Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, United Nations and General International Matters, Volume II

145. Circular Instruction From the Department of State to Certain Diplomatic Missions¹

CA–1178

Washington, August 4, 1960.

SUBJECT

• Fifteenth Regular Session of the United Nations General Assembly

[Here follow a table of contents and a summary of action requested.]

A. Introduction

The fifteenth regular session of the General Assembly (GA) is scheduled to convene in New York on September 20, 1960. This session will see a large increase in the size of the United Nations, comparable to 1955 when 16 new members were admitted. With all but one of the 16 probable applications for membership this year coming from the newly emerging states of Africa, this increase will pose a challenge and opportunity for the United States and other free world members to so influence and guide the new members that they will become effective supporters of the UN system. The Assembly will deal with a number of issues of importance to the security and well-being of the world. Moreover, meeting in the aftermath of the summit collapse and the Communist withdrawal from the Geneva disarmament negotiations, an atmosphere of sharper confrontation between the free world and the Soviets will prevail. The growth in the General Assembly’s size dramatizes the role of the Assembly as an arena in which the battle for the minds and allegiance of the uncommitted peoples is being fought.

B. Background Information

1. Composition of the General Assembly

When the 15th GA convenes, it will comprise 82 members. By the time it adjourns, there may well be 98 members. Since its founding in 1945 when it had only 51 members, the UN has periodically admitted new members, reflecting the emergence of newly-independent nations in Africa and Asia as well as the admission of a number of European States. Clearly the principle of one state one vote in the GA does not accurately reflect the relative power of individual members, and many of the new members are too inexperienced in international affairs to act responsibly on all vital issues. Through active consultation in New York and in foreign capitals it is possible to achieve necessary majorities or consensuses for positions which are fundamentally in the interests of the US and the other free world members of the UN.

The 15th GA is expected to consider the applications of the following sixteen new states: Cameroun, Togo, Republic of Congo (former Belgian), Mali Federation, Malagasy Republic, Somali Republic, Dahomey, Niger, Upper Volta, Ivory Coast, Nigeria, Gabon, Chad, Congo (former French), Central African Republic, and Cyprus. The Security Council has already acted favorably upon the applications of Cameroun (January 26), Togo (April 27), Mali (June 28), the Malagasy Republic (June 29), the Somali Republic (July 5) and the Republic of Congo (July 7). With the exception (Cyprus) these prospective members are African. The admission of some or all could expand the size of the present group of African states (9) at the UN until it equalled or surpassed that of the Latin American states (20) which is presently the largest geographic grouping. The influence of both the African and the Asian groups has increased considerably in recent years and will probably continue to increase as new countries obtain their independence.

For African and Asian nations, membership in the UN holds a special significance because it symbolizes international acceptance and status. Many of these nations regard the UN, and especially the GA, as a forum in which they are able to exert a greater influence upon international developments than they might otherwise expect. Many have had little or no experience in traditional diplomacy and, in many instances, have little knowledge of or interest in issues which the United States considers vital. Anticolonialism, social and humanitarian issues, and problems of economic development are of paramount importance to these nations. There is a predisposition by some Afro-Asian states toward non-alignment on “cold-war” issues although a number of the present members are firm free world supporters. This predisposition has been encouraged among the present Afro-Asian members of the UN by the Communists and there is every reason to believe that the latter will encourage, or foster, such a predisposition in the new members whenever possible. Among the Afro-Asian states are at least 11 firm supporters of the free world on cold war issues: Japan, Laos, Malaya, Pakistan, Philippines, Thailand, China, Turkey, Iran, Tunisia and Liberia. It is important accordingly to avoid referring to the Afro-Asians as if all were neutrals and to give credit to the substantial support the free world enjoys there.

2. Bloc Voting

The groupings in the GA are: Non-Communist Europe, Soviet bloc, Latin America, Old Commonwealth, and Afro-Asian. All of the groups either caucus or hold informal consultations. In recent years two distinct sub-groups have developed within the Afro-Asian group(1) the Arab League states, and (2) the African states. Arab League representatives meet in advance of the GA to formulate the Arab position on candidates and issues, and league decisions are binding if adopted unanimously. The African group (which includes all states of the African continent except the Union of South Africa) caucuses during the General Assembly for the purpose of consulting on particular issues. Decisions of the caucus are frequently not binding. The rapid evolution of additional independent African states and their admission to UN membership will augment the relative voting strength of this group. There is the possibility that, in time, the African states south of the Sahara may decide to organize themselves into a distinctive African group.

The “Old” Commonwealth members consult periodically during the Assembly and on special occasions are joined by Asian and African Commonwealth members for informal discussions. Non-Communist European countries do not hold caucuses as such, although they are developing the practice of periodic informal group meetings. Two European sub-groups—the five Scandinavian countries and the three Benelux states—meet on the Foreign Minister level prior to the General Assembly to concert their actions on candidates and issues, and the members of these sub-groups consult regularly during Assembly meetings. The UK also meets formally with France, Portugal and the US prior to the session.

The Soviet bloc follows the directives emanating from Moscow and meets regularly during the Assembly.

The solidarity of the groups (the Soviet excepted) varies considerably. On slates, but not on substance the Latin Americans display the greatest unity. The Afro-Asians do not act as a unit but maintain cohesiveness on questions of economic development, on colonial issues and on humanitarian questions. While the groups constitute a source of pressure for conformity on individual delegations within the respective groups, the effectiveness of this pressure varies with the issue involved. As in any deliberative group, the practice of log rolling is employed, though in the Assembly it is limited largely to elections.

United States operational relations with the Latin American bloc have been established on a firm footing. From time to time members of the U.S. Delegation are invited to appear before the Latin American caucus to explain the United States position on a particular issue and/or to enlist Latin American support. U.S. contacts with the non-Communist Europeans and the Old Commonwealth groups are close and rest on a basic community of interests, though colonial issues present difficulties. Relations with the Afro-Asian group are primarily with individual members of the group, although we have occasionally dealt with the African caucus as a whole. Relations with the Soviet bloc depend on the undulations of the “cold war”.

