he thinks he holds good cards. The latter was very evident in Khrushchev’s speech today.
The conclusions of the paper, on which there was broad agreement among the three Under Secretaries, were briefly as follows:
Within the general framework of peaceful co-existence, as he interprets it, Khrushchev can alternate between sweet reasonableness and his more militant tactics of today where he uses rough language about the West and exploits “targets of opportunity”. The only safe assumption is that so long as Khrushchev is in power Soviet tactics will be flexible and unpredictable. This judgment means that in the first place the West must not allow Khrushchev to succeed, either by cajolery or by threats, in gaining material advantage for the Soviet cause, e.g., by ousting the West from Berlin, depriving the Western alliance of necessary bases, compelling the West to agree to disarmament arrangements unfavorable to Western security, etc. In other words, the West need not and should not give way on substantive matters and should pursue a policy of continual firmness matching each Soviet move forward with an appropriate but not excessive counter-action. In addition, Khrushchev must not be allowed to succeed in swaying opinion in the uncommitted parts of the world against [Page 353] the West. Furthermore, Western spokesmen should consistently expose Soviet policies and aims, pointing up to the uncommitted countries the advantages of cooperation with the West.
Mr. Ramsbotham observed there had been some disagreement with the final conclusion of the paper in which the British thought that given Khrushchev’s personality it was not in the interest of the West to keep him at arm’s length, particularly since his influence on Chinese policy may prove an important factor in the West’s favor. From this point of view alone the West has an interest in diverting him from a militant anti-Western policy. The U.S. view, continued Mr. Ramsbotham, was that the West had no influence in about 95% of Sino-Soviet relations. The French spokesman took some issue with the British argument that the West should seek a renewal of contact with Khrushchev as soon as conditions permit, the French feeling that the next move in this direction was up to Khrushchev.
Mr. Merchant thanked Mr. Ramsbotham for his full and stimulating report and observed that there were no basic tripartite differences on the UK paper, only a difference here and there on a nuance.
- Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 59, Conference Files: FRC 83–0068, CF 1767. Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by Long and approved by S on October 5 and by M on September 29. The time of the meeting was taken from the chronology of Herter’s trip to the General Assembly. (Ibid., CF 1776)↩
- Reference is to a paper entitled “How to Deal With the Soviet Propaganda Offensive in the United Nations,” which Ramsbotham had distributed to the U.S. and French Delegations the previous day. A copy is attached to SecDel/MC/26; ibid., CF 1766.↩
- See Document 183.↩