Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, United Nations and General International Matters, Volume II

68. Paper Prepared in the Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State¹

Washington, March 4, 1959.

ADMISSION OF NEW MEMBERS TO THE UNITED NATIONS

Prospective Candidates

1. Somaliland (independence 1960)

2. Nigeria (independence 1960) (possibly including all or part of British Cameroons)

3. Cameroun (independence 1960) (possibly including southern British Cameroons)

4. Togo (independence 1960)

5. Cyprus (independence by February 1960)

Possible Candidates Within Next 5 to 10 Years

Most Likely

6. The West Indies (possibly including British Guiana and British Honduras)

7. Central African Federation (Southern Rhodesia, Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland)

Less Likely

8. Western Samoa (self-government 1960—but foreign relations may be handled by New Zealand)

9. Tanganyika

10. Uganda

11. Kenya

12. Sierra Leone

13. Madagascar

14. French West Africa (except Guinea), or parts thereof

15. French Equatorial Africa, or parts thereof

16. Aden

Present prospects are that the French overseas territories will remain within the French Community and therefore will not be eligible for separate membership in the UN. However, some of those listed above may become independent or States associated with France under Article 88 of the new French Constitution and thereupon apply for membership.

The future status of the Belgian Congo and the Trust Territory of Ruanda-Urundi is too uncertain to warrant an estimate of future constitutional change.

There is nothing at present to indicate that any change in the status of Portuguese and Spanish colonies looking toward independence is to be anticipated within the next ten years, nor are there grounds for projecting independence within this period for any of the dependent territories in the Pacific except Western Samoa.

MEMBERSHIP IN UN BY AREA		Present UN (82 Members)	UN of 87 Members	UN of 98 Members
Western Hemisphere (including US but excluding Canada)	21	21	22
Old Commonwealth	4	4	4
Non-Communist Europe	16	16	16
Africa (excluding UAR and Union of South Africa)	8	12	20
Middle East	14	15	16
Far East and Pacific	9	9	10
Communist Europe	10	10	10

Analysis

Omitting the three divided states whose admission to the UN depends on political settlements and is therefore unpredictable, admission by 1961 of at least five new states (total 87) appears almost certain if there is no change in the attitude of the UN membership generally toward admission. Within 10 years there is the possibility of a further addition of from 2 to 11 new members (possible total 98). All of these prospective or possible candidates are now dependent territories. The rapid progress of these areas toward independence can be measured by the fact that a similar analysis prepared in April 1957² lists but two such areas as prospective candidates. At that time only Malaya (since admitted to the UN) and Somaliland were scheduled for independence. While Nigeria was regarded as a likely possibility, the future status of the French trust territories was considered too uncertain to warrant an estimate with respect to the Cameroons and Togoland.

Four of the prospective candidates are from Africa and will raise the number of African UN members (exclusive of the UAR and the Union of South Africa) to 12 and, exclusive of the Arab states in Africa, to 8. The great majority of the possible candidates over the next 10 years are also from Africa and their admission could raise these figures as high as 20 and 16, respectively. Of the four remaining possibilities, 2 are in the Middle East, 1 in the South Pacific, and 1 in the Western Hemisphere.

Voting Situation

UN membership for the four prospective African candidates will increase the voting strength of the Africans and Asians (including China) in the UN to 34–35 (depending on the future alignment of Cyprus). Theoretically, were these 34–35 Asian and African members to vote together they and the 10 Communist members (the Soviet bloc and Yugoslavia) would have a simple majority in a UN of 87 members. In a UN of 98 members, the Africans and Asians plus the same Communist group would have four votes more than necessary for a simple majority. They would still, however, fall far short of the two-thirds majority required for decisions on “important questions”—58 in the first case and 66 in the second.