The U.S. must cooperate effectively with all but the last of the various geographic groupings in the General Assembly in order to achieve the majority necessary to secure the adoption of important Assembly resolutions. This means working closely with individual members of the different groups to influence so far as possible group thinking and to obtain the support of as many of the individual members as possible.

To a degree, the groups serve a useful purpose in providing a means for informally exchanging views on the various items that come before the GA and in working out slates of candidates for offices. Tendencies toward any further coalescence of regional or special-interest groupings, particularly among the Afro-Asian countries, may result in a rigidity of voting patterns prejudicial to a constructive approach to international problems and to the attainment of U.S. foreign policy objectives in the GA.

3. Communist-Free World Relations

East-West relations in the 15th General Assembly will be decidedly less amicable than those which existed, at least superficially, during the 14th General Assembly. The 14th General Assembly was conducted against a backdrop of a strong and oft-repeated Soviet line of peaceful co-existence with the “Capitalist” world. This backdrop included the visit of Soviet Premier Khrushchev to the U.S. and the acceptance of his invitation by President Eisenhower to visit the Soviet Union in 1960.² Talks for the suspension of nuclear tests had resumed in Geneva with some hope of limited success, and the big four (U.S., USSR, U.K., and France) had reached agreement for the resumption of disarmament negotiations in a ten-nation committee. The 14th General Assembly adjourned with increased hopes that continued progress would be made for the lessening of international tension.

The pacific interlude has since been broken by Khrushchev’s refusal to meet with President Eisenhower and Premiers DeGaulle and MacMillan at Paris, the withdrawal of the invitation to President Eisenhower to visit the USSR, and the subsequent Soviet walk-out from the Geneva disarmament talks. These events have been accompanied by the resumption of an abusive Soviet propaganda campaign which has served to heighten international tension. It seems clear that the Soviet Government has chosen to adopt a posture of extreme militancy and to seek its goals through intimidation rather than the appearance of conciliation. While it is likely that the Soviet spokemen will continue to stress the theme of “peaceful coexistence”, this theme will undoubtedly be subordinated to Soviet missile rattling and threats against countries accused of hostile policies.

Against such a background it is clear that the 15th General Assembly will be conducted in an atmosphere charged with tension. The Soviets can be expected to exploit their participation in the UN for four principal purposes. First, they will attempt to promote the concept of an affinity of interests between the Soviet bloc and the underdeveloped nations of Africa, Asia and Latin America, primarily by seeking a “habit alignment” with these nations on a wide variety of issues. Second, they will exploit every opportunity for disrupting the unity of the free world allies. Third, they will attempt to attain a larger measure of international prestige and respectability for the Communist bloc. Finally, they will concentrate on various propaganda goals. In particular, they will attempt to persuade the world that Soviet power and prestige are constantly increasing while United States power has suffered a decline. They will pose as the “true champions of peace” and will attack the United States and the Western powers for their failure to accept Soviet disarmament proposals. They may also be expected to make repeated references to the U–2 incident, and to contend that the elimination of foreign bases represents the sine qua non of a relaxation of international tensions.

Our guideline in this situation was set forth by the President in his report to the nation following the collapse of the Paris Summit talks,³ in which he said that the United States “must continue business-like dealings with the Soviet leaders on outstanding issues and improve the contacts between our own and Soviet peoples, making clear that the path of reason and common sense is still open if the Soviets will but use it.” It should be noted that this policy does not imply that the U.S. must refrain from firmness in dealings with Soviet militancy, that we feel obliged to make unilateral concessions to Soviet ambitions or that we need to avoid taking strong positions in support of our own principles and vital interests. It is important that the Soviet leaders learn as soon as possible that the free nations are not being intimidated, that our essential unity is not impaired, and that militant Soviet policies are not otherwise paying dividends.

[Here follow sections C, “Consultations,” and D, “Specific Instructions.”]

E. United States Views

1. 15th GA Presidency

As you know the U.S. is committed to support the candidacy of Frederick H. Boland (Ireland) for President of the Assembly and, to date, the Boland candidacy appears to be progressing satisfactorily. The US position on the other candidacies for President (Thor Thors of Iceland and Jeri Nosek of Czechoslovakia) remains as set forth in CG 517 of February 16, 1960, and CG 577 of March 10, 1960.⁴ You should in any discussions of this matter with the Foreign Office make clear that our strong opposition to Nosek as President of the 15th GA has been underscored by the abortive nature of the Summit Meeting, since this greatly increases the likelihood that the 15th GA will have before it crucial issues of vital concern to the Free World. You should also as appropriate cite the complete disregard of rules of procedure by the Polish chairman in breaking off the Geneva disarmament discussions of the Committee of Ten as a concrete example of why a Soviet bloc President of the GA would be clearly prejudicial to the orderly conduct of the Assembly’s business as well as detrimental to free world interests.

2. The Election of Other Officers Comprising the General Committee

The Assembly’s General (steering) Committee is made up of the President, the 13 vice presidents, and the chairmen of the seven main committees. The geographic allocation of seats there, established by the Assembly at its 12th session, varies slightly from year to year—the area holding the presidency losing a vice presidency. In general, however, the allocation is as follows:

Vice Presidents—4 from Asia and Africa, 2 from Latin America, 2 from “Western Europe and other states”, and 1 from Eastern Europe, plus the five permanent members of the Security Council; Chairmen— 2 from Latin America, 2 from Asia and Africa, 2 from “Western Europe and other states”, and 1 from Eastern Europe. The “slate” for the General Committee is usually not fully developed until just before the Assembly session opens and tends to be determined by general agreement before the actual elections take place.

Candidacies so far advanced are: for Vice President—Libya, Sudan; Panama, Venezuela; Japan, Canada; for Chairmen—Committee I, Shaha (Nepal), Corea (Ceylon); Special Political Committee, Tarabanov (Bulgaria); Committee II, Stanovnik (Yugoslavia); Committee III, Lopez (Philippines); and Committee IV, Pachachi (Iraq). No candidacies have yet been announced for Committees V and VI. We have taken no final position on any of these candidacies since it is our normal practice not to take a position on candidates for GA offices until we can look at the “slate” as a whole, the over-all composition of the General Committee being in our minds very important.

