Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, United Nations and General International Matters, Volume II

144. Circular Airgram From the Department of State to Certain Diplomatic Missions ¹

Washington , August 2, 1960—6:53 p.m.

CG–97

Ref Oslo’s G–12 to Dept, rptd info G–3 to Stockholm, Copenhagen, G–2 to Helsinki, G–1 to Reykjavik.² In Dept’s view two factors, 1) Iceland’s position as participant Nordic Foreign Minister’s Meeting and 2) Dept’s own assurances Thors and GOI US would not actively campaign against him or for Boland unless it appears necessary in order avoid election Soviet bloc or neutralist “compromise” candidate, make any effort persuade other Scandinavians not support Thors’ candidacy “in first instance” both undesirable and likely prove unproductive. However Dept remains concerned over possibility of deadlock over GA presidency even though such possibility appears remote at this juncture. You should therefore seek occasion before Nordic Foreign Ministers Meeting approach Foreign Minister along following lines:

1. We appreciate why Scandinavians believe they must at least initially support Thors candidacy and have no intention trying to dissuade them.

2. We continue however be concerned over potentially dangerous situation inherent in maintenance two rival West European candidacies which could so split free world vote as to result in deadlock and pave way for shift to Nosek or some unacceptable “compromise” candidate.

3. We believe danger to free world in Soviet bloc or neutralist “compromise” candidate as GA president underscored by fact 15th GA will in all likelihood be required, in view abortive nature Summit meeting, consider matters of vital concern free world. Recent performance Polish chairman in breaking off Committee of Ten disarmament negotiations at Geneva in complete disregard rules of procedure³ indicative why Soviet bloc president 15th GA clearly not conducive orderly conduct GA’s business or in free world interest. Moreover we consider election of Soviet bloc GA president would be most undesirable and inappropriate at this time in view barrage of threats now issuing from Moscow and Soviet efforts to disrupt UN operations in Congo, where Scandinavians themselves are making important contributions toward restoration order.

4. We continue to believe Boland stronger candidate than Thors and our information indicates Boland candidacy has substantial support. We would therefore hope Scandinavians could see their way clear to shift to Boland if it appears after first ballot he leading Thors, and thus assist in avoiding any prolonged and open contest between two West European candidates from which only Soviet bloc could hope to profit.⁴

Herter

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 320/8–260. Confidential. Drafted by Hartley; initialed by Sisco; cleared by Nunley; and approved by Wallner who signed for Herter. Sent to Oslo, Stockholm, Copenhagen, and Helsinki and repeated to Reykjavik and USUN.
2. Dated July 28, this telegram reported that the Nordic Foreign Ministers would meet in Oslo August 29–30, predicted they would support Thors for President of the 15th U.N General Assembly, and requested instructions by August 24. (Ibid., 320/7–2860)
3. On June 27, the Soviet Delegation to the Ten-Nation Committee on Disarmament, which had convened in Geneva on March 15, walked out of the meeting. The Polish chairman then ended that day’s session, despite requests from Western delegations to speak. The conference ended the following day.
4. Willis reported that the Nordic Foreign Ministers had decided to continue supporting Thors’ candidacy, but had agreed to reconsider this decision once voting began, and that the Norwegian Foreign Minister felt they would not support Nosek. (Telegram 161 from Oslo, August 31; ibid., 320/8–3160)