In fact, however, all the present Asian and African members do not always, or even usually, vote together or with the Soviet bloc. Nor does Yugoslavia always vote with the Soviet bloc. The Africans and Asians come closest to voting together on “colonial” and economic development issues but definitely split on East-West issues. There are certain members in both Asia and Africa that are aligned with or oriented toward the West; some among the Asians and Arabs that lean increasingly toward the USSR; and a very substantial group of “neutralists.” There is no reason to expect this situation to change essentially with the admission of the prospective and possible new members. The fact that a large proportion of them are from Africa may serve to detract in some measure from such “Afro-Asian” cohesiveness as presently exists. The Africans have no close ties with the Asians and are likely to prefer African to Arab-Asian leadership if effective African leadership develops. At the same time, even with separate leadership, the new African states, being relatively unexperienced politically and economically underdeveloped, are likely to find many points of common interest and of common emotional reaction with the Asians.

In the area of East-West issues, the potential new membership can be expected to result in a very substantial addition to the “neutralist”group. There is no reason to anticipate that any of this new membership will be Communist-aligned (at least in the beginning). They are developing toward independence under Western influence and, with two exceptions in the Middle East, they are all far removed from the Communist bloc geographically and at this time, from any strong Communist influences or ties. There is reason to believe, however, that given their geographic location, their stage of political and economic development, their past experience, and the “cold war” atmosphere, most of the prospective and possible new members will lean toward “neutralism.” This disposition will undoubtedly be encouraged by the power position of the USSR, its efforts to appear as a sympathetic and generous friend in those matters of most concern to the new members, and its present posture of flexibility in accommodating to neutralist sentiment, which appears to offer some hope for compromise. This disposition toward neutralism will also be encouraged by the desire of the new members to further their own immediate ends by playing the Soviet bloc off against the West.

There is no question but that the US will encounter increasing difficulty in finding built-in support for its positions in the UN as the membership grows. So far as substantive proposals on “important questions” are concerned, the problem appears to be one of degree. Any “automatic majority” the US may have had in the UN has already disappeared. We cannot now obtain the necessary two-thirds vote to carry a proposal unless some “uncommitted” members vote with us, the number required depending on the solidity of our support from Latin America, from non-Communist Europe and the “Old Commonwealth,” and from among those Asian and African nations with which we have close ties. As the membership grows, and with it the voting strength of the “neutralists,” the solidity of this support and our ability in competition with the USSR to attract the votes of the “uncommitted” to our proposals will become increasingly important. It is likely to prove more and more difficult to obtain a two-thirds vote, with the result that Assembly discussion may more frequently end in no action or in non-controversial resolutions, which may fall definitely short of our objectives. At the same time, we can safely anticipate continuing to have the one-third vote necessary to defeat clearly unacceptable proposals except on occasion in the economic, social, and colonial fields where the Asians and Africans can be expected to develop the greatest degree of cohesion and to be joined by a varying number of Latin Americans, depending on the issue.

The US will encounter the greatest difficulty in an expanding UN on those matters where a simple majority vote is required. Here our ability to manipulate the GA committee structure to our own advantage and to assure procedural decisions favorable to our position will be much less certain. Failure in this field could have most serious consequences, particularly on Chinese representation, where the voting margin is already narrow and on which little positive support for our position can be expected from the potential new membership. However, it does not appear that the admission of the four prospective candidates can materially affect the Chinese representation issue in the GA so long as the present voting pattern on this issue remains otherwise relatively unchanged, though it will probably narrow our margin. In fact, even if all 16 potential and possible new members voted against us on this issue the opposition would still, projecting the present voting pattern, be in the minority in a UN of 98 members, though whether this situation would be reflected in the actual vote would depend on the number of abstentions.

Limitation of Membership

Despite the difficulties for the US in an ever-expanding UN, any effort on our part at this juncture to limit UN membership to more mature nations or to slow down the admission process in the case of newly independent states appears both impractical and undesirable. It is unlikely to obtain the necessary support to be successful without resort to the veto; it would seriously prejudice our relations with the states directly concerned; and in the eyes of the “anti-colonial” majority, it would place the US on the side of the colonial powers—all to the advantage of the USSR.