FYI. The primary U.S. objective in this connection is to obtain a General Committee favorable to U.S. interests generally, and particularly with respect to the Chinese representation issue. We also attach special importance to the election of China, as a permanent member of the Security Council, to a vice presidency. End FYI.

3. Elections to the United Nations Councils and the International Court of Justice

Elections will be held at the 15th GA for four seats on the Security Council, six seats on the Economic and Social Council, and five seats on the International Court of Justice. In addition, a separate election will be held to fill the vacancy on the International Court of Justice created by the recent death of Judge Lauterpacht (British). We have with two exceptions given no commitments of support to candidates for any of these seats, in keeping with our usual practice of not making commitments so far in advance of the actual elections. You should, however, let it be known that we are committed to support the election of Portugal to the seat on the Security Council currently occupied by Italy, this being generally regarded as a West European seat and Portugal being the West European candidate. We have also given a commitment of support to China for election to the Economic and Social Council.

(a) Security Council

The seats currently held by Tunisia, Italy and Argentina will be vacated at the end of 1960. Announced candidates for these seats are the UAR, Portugal, Chile and Cuba. Jordan may also be a candidate to succeed Tunisia. A Jordanian candidacy was announced last year, but since then, Jordan has announced its candidacy for the Economic and Social Council and has made no recent mention of its earlier candidacy for the Security Council. The Arab League is apparently disposed to support the UAR as Tunisia’s successor. An earlier Netherlands candidacy to succeed Italy has been withdrawn in favor of Portugal. Pursuant to the compromise worked out at the 14th General Assembly,⁵ Poland should submit its resignation from the Council before the end of this year in order that Turkey may occupy the seat for the second half of the term. This will require that the Assembly go through the formality of electing Turkey.

(b) Economic and Social Council

Chile, China, Costa Rica, France, Netherlands, and the Sudan retire from the Economic and Social Council at the end of 1960. The re-election of China and France would be in accord with the generally accepted practice that the five permanent members of the Security Council are always represented on all major UN bodies. In this connection, the U.S. attaches major importance to the re-election of China, in order both to maintain the GRC’s international status and to maintain the five-permanent-member tradition unimpaired. Ethiopia, Ghana, and Jordan are candidates to succeed the Sudan. Jordan has received the preliminary endorsement of the Arab League. Belgium is an announced candidate, and Italy a possible candidate to succeed the Netherlands. El Salvador is a candidate to succeed Costa Rica. No candidacy has yet been announced for the seat currently occupied by Chile.

(c) International Court of Justice

The seats on the International Court of Justice currently occupied by United States, Norwegian, Uruguayan, Pakistani and Russian nationals become vacant early in February 1961. Each member of the Court maintains a panel of up to four legal experts, termed the “national group”, which submits nominations to the Secretary-General; vacancies are filled by the General Assembly and Security Council from the nominated candidates. The Uruguayan (Armand Ugon), Pakistani (Zafrulla Khan) and Norwegian (Klaestad) incumbents have been nominated for re-election. The United States national, Judge Hackworth, has already been nominated by five national groups, but the United States national group has not yet acted. There is as yet no indication whether the incumbent Soviet judge will be candidate. Other candidates are: Bartos (Yugoslavian), Bustamante y Rivero (Peruvian), Castren (Finn), Daftari (Iranian), Fernandes (Brazilian), Guggenhein (Swiss), Jarfa (Chilean), Morelli (Italian), Pal (Indian), Petren (Swedish), Sapena Pastor (Paraguayan), Sorensen (Danish), Tanaka (Japanese), Trolle (Danish), Tunkin (Russian).

The UK national group has nominated Fitzmaurice to fill the un expiredterm of Judge Lauterpacht (UK) who died recently.

While the Statute of the Court takes no cognizance of geographic distribution, referring rather to the representation in the Court of “the main forms of civilization and of the principal legal systems of the world”, there is nevertheless a disposition in the UN to take into account the factor of geographic distribution.

4. Enlargement of UN Councils

For the fifth consecutive year the Assembly will have on its agenda two items concerning, respectively, an increase in the number of non-permanent members of the Security Council and the enlargement of the Economic and Social Council. The position of the USSR making its ratification of any Charter amendments conditional on the settlement of the Chinese representation issue in its favor has so far discouraged the Assembly from adopting the amendments necessary to bring about an increase in the size of the two Councils. Such amendments are subject to the Great Power Veto. However, the Assembly at its14th session, in deciding again to carry over these two agenda items to its next session, adopted a “declaration of intention” that if no progress is made on enlargement of the two Councils at the15th GA, the Assembly should at that time set up “a committee to study the possibilities of arriving at an agreement which will facilitate the amendment of the Charter” to achieve such enlargement.⁶ The discussion at the 14th session had made clear the consensus of the Assembly that the expanding membership of the UN requires a reasonable enlargement of these two Councils if the new membership is to have adequate opportunity for participation in their work, particularly in the work of the Economic and Social Council. In the case of a similar agenda item concerning the International Court of Justice, opinion in the Assembly was divided and this item was not carried forward.

The US continues to favor the enlargement of the two Councils, and particularly the Economic and Social Council in whose work the new membership has such a direct and primary interest. The Department sees little prospect at this time of any change in the Soviet position—certainly not with respect to the Security Council—though there may be some slight possibility that with respect to the Economic and Social Council the USSR might prove responsive to pressure from the African and Asian members. The Department would in this connection like to be kept informed of any indications that such pressure may be developing. In the meantime it is reviewing the situation to determine whether there is any constructive action which can be taken so long as the Soviet position remains unchanged. For example, the US has already proposed to the members of the Economic and Social Council that, in the event the Soviet Union continues to prevent an enlargement of the Council itself, the functional commissions of ECOSOC should be moderately enlarged to provide increased representation for Asia and Africa.

5. The Representation of China

The question of the representation of Communist China in the UN is expected to be raised. (At the last four General Assemblies India took the initiative and introduced the question in the form of an item for inclusion on the agenda; prior to 1956 the USSR generally raised the issue.) To date India has taken no steps to introduce this issue at the 15th GA. In accordance with our policy of strong support for the Government of the Republic of China in international organizations, we shall again propose that the Assembly decide “not to consider” any proposals to exclude the representatives of the Government of the Republic of China and/or to seat Chinese Communists. FYI. By taking such procedural position and avoiding a vote on the substance, we expect to be able again to achieve our policy objective with maximum free-world support. Furthermore, we are confident that the UK, as in the past, will support the moratorium formula. End FYI.

