Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, United Nations and General International Matters, Volume II

147. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Korea¹

Washington, August 23, 1960—9:42 p.m.

159. Re urtels 188, 197.²Dept most sympathetic ROK frustration re admission UN, particularly in view pending admission large number newly independent African states. Dept also agrees ROK in position this year make even stronger case than heretofore for admission. While ROK’s qualifications for membership never seriously questioned except by Soviet bloc, same arguments in support its admission repeated year after year tended lose their effectiveness. This year internal developments ROK will permit introduction new elements in debate.

You should inform Foreign Minister in above sense, assuring him of continued US support this matter. You should also indicate Dept prepared request SC meeting in September, when Italy SC President, to reconsider ROK application in effort focus maximum attention on fact admission ROK long overdue. At same time you should make clear Dept sees no possibility favorable SC action barring major change in Soviet policy. Dept pleased note Prime Minister’s statement reported urtel 216³ appears recognize this fact.

Re possible tactic suggested by Yun: We have given most careful consideration Yun proposal but find it not practical procedurally. UN Charter provides for admission by GA on recommendation SC and 1950 advisory opinion ICJ states admission not possible in absence this recommendation.⁴ Charter also gives five permanent members veto in all SC decisions of substantive character and admission new members clearly substantive both by nature of admission and on basis precedents. Moreover US itself has recognized admission as matter legitimately subject veto by proposing in 1949 Vandenberg resolution⁵ and subsequently five permanent members agree voluntarily forego their veto on admission new members. While SC President has on occasion succeeded in having his ruling that given matter procedural upheld over opposition permanent member despite five-power agreement San Francisco that decision this question itself subject veto, this only possible where good case can in fact be made for regarding matter as procedural. Lao and Chinese Communist invitation cases thus not precedents because they related procedural not substantive matters.

While 1948 ICJ advisory opinion that making admission one state dependent on admission others incompatible “letter and spirit” Charter⁶ obviously applicable Soviet linking admission ROK and north Korea, SC President has no authority rule this ground for denying Soviet negative vote constitutes veto. Had SC President such power membership deadlock 1950–1955 would not have occurred and Charter provision giving veto power five permanent members would be seriously undermined. SC acceptance determination by President that permanent member acting contrary Charter and therefore deprived of veto would clearly exceed recognized powers presiding officer and would constitute very dangerous precedent, which could be extended beyond admission’s question and to which none of permanent members could be expected agree. Moreover, in Dept’s view GA reaction any such maneuver likely be highly unfavorable and likely prejudice obtaining required two-thirds vote there. You should therefore make clear ROK suggested tactic both unrealistic and undesirable for reasons given above and US could not support it and we see no possibility other permanent SC members would do so.

With respect GA, Dept believes consideration ROK application best handled in conjunction unification item, assuming Soviet veto in SC. Dept has in mind not only strong statements deploring ROK’s continued exclusion UN during debate but also inclusion reference this matter in preambular paragraph resolution on unification item. This tactic in Dept’s view has best chance obtaining maximum support for new GA statement endorsing ROK application and at same time avoiding resolution lumping together all pending applications. In this general connection, Dept hopes ROK will actively seek stimulate as many supporting statements in GA as possible, particularly from friendly A-As. After last Soviet veto ROK application, only US spoke in GA deploring failure SC act favorably.

Dillon

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 303/8–1660. Confidential. Drafted by Hartley; initialed by Cargo; cleared in draft with Bacon, Reis, and Bane; and approved by Wilcox who signed for Herter. Repeated by pouch to USUN.
2. Regarding telegram 188, see footnote 5, supra. Telegram 197, August 16, reported on Ambassador McConaughy’s conversation with the Korean Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs regarding Korean membership in the United Nations. (Department of State, Central Files, 303/8–1660)
3. Telegram 216, August 29, transmitted the substance of two press interviews given by the Korean Prime Minister on August 19 and 20. (Ibid., 795B.00/8–2060)
4. Regarding this opinion, see Competence of the General Assembly for the Admission of a State to the United Nations: Advisory Opinion of March 3, 1950.
5. See footnote 4, Document 68.
6. Regarding this decision, see Conditions of Admission of a State to Membership in the United Nations (Article 4 of the Charter) Advisory Opinion of May 28th, 1948: I.C.J. Reports 1948.