Though the Charter stipulates that membership is open to all “peace loving states” accepting the obligations of the Charter and “able and willing” to carry them out, these criteria have in the past been very liberally interpreted by the UN membership, including the US. We ourselves have never abstained on or voted against any applications except those of Soviet-bloc candidates. In the case of the ten newly independent nations applying for membership in the last eight years, their ability to carry out their Charter obligations has not been seriously questioned. Since 1949, no application has been referred by the Security Council to its Committee on the Admission of New Members, established to review applications in private and report its conclusions to the Council. Indonesia applied on September 25, 1950, was unanimously recommended for admission by the Council the following day, and admitted by the Assembly on September 28 by acclamation. This was the last state admitted until 1955 because of the membership deadlock. Then, however, Ceylon, Jordan, Libya, Laos, Cambodia, and Nepal were admitted as part of the “package” proposal, having previously been found qualified by the General Assembly but vetoed by the USSR in the Security Council. In 1956, Morocco, Tunisia, and the Sudan were admitted by the unanimous vote of the General Assembly on the opening day of its 11th session following unanimous recommendations by the Security Council earlier in the year. The question of their ability to carry out their Charter obligations was not raised in either the Council or the Assembly. The same was true in the case of Ghana, which was recommended for admission by unanimous vote of the Council the day following its achievement of independent status, and of Malaya, which the Council unanimously recommended for admission five days after it became an independent state. In all these cases, the Council has accepted without discussion the view expressed by the sponsor or sponsors of the draft resolutions adopted that reference to the Committee on the Admission of New Members could be only a formality since there was no doubt about the qualifications of the applicants under Article 4 of the Charter.³ The recent admission of Guinea without reference to the SC committee and without objection, despite the reservations expressed by France and the uncertainty created by the Ghana–Guinea declaration of intention, reflected the overwhelming sentiment of the UN membership. It is a clear indication that any effort now to apply strictly the criteria set forth in Article 4 would be regarded by the applicant and its supports as discriminatory treatment, while any effort to revert to prior committee consideration in the SC would be interpreted as reflecting on the qualifications of the applicant.

There is a general disposition among UN members to favor “universality” of membership. This is true not only of the Asians and Africans but also of the Latin Americans and certain European states, the Scandinavians in particular. The Soviet bloc can be expected to support the admission of newly independent states, at least in Africa or Asia, as part of its effort to extend Communist influence. Any US attempt to reduce or slow down admissions, even if supported by the UK, France, and certain others, is therefore not likely to be successful without resort to the veto and would probably result only in a psychological loss for the US and a psychological gain for the USSR. Resort to the veto would mean a complete reversal of the position endorsed by the Vandenberg resolution of 1948⁴ and strongly advocated by the United States ever since. Such use of the veto would be widely resented within the UN and could only alienate the newly independent states whose admissions had been vetoed.

Three of the four prospective candidates (Somaliland, Togoland, and the Cameroons) are trust territories which, therefore, will have been brought to independence under UN aegis and whose independent status will have been recognized by the GA in agreeing to the termination of the trusteeship agreements concerned. UN membership has come to be regarded as the ultimate symbol of independent status, and it does not appear practical or desirable to deny this symbol for a test period to new states that are the creation of the UN. To do so would cast doubt on whether the basic objectives of the UN trusteeship system had in fact been achieved in their cases. This being so, it would be extremely difficult to justify denying or delaying membership in the case of other newly independent states whose ability to carry out their Charter obligations had been tested to no greater extent than that of the ex-trust territories.