At your discretion, you may point out that the Chinese Communist regime (1) does not meet the standards for international behavior specifically set forth in the UN Charter and continues to show nothing but contempt for the principles for which the UN stands; (2) by continuing its brutal actions in Tibet, about which the 14th GA expressed grave concern and of which new and serious reports are now being received, adds one more example to its record of shocking disregard for human life and liberty; meanwhile it continues by its wanton shelling to disturb the peace in the Taiwan Strait; (3) is a condemned and persistent aggressor against the UN in Korea; and (4) prevents the implementation of the UN resolution calling for peaceful reunification of Korea by free elections.

For your background, the breakdown of the vote on the U.S.-sponsored resolution “not to consider” Chinese representation at the 14th General Assembly, taken on September 22, 1959, was as follows:⁷

(a) 44 states in favor: Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, France, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Iran, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Laos, Lebanon, Liberia, Luxembourg, Malaya, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Spain, Thailand, Turkey, Union of South Africa, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, and Venezuela.

(b) 29 states against: Afghanistan, Albania, Bulgaria, Burma, Byelorussia, Cambodia, Ceylon, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Finland, Ghana, Guinea, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Ireland, Morocco, Nepal, Norway, Poland, Rumania, Sudan, Sweden, Ukraine, United Arab Republic, USSR, Yemen, and Yugoslavia.

(c) 9 states abstaining: Austria, Cuba, Ethiopia, Iceland, Israel, Libya, Portugal, Saudi Arabia, and Tunisia.

Posts in those countries which voted in favor of the resolution should express appreciation for support on this question, which the U.S. believes continues to be one of paramount importance to the entire free world, and solicit continued support for a like U.S. position at the 15th GA. Posts in those countries which voted in the negative should, unless it is believed to be counterproductive, solicit support for adoption of the moratorium resolution or possibly an abstention, instead of a negative vote. Posts in those countries which abstained should, in their discretion, endeavor to obtain assurance for support of the moratorium resolution and if this is not forthcoming, at least continued abstention in preference to a negative vote. Posts should coordinate approach with local GRC Mission.

Posts are requested to report the outcome of this representation by cable.

6. U–2 Incident

The U–2 incident appears certain to be discussed at the Fifteenth General Assembly either in a separate agenda item or as part of the disarmament item. Our position has been made quite clear in the President’s May 25 radio and television address to the nation. The text of this address was reprinted in the June 6 edition of the Department of State Bulletin (Vol. XLII, No. 1093).

7. Disarmament

On June 27, 1960 the Soviet Union submitted a request for inclusion in the agenda of an item entitled “Disarmament and the Situation with Regard to the Fulfillment of the GA Resolution of November 20, 1959 on the Question of Disarmament”.⁸

The U.S. and its allies are now consulting on the position to be taken in the disarmament field during the coming session. As a first step, the U.S. has requested that the UN Disarmament Commission be convened in August to consider on an urgent basis the situation arising from the Soviet decison to break off disarmament negotiations in the 10-nation committee which had been working in Geneva. During debate the Soviet Union will attempt to show that it has sought an agreement on general and complete disarmament and will allege that the Western powers are interested only in control and inspection without disarmament. The Western powers, for their part, can be expected to explain the proposals which they made in Geneva. This will include the disarmament proposal introduced into the Committee by the U.S. on June 27, the day that the Soviet Union walked out of the meeting. In the latter connection, we plan to stress the arbitrary and irresponsible torpedoing of the negotiations by the Soviet Union at a time when the Communists know that further Western proposals were about to be presented. The manner in which the Communist Chairman steamrollered the final meeting of the 10-nation conference is particularly illuminating, and, in discussions on this point, posts may find it useful to draw on CG–909, June 30, 1960.⁹

The main burden of the Western case will be to contrast the Soviet and Western records. The Soviets have insisted on an “all or nothing” plan for general and complete disarmament with discussion of effective international controls postponed until full agreement has been reached on its plan; the West, while agreeing with the goal of general and complete disarmament, has urged agreement be reached on feasible first steps of an overall plan which could be taken immediately, would greatly reduce the risks of war, and would be concrete progress toward the ultimate goal.

In presenting its proposals, and in subsequent negotiations, the Western Governments were guided by the following fundamental concepts which we believe constitute the proper approach to complete and general disarmament under effective international control:

1. We believe that disarmament must be carried out by stages with each stage to be completed as rapidly as possible but that it is impossible to fix in advance a timetable for the process as a whole.

2. We believe that in the process no country or side should obtain military advantage, and that to this end nuclear and conventional measures must be balanced.

3. We hold that disarmament measures must be verified from their entry into force. To ensure that there is no evasion, there must be an effective international disarmament organization within the framework of the United Nations.

4. Finally, we believe that disarmament measures which can be implemented and effectively controlled at an early stage should be negotiated now and put into effect at the earliest possible moment.

The Western proposals have provided for certain concrete measures which could be undertaken as early and immediate steps in working toward general and complete disarmament.

These include:

A) A prohibition against orbiting vehicles carrying weapons of mass destruction.

B) Cessation of production of fissionable material for weapons purposes and transfer of agreed quantities of such materials to peaceful uses.

C) Prior notification of proposed missile launchings.

D) Establishment of force level ceilings for the U.S. and the USSR, and further reduction of the forces of the U.S. and the USSR and all other militarily significant nations, under adequate control, together with deposit of military equipment in internationally supervised depots.

E) Measures for protection against surprise attack.

The U.S. plan of June 27 was a major policy action which would have provided a useful basis for negotiation. It should be pointed out that this proposal constituted a speedy and flexible response to the Soviet proposal of June 2¹⁰ and represented an adjustment of our position to accommodate significant aspects of the Soviet and allied views.