The problem presented by the growing UN and its changing complexion is primarily one affecting the United States leadership role and the position of the older powers in the Organization. Since together we constitute no more than a small minority of the members, the suggestion that this problem be referred to a UN committee for study and recommendation does not appear practicable. Any such committee would have to be geographically representative of the membership as a whole, and it would be unrealistic to expect a committee so composed to view sympathetically, or even to see as a problem, the difficulties presented by the new UN for US leadership and for a relatively small number of older powers. This is particularly true in view of the disposition of the majority of UN members to favor “universality” and to be antagonistic to “colonialism.” They could not therefore be expected to come up with recommendations tending to restrict membership in the UN. Moreover, they are jealous of their “sovereign equality” in the Organization as laid down by the Charter, and therefore could not be expected to arrive at recommendations designed to permit a more accurate reflection in the Organization of the widely divergent power positions—military, political, and economic—of its members. This estimate is borne out by the widespread opposition to any scheme for weighted voting that was evidenced at the time the Charter review question was active in 1955.

Implications for US Position in the UN

The substantial and growing number of “uncommitted” members has strengthened the USSR’s position in the UN. The vote the US can expect in support of its position vis-à-vis the USSR is likely to fall noticeably short of the very substantial majority it has obtained in the past. The UN will not provide as effective a cold-war forum as heretofore. This does not mean that where the USSR is in flagrant violation of the Charter the possibility of obtaining a two-thirds vote should be precluded, but it does mean that in other situations, the US will be under strong pressure to compromise.

In these circumstances the US will be required to go as far as it can without sacrificing basic principles and objectives to meet the desires of a substantial body of the membership for resolutions that are acceptable to the membership generally, including the USSR. An appearance of inflexibility vis-à-vis the USSR will alienate rather than attract support. Moreover, the US should be careful not to prejudice the future usefulness of UN mechanisms and procedures (as might have been the case recently had we pressed our position on the Standby Peace Force item in the GA) in order to demonstrate in any given instance its imperviousness to Soviet threats or its ability to win in the face of strong opposition. At the same time, the US should not carry its flexibility to the point of giving the impression it is abdicating its leadership or is susceptible to blackmail, Soviet or other. Where basic principles and objectives are at stake, the US should make clear that it is prepared to accept a vote short of the required two-thirds—and thus to see the Assembly take no action—rather than to compromise them.

To offset the effect on “uncommitted” states, as well as on some of those that are aligned with us, of such Soviet threats as the recent ones implying the USSR’s withdrawal from, or non-participation in, the UN, the US should make clear that we regard these threats as nothing more than blackmail; that we see no evidence of slackening Soviet interest in the UN and its activities; that, on the contrary, in our view the price to the USSR of any such move would not be worth its psychological advantages since it would 1) deprive the USSR of a major mechanism for identifying itself with the nationalist, “anti-colonial” movement in Asia and Africa and for cultivating the neutralists in these areas; 2) deprive the USSR of its ability to block UN decisions disadvantageous to it; and 3) be inconsistent with the Soviet policy objectives since Stalin’s death of ending the diplomatic isolation of the Soviet bloc and gaining recognition for itself and its satellites of equal status with the “capitalist” world. We should make it clear that we will stand firm, and expect our friends to do likewise, against this blackmail, and moreover, that, even at the risk of its proving to be more than blackmail we, and they, cannot afford to give in to it.

Rather than withdrawing from the UN, the USSR may well decide to place greater emphasis on the UN as the atmosphere there becomes more favorable to it. The USSR may become an increasingly active participant in various fields of UN endeavor as part of its effort to cultivate the “uncommitted” and gain recognition of its “equal status.” The Soviet drive for “parity,” symbolic or real, can be expected to intensify.

In the new UN, the quid pro quo factor will assume increasing importance in marshalling support for the US position. As the number of “uncommitted” members grows their bargaining position will be enhanced, and their support on matters of vital interest to the US can be expected to become more and more conditional on receiving our support both inside and outside the UN on matters of primary concern to them. In this situation the US will be faced with serious difficulties in the economic and “colonial” fields, where the desirability of being responsive to the urgent desires of the “uncommitted” countries must be weighed against what it is desirable and feasible to do in terms of the long-range interests of the states whose political and economic development is involved, the impact on our relations with the states already committed to us and the retention of whose support is essential to the US position, and the costs in money and manpower.

To minimize the quid pro quo factor, US positions in the UN will need to be such that the “uncommitted” members will find them difficult to oppose from the standpoint of rightness in the moral sense, and reasonableness in the political sense. The US will also need to be as responsive to the desires of the “uncommitted” where their own immediate objectives are concerned as over-all policy considerations permit. Where such problems as racism are involved, with their highly emotional content, the US must stand firmly on principle. While the development of a responsible approach to international relations, both bilateral and multilateral, on the part of the newly independent states can only be expected as they gain in experience, thought should be given to continuing through the UN and its mechanisms the guidance and assistance previously received from the administering powers.

In this connection, besides the various forms of UN technical and economic assistance, the possible device of a UN presence of some type in such states has been suggested, to which they might turn for information and advice. A UN presence would at the same time serve to make more difficult the exploitation of the inexperience of the newly independent states by others for their own ends. Any arrangement of this sort would of course require the consent of the state concerned. This consent would probably be easiest to obtain in the case of ex-trust territories, but other newly independent states might prefer assistance from this source to that of a bilateral character.

It is unlikely that the new UN can be developed into an effective instrument for collective security action. It should, however, continue to be useful in the field of pacific settlement, particularly where the problem is not essentially an East-West one or one having strong “colonial” implications. These latter questions, moreover, may be expected to become less prominent in the UN as more and more now-dependent areas achieve self-governing or independent status. On the other hand, emphasis on the economic and social functions of the UN is likely to continue to increase.

It is possible that the US will wish to make a more selective use of the UN as it grows in size and its character changes. It is possible that the General Assembly may become too unwieldy a body for its present purposes. The Secretary General in these circumstances is likely to play an increasingly important role. Greater reliance may have to be placed in sub-bodies. While it would be unrealistic to expect the establishment by the GA of subordinate bodies that do not reflect fairly accurately the complexion of the UN as a whole, smaller bodies could reduce our operating problems somewhat. Greater emphasis on the more selective Councils, as against the General Assembly, would appear to be to our advantage, and serious consideration should be given whether we should not consciously strive to direct the trend back toward greater reliance on the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council, respectively. (The future of the Trusteeship Council is currently under review in light of the reduction in the number of trust territories and of administering powers that is anticipated.)

The eventual enlargement of the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council to reflect the increased UN membership must be anticipated if we are to have greater recourse to them, and it is not likely that the very modest enlargements so far advocated by the US will prove generally acceptable. The prospect of a substantially enlarged Economic and Social Council does not have too serious implication for the US, since it can only recommend. This is not true, however, in the case of the Security Council. Here, where we could easily lose with enlargement the certain majority we have enjoyed to date, we should review carefully whether it is in the long-run US interest to go as far in giving up our veto power as we have said in the past we could go.

We should also weigh carefully whether it is advisable to continue to emphasize the over-riding moral obligation of UN members to carry out General Assembly resolutions, instead of the recommendatory character of these resolutions. We may ourselves at some future time in the new UN be faced with resolutions we cannot or do not consider it in the national interest to implement.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 310.2/3–459. Secret. Attached to a March 4 memorandum from Wilcox to Herter which noted that the paper had been prepared at Dulles’ request, that Becker had cleared it, and that the Office of the Legal Adviser agreed with its conclusions. Herter initialed the memorandum. A previous draft of the paper, December 30, 1958, was sent to Dulles on January 5, 1959, and to Lodge for comment on January 22. (ibid., IO Files: Lot 61 D 91, Memoranda, 1959) The paper was revised to reflect Cyprus’ probable admission to the United Nations.
2. Reference is to a paper entitled “Forecast of New U.N. Members During the Next Decade.” (ibid., Lot 60 D 113, U.N. General, 1957)

3. Article 4 of the U.N. Charter reads in part:

   “1. Membership in the United Nations is open to all other peace-loving states which accept the obligations contained in the present Charter and, in the judgment of the Organization, are able and willing to carry out these obligations.”

4. For text of the Vandenberg Resolution, June 11, 1948, see Foreign Relations, 1948, vol. i, p. 25, footnote 7.