Certain factors in the Soviet plan which are particularly objectionable to the U.S. were the following: (1) The Soviets have continued to insist that not a single measure be implemented and not one significant control system worked out until the entire Soviet package plan has been accepted. We have consistently emphasized the desirability of exploring, isolating and agreeing on feasible first stage measures to prevent the development of an unstable military environment and to promote the development of that confidence necessary for agreement on broader measures. We have opposed and will continue to oppose negotiations on rigid package plans put on an “all or nothing” basis. (2) The proposals advanced by the USSR for the first stage could result in unbalanced disarmament which can upset the strategic equilibrium which now exists and, rather than promoting peace and stability, would create an unstable situation in which the danger of military conflict would increase. (3) The Soviet proposal makes it plain that the right to search for clandestine military activities would be reserved until general and complete disarmament had been achieved. This obviously would not be adequate to the purpose of verifying that the Soviet proposals were, in fact, being carried out.

The Soviet record thus far strongly indicates that the Soviet Government has been wholly disinterested in conducting any serious negotiations on disarmament, but has instead concentrated exclusively on propaganda objectives. This hypocrisy is demonstrated by the Soviet insistence on the “all or nothing” package plan, the Soviet refusal even to consider concrete and immediate disarmament measures, by Soviet fulminations against “control without disarmament” (which indicates a Soviet desire to defer control measures until significant disarmament steps have already been taken and to avoid any verification of the status of armaments at the time disarmament begins), and by the Soviet insistence that the Western nations take certain initial steps which would be dangerous to free world security prior to any significant and verifiable Soviet disarmament. The U.S. continues to hope that the Soviet Government can be persuaded to negotiate seriously on disarmament, and believes the pressure of world opinion may be a useful means toward this end, but sees no evidence that the Soviet Government is yet prepared to enter into serious discussions on any workable disarmament arrangement.

8. Outer Space

The 14th General Assembly established a 24-nation UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space consisting of Albania, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Czechoslovakia, France, Hungary, India, Iran, Italy, Japan, Lebanon, Mexico, Poland, Rumania, Sweden, USSR, UAR, UK and the U.S. The inclusion of 7 Soviet bloc members was agreed—in order to secure the active participation of the USSR, which had boycotted the Ad Hoc Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space established at the 13th GA.

The tasks assigned the new Committee were based in large part on the report of the Ad Hoc Committee which outlined the future work that the UN might undertake in the outer space field. The first task was the study of means to effect scientific and technical programs in the peaceful uses of outer space that could appropriately be undertaken under United Nations auspices. The second was the study of legal problems that might arise from the exploration of outer space. The GA also entrusted the Committee with working out proposals for the holding of an international scientific conference for the exchange of experience in the peaceful uses of outer space, to beheld in 1960 or 1961.

Since January, an effort has been underway at UN Headquarters to negotiate a mutually agreeable slate of officers and a scheme of organization for the Committee, and if possible, for the proposed Conference. The USSR has insisted on a predominant role in the Conference. Alternately, it has advocated that as the U.S. and USSR are the only two significant powers in the outer space field, they should share most of the major offices. Such an argument in our view counters a well established tradition in the UN that the big powers should not hold major offices in UN conferences, and subsidiary bodies. Moreover, we believe that the essence of the GA is the principle that the smaller powers should play a significant role, and that they can make useful contributions.

The Committee was expected to report to the 15th GA on its progress in the scientific and legal fields. However it is unlikely that it will be able to proceed with work in depth prior to the 15th GA.

9. Algeria

It now appears certain that the Algerian question, which has been debated by the GA every year since 1955, will be discussed at the 15th GA. In the event negotiations between the French Government and the Algerians are proceeding at the time of the 15th GA, it is questionable whether the African and Asian countries which have requested inscription of the item in previous years will wish to run the risk of hampering direct talks. On the other hand, the prospects for high level talks in Paris are highly uncertain.

During the 14th GA, the Algerian question was debated at length. France did not participate in the debate, although the French Foreign Minister in his general debate statement at the beginning of the session did call the Assembly’s attention to President de Gaulle’s September 16 “self-determination” offer.¹¹ He reiterated at the same time the French contention that a debate on Algeria was outside the competence of the UN. The US representative, speaking on December 2 in the Political Committee,¹² recalled the hope of the United States Government that a “just, peaceful and democratic solution” might be found, offering satisfaction to the aspirations of the Algerian people as a whole. He expressed the belief that the September 16 de Gaulle statement formed a basis for concrete discussions between the parties concerned, and he urged upon the committee “the wisdom of avoiding a resolution which could prejudice a solution” of the problem.

Two resolutions were put forward during the course of the debate. The first called for Algerian independence and for negotiations between the French Government and the so called “Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic” composed of the rebel leaders. This resolution was adopted by the first committee, but by less than a two-thirds majority.¹³ The U.S. opposed the resolution. A modified resolution was put forward in the plenary, which recognized the right of the Algerian people to self-determination, expressed concern over continuing hostilities, and urged the two parties to negotiate to determine the conditions necessary for the implementation of the right to self-determination for the Algerian people, including conditions for a cease fire. This resolution failed by one vote to secure the required two-thirds majority.¹⁴ The U.S. abstained on this resolution, pointing out that while we support the substantive principles embodied in the resolution, we nevertheless did not believe the resolution would actually help to resolve the Algerian problem or otherwise serve a useful purpose.

On June 14, 1960, President de Gaulle again appealed to the “leaders of the insurrection” in Algeria to come to Paris to find “an honorable end to the fighting that still drags on … ”¹⁵ Once this can be done, he stated, “we shall set everything in motion in order that the Algerian people can speak its mind in an appeased atmosphere.” On June 20, the “Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic,” while reserving its position on details of the self-determination offer, “decided to send a delegation headed by Mr. Ferhat Abbas to meet General de Gaulle.” To prepare the way for the Abbas mission emissaries were sent to Paris in June to make the necessary travel and security arrangements. After five days of talks, the Algerian negotiators left Paris, terming French proposals “humiliating” and predicting that Abbas would not go to Paris. Both sides took pains, however, to stress that the talks were suspended, rather than broken off. The issues over which they were suspended are probably all negotiable, but not at that time, and not all at once.

The negotiations, which may well be protracted and will almost certainly be difficult, if they finally take place, will profoundly affect the climate of opinion and the prospect for renewed discussion of the problem. Progress toward an agreement this summer could obviate abitter debate. On the other hand, if negotiations do not take place, or if they are held and fail, UN consideration of the problem is almost certain and may well be more difficult than in the past.

Developments between now and the opening of the GA will necessarily affect our view on the best manner of handling the Algerian item.

10. South Africa

A) “The Question of Race Conflict in South Africa Resulting from the Policy of Apartheld of the Government of the Union of South Africa”

This item has been on the agenda of every regular GA since 1952 and on July 20 a group of African, Asian and Latin American countries decided to request its inclusion on the agenda of the 15th GA. At the 14th GA, the U.S. joined 62 other nations in voting for a resolution which: (1) expressed its opposition to the continuance or preservation of racial discrimination in any part of the world; (2) called upon all member states to bring their policies into conformity with their obligations under the Charter to promote the observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms; (3) expressed its deep regret and concern that the Government of the Union of South Africa had not yet responded to appeals by the GA that it reconsider governmental policies which impair the right of all racial groups to enjoy the same fundamental rights and freedoms; and (4) appealed to all member states to use their best endeavors as appropriate to achieve the purposes of the resolution.¹⁶

On March 25, 1960, 28 African and Asian delegations, later joined by Laos, requested “an urgent meeting of the Security Council to consider the situation arising out of the large-scale killings [at Sharpeville]¹⁷ of unarmed and peaceful demonstrators against racial discrimination and segregation in the Union of South Africa.” Seven Asian and African countries other than Security Council members participated in the debate, as did the Representative of the Union of South Africa. The U.S. supported inscription and voted for a resolution: (1) recognizing that the situation in the Union of South Africa is one that has led to international friction and if continued might endanger international peace and security; (2) deploring the loss of life of so many Africans during the March 1960 disturbances as well as the policies and actions of the Union Government which gave rise to the situation; (3) calling upon the Union to take measures aimed at bringing about racial harmony based on equality; and (4) requesting the Secretary General, in consultation with the Union Government, to make such arrangements as would adequately help in upholding the purposes and principles of the Charter.¹⁸ On April 19, 1960, the Secretary General accepted a Union proposal to hold preliminary consultations with the Union Minister of External Affairs in London. Later this summer, the Secretary General will spend several days in the Union discussing the international effects of apartheid with Union Government and non-official leaders.

FYI. The Union asserts that the question of apartheid comes entirely under its domestic jurisdiction, and because of this declined to participate fully in UN activities from the fall of 1956 until July 1958. At that time, the Union announced its return to full participation in the work of the UN, although it continued to oppose the inclusion of apartheid and treatment of Indians (see below) items on the agenda.

Our view is that the discussion of such matters or general recommendations on carrying out Charter obligations in the field of human rights do not constitute intervention in matters essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of a state. At the same time, we hope that the efforts of the Secretary General in South Africa will be fruitful. End FYI.

B) Treatment of Indians in the Union of South Africa

This item has been considered by the GA every year with one exception since 1946. At its 12th Session, the GA appealed to the Union to negotiate with India and Pakistan on the treatment of people of Indian origin in the Union in accordance with the principles of the Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. At the following session, the U.S. joined with 62 nations to adopt a resolution regretting the Union’s failure to negotiate and again appealing to the Union to enter into negotiations without prejudice to its juridical position.¹⁹

The 14th Session of the GA adopted a resolution which: (1) noted the continued readiness of the Indian and Pakistani Governments to enter into negotiations with the Union; (2) regretted deeply that the Union had not replied to communications from these governments; (3) drew the attention of the Government of the Union to the repeated appeals of the GA to the Union to enter into negotiations with India and Pakistan; and (4) invited Member States to use their good offices in such a manner as might be appropriate to bring about the negotiations envisaged.²⁰ This resolution was adopted with 66 votes in favor, including the U.S.

This item has again been included, and we would hope for a debate with a minimum of acrimony.

11. Hungary

United Nations Special Representative on Hungary, Sir Leslie Munro, on November 17, 1959, cited rumors of continuing secret trials and executions in Hungary and requested inscription of “the Question of Hungary” in the agenda of the 14th GA as an urgent and important item. In his report to the GA, Sir Leslie, among other things, stated that there had been no evidence during the preceding year of any basic change in the Hungarian situation that would warrant relaxation of continued UN attention to the problem.²¹

After debating the Special Representative’s report, the U.S. joined with Belgium, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Federation of Malaya, France, Haiti, Honduras, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Philippines, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, UK, and Uruguay in submitting a draft resolution. The resolution deplored the continued disregard by the USSR and the present Hungarian regime of the GA’s resolutions, called upon them to cooperate with the Special Representative, and requested Sir Leslie Munro to continue his efforts to obtain compliance with the Assembly’s resolutions on Hungary. The resolution was adopted by a vote of 53 to 10(Soviet bloc and Yugoslavia) with 17 abstentions (Afghanistan, Ceylon, Ethiopia, Finland, Ghana, Guinea, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, UAR, Yemen). As in previous years, on the initiative of the U.S. no decision (i.e., neither accept nor reject) was taken on Hungarian credentials.²² By this action the Assembly expressed its doubts as to whether the present Hungarian regime did, in fact, represent the people of Hungary.

On March 31, 1960, the Budapest authorities announced that a partial amnesty had been declared for certain categories of persons who had been sentenced for “crimes against the people.” Sir Leslie Munro at a press conference in Geneva on June 8 asked for full details as to the persons affected by the decree. He also requested information concerning the fate of the large number of Hungarian patriots deported to the Soviet Union in 1956 and that of the Hungarian refugees who returned to their country after 1956. The United Nations Special Representative reiterated his desire to consult with Hungarian and Soviet authorities with a view to implementing the Assembly’s resolutions on Hungary.

A request for inscription of an item on Hungary in the agenda of the 15th GA has not thus far been made, and the plans of the Special Representative concerning the submission of a report are unknown. In the absence of a demonstration of willingness by the Hungarian regime to undertake some measure of compliance with the resolutions of the UNGA, however, it is virtually certain that the Hungarian question will be considered in some form by the 15th GA. The U.S. does not believe that the UN can wholly abandon the Hungarian question so long as the Soviet Union and the Hungarian regime maintain a position of total intransigence.

12. Korea

The resolution on Korea adopted by the 14th GA requested the Secretary General to inscribe the Korean question in the provisional agenda for the 15th session.²³

This matter will be discussed in connection with the annual report of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea (UNCURK). It is anticipated that representatives of the sixteen nations which contributed armed forces to the defense of Korea will again submit a resolution calling upon the Communists to accept the fundamental principles for unification set forth by the states participating on behalf of the UN in the Korean Political Conference held in Geneva in 1954 and subsequently reaffirmed by the General Assembly. The principles are: (1) the UN, under its Charter, is fully and rightly empowered to take collective action to repel aggression, to restore peace and security and to extend its good offices to seeking a peaceful settlement in Korea; and (2) in order to establish a unified, independent and democratic Korea, genuinely free elections should be held, under UN supervision, for representatives in the National Assembly, in which representation shall be in direct proportion to the indigenous population in Korea.

Last year’s resolution was adopted by a vote of 54 to 9 (Soviet bloc) with 17 abstentions (Afghanistan, Burma, Cambodia, Finland, Ghana, Guinea, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Lebanon, Libya, Nepal, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, UAR, Yemen, Yugoslavia). It reaffirmed the Geneva principles and reiterated the United Nations determination to bring about by peaceful means the establishment of a unified, independent, and democratic Korea under a representative form of government, and the full restoration of international peace and security in the area.

This issue takes on particular importance this year because of the elections of July 29, 1960 in the ROK which have been notable for their fairness and freedom despite isolated instances of violence and demonstrations and which stand in sharp contrast to the Presidential election of March, 1959, the abuse of which led to the overthrow of the Rhee administration.

13. United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA)

In accordance with usual practice, the Director of UNRWA will submit to the GA an annual report chronicling the recent activities of the Agency in its relief and rehabilitation work for the approximately one million Palestine refugees. By 1456 (XIV) of the last GA,²⁴ the mandate of UNRWA was extended for three years beyond June 30, 1960. The length of this extension was essentially a compromise between the views of the Arab host governments, which favored a longer extension, and those of the U.S. We believed that a longer range or indefinite extension of the Agency’s mandate would tend to relieve such pressure as there might otherwise be on the parties principally concerned, i.e., Israel and the Arab States, to endeavor to find a fundamental solution to the problem of the Palestine refugees. The 14th GA’s resolution also called upon the Arab host governments to cooperate with the Director in rectifying widespread irregularities in the Agency’s relief distribution system. Further, the resolution called upon the Arab host governments to accord UNRWA personnel the privileges and immunities befitting the personnel of a subsidiary organ of the UN. Potentially, the most significant element in resolution 1456 was a request that the Palestine Conciliation Commission (PCC) make further efforts to seek implementation of paragraph 11, resolution 194 (III). This paragraph gave the Palestine refugees the right to choose either repatriation or compensation for property they left behind in what is now Israel. The principle of the refugees’ right to choose between repatriation and compensation has been reaffirmed by the GA many times. Israel opposes its implementation, and the Israeli abstention on resolution 1456 was based on that objection. All of the Arab delegates supported the resolution and there were no negative votes.

Presumably the UNRWA Director’s report will outline the measures taken to implement the provisions of last year’s resolution, excepting that part calling for further PCC efforts. The PCC, as is customary, will submit its own report when it is timely to do so.

FYI. At present it is not possible to foresee whether circumstances next autumn will be such that the usual full-blown debate on the Palestine refugee problem would serve a useful purpose. Possibly we shall seek to avoid debate, especially if it is deemed that an acrimonious exchange could impair quiet diplomatic efforts to make some progress on the refugee issue and related matters. (There are procedural means whereby the Director’s report could be handled in a manner that would not necessitate a contentious debate.) On the other hand, interim developments may render a full scale debate tactically desirable. Posts should not take the initiative in raising the question of debate with foreign officials. However, if asked, you should indicate that we do not at present view a “regular” debate on Palestine refugees in the 15th GA as necessarily appropriate. End FYI.

The finances (of which the U.S. has traditionally contributed about 70%) available to UNRWA have in general enabled the Agency to provide only essential relief services and elementary education to the Palestine refugees. Lack of funds has unfortunately severely restricted the scope of UNRWA’s extremely effective vocational training and individual grants and loans programs. These programs constitute the sole means presently available by which some of the younger refugees can be rendered self-supporting. The U.S. believes its contribution to UNRWA should not exceed 70% of the total governmental contributions. The more funds that are contributed to the Agency by other governments in the future, the more real progress will be made towards a solution of this problem. Posts are requested to avail themselves of every appropriate opportunity to urge those who have not yet contributed to do so, and urge those who are presently contributing to increase their pledges.

13. South Tyrol

In a letter dated June 23, 1960, the Foreign Minister of Austria requested the Secretary General to inscribe an item entitled “The Problem of the Austrian Minority in Italy” on the agenda for the 15th GA. In an enclosed explanatory memorandum, Austria asserted that Italy had failed to grant the Province of Bolzano, and hence the South Tyrolese, the autonomy which, according to Austria, had been provided for in the 1946 De Gasperi–Gruber Agreement between Italy and Austria.²⁵ The memorandum requested the Assembly to bring about a settlement based on democratic principles.

The De Gasperi-Gruber Agreement, according to Italy, does not specifically provide for autonomy for Bolzano Province. The Agreement states that the German-speaking inhabitants of Bolzano Province and the neighboring bilingual townships of Trento Province “will be granted the exercise of autonomous legislative and executive regional power”.

The South Tyrol, or Alto Adige as the Italians call it, has been a part of Italy since 1919. Subsequent to the De Gasperi-Gruber Agreement, the Italian Government in 1948 established the autonomous region of Trentino–Alto Adige, comprising the provinces of Bolzano, where the German-speaking population predominates, and the Trento, where the Italian-speaking inhabitants are a majority. Within the entire autonomy there is a majority of Italian-speaking residents. Although the leaders of the South Tyrolese assented to the amalgamation of Bolzano and Trento provinces in 1948, they and their Austrian supporters in North Tyrol now claim that Italy has not lived up to the spirit or the letter of the De Gasperi-Gruber Agreement. Among other things, the South Tyrolese assert that the Italian Government has failed to appoint German-speaking officials in proportion to the German-speaking inhabitants and has discriminated against them in such matters as public housing and employment.

We were opposed to the submission of this dispute between two of our friends to the United Nations. On numerous occasions we urged both Italy and Austria to make every effort to settle the matter through direct discussions. Furthermore, in the event bilateral negotiations were to fail, we urged that the dispute be referred to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) under the contentious proceedings provisions of the Statute by which both parties undertake to implement the Court’s decision.

On June 22, the Italian Government did in fact propose to Austria recourse to the ICJ. The Austrian response was to request inscription of the matter in the agenda of the 15th GA. Although Foreign Minister Kreisky has said that he would seek only a resolution by which the General Assembly would request an advisory opinion from the ICJ, we are concerned over the prospects that a public debate in the GA will invoke polemics which will encourage extremists and make the ultimate resolution of the problem more difficult.

14. Tibet

Following Chinese Communist attacks upon the Tibetan people aimed at the destruction of their political and religious liberties and human rights, the Dalai Lama appealed in 1959 to the Secretary General for UN consideration of the plight of his people. An item was proposed for inclusion on the agenda of the 14th GA by Ireland and Malaya and a resolution on the question of Tibet was subsequently approved by the General Assembly.²⁶ This resolution, after expressing grave concern over reports of the loss of human rights and freedoms of the Tibetan people and deploring the effect of events in Tibet in embittering international relations, called for respect for the fundamental human rights of the Tibetan people and for their distinctive cultural and religious life.

Reports of continuing attacks upon the Tibetan people by the Chinese Communists continue to be received and the International Commission of Jurists has investigated the problem. The results of this investigation have recently been embodied in a report which reveals acts of religious genocide and violation of human rights.

While the United States has not yet reached a decision on specificaction on Tibet, and would in the first instance wish to take into account the views of others, particularly the sponsors of last year’s item (Ireland and Malaya), we foresee the likelihood that the Tibetan question will be before the forthcoming General Assembly in some form.

Herter

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 320/8–460. Confidential. Drafted by Oakley; cleared by Sisco, Kerley, Monsma, Herz, Driscoll, Westfall, Ludlow, Bacon, Nunley, S/AE, and OES; and approved by Sisco who signed for Herter. Sent to 83 diplomatic posts and repeated to 13 diplomatic and 11 consular posts. An enclosed checklist of items, SD/A483A, is not printed.
2. See footnote 4, Document 89.
3. For text of Eisenhower’s May 25 address, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States:Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1960–1961, pp. 437–445.
4. Regarding CG–517 and CG–577, see footnote 3, Document 135.
5. Regarding this compromise, see Document 118.
6. For text of U.N. General Assembly Resolution 1404 (XIV), adopted November 25, 1959, see U.N. doc. A4354.
7. Regarding U.N. General Assembly Resolution 1351 (XIV), see footnote 2, Document 95.
8. For texts of the Soviet request and explanatory memorandum, see U.N. doc. A4385. The resolution under reference is U.N. General Assembly Resolution 1378 (XIV); for text, see U.N. doc. A4354.
9. On July 21, Eisenhower announced that he had instructed Lodge to request an early meeting of the U.N. Disarmament Commission. For text of his statement, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1960–1961, pp. 583–584. For text of Lodge’s July 22 letter to Disarmament Commission Chairman Padilla Nervo, see U.N. doc. DC/154. For text of the U.S. proposals submitted to the Ten-Nation Committee on Disarmament in Geneva on June 27, see U.N. doc. TNCD/7. A copy of circular airgram CG–909, which transmitted background information and the U.S. position on the Soviet walk-out, is in Department of State, Central Files, 396.12–GE/6–3060.
10. For text, see U.N. doc. TNCD/6/Rev. 1.
11. For text of Couve de Murville’s general debate statement, see U.N. doc. APV.814. For text of de Gaulle’s September 16, 1959, address, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1959, pp. 1096–1099.
12. For text, see ibid., pp. 1102–1104.
13. For text and a record of the vote on the draft resolution, see U.N. doc. A4339.
14. For text of the draft resolution, see U.N. doc.AL.276. For a record of the debate and vote on the draft resolution, see U.N. doc. APV.856.
15. Ellipsis in the source text.
16. For text of U.N. General Assembly Resolution 1375 (XIV), adopted November 17, 1959, see U.N. doc. A4354.
17. Brackets in the source text.
18. For text of this U.N. Security Council Resolution, adopted April 1, 1960, see U.N. doc. S/INF/15.
19. Regarding U.N. General Assembly Resolutions 1179 (XII), adopted November 26, 1957, and 1302 (XIII), adopted December 10, 1958, see footnotes 17 and 18, respectively, Document 84.
20. For text of U.N. General Assembly Resolution 1460 (XIV), adopted December 10, 1959, see U.N. doc. A4354.
21. Regarding Munro’s report to the14th U.N. General Assembly, see footnote 2, Document 122.
22. For text of U.N. General Assembly Resolution 1454 (XIV) on the Question of Hungary, adopted December 9, 1959, see U.N. doc. A4354. For text of the Report of the Credentials Committee, see U.N. doc. A4346. For text of U.N. General Assembly Resolution 1457 (XIV) approving the report of the Credentials Committee, adopted December 10, 1959, see U.N. doc. A4354.
23. Reference is to U.N. General Assembly Resolution 1455 (XIV); ibid.
24. Adopted December 9, 1959; ibid.
25. For texts of the letter and explanatory memorandum, see U.N. doc. A4395. The text of the September 5, 1946, agreement between Austrian Foreign Minister Gruber and Italian Premier De Gasperi was incorporated into the Treaty of Peace With Italy as Annex IV. For text of the Treaty, signed at Paris February 10, 1947, see 61 Stat. 1245.
26. Regarding U.N. General Assembly Resolution 1353(XIV), see Document 102.