Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, United Nations and General International Matters, Volume II

141. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Iceland¹

Washington, June 28, 1960—7:18 p.m.

346. While US has made its support Boland generally known, he has been campaigning actively own behalf and US has so far remained in background (urtel 372²) Dept would hope be able continue do so. However, this would not be feasible were situation to develop making election Nosek or some other unacceptable candidate appear serious possibility. Such situation only likely arise should Thors candidacy attract sufficient votes seriously detract Boland’s strength, thus splitting vote non-Communist candidate can be expected attract and opening way shift to Nosek or some unacceptable “compromise” candidate. In this event US would have take whatever steps seem necessary to assure election candidate acceptable to West and Dept believes Boland stronger candidate than Thors.

You should therefore reiterate Prime Minister our strong friendship and high regard Iceland and Thors; our deep regret his candidacy put forward in circumstances making impossible, as Iceland aware, its support by US; and Dept’s continuing concern over potentially difficult situation inherent in two rival West European candidacies. You should stress that if such situation appears be developing, any steps US may deem necessary take will be taken not against Thors or the interests of Iceland but to avoid dangers to free world in Soviet bloc or neutralist “compromise” candidate as GA President. These dangers underscored by fact 15th GA will in all likelihood be required consider, in view abortive nature Summit Meeting,³ matters of vital concern free world. Within this context US will continue to extent possible limit its campaigning behalf Boland to making our firm support his candidacy clear as circumstances warrant.

Should appropriate occasion arise you might also wish point out Foreign Minister we do not agree his characterization of US actions of Law of Sea Conference accurate. Joint US-Canadian position put forth and supported Geneva at considerable sacrifice interests of US and other countries which supported this proposal. These countries agreed considerable self-sacrifices were justified in seeking codify international law in this very important field. None of so-called US pressures at Geneva were directed against Iceland specifically but were rather earnest attempt reach agreement which we considered essential for security of free world. We were distressed find minority of nations, including Iceland, could not modify their original positions in order reach such an agreement. We of course unhappy Iceland could not join us in this endeavor since we cannot see how adoption US-Canadian proposal would have been inimical Iceland’s long-term interest, especially with further suggestion by UK for special consideration for Iceland.⁴ We feel failure this conference with its resultant threat to free world security is event which can only be deplored in Western world and can only in end rebound to disadvantage Iceland itself.⁵

Herter

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 320/6–2460. Confidential; Limited Distribution. Drafted by Hartley and Williamson; initialed by Cargo and Sisco; cleared by Willoughby, Van Heuven, BNA, and U/LS; and approved by Wilcox who signed for Herter. Repeated to USUN.
2. Telegram 372, June 24, reported that the Icelandic Prime Minister and Foreign Minister had asked that the United States refrain from campaigning for Boland and had alleged that it had used pressure tactics and had acted against Iceland’s interests during the last Law of the Sea Conference. (Ibid.) Regarding the Second Law of the Sea Conference, held at Geneva March 17–April 26, see Documents 399 ff.
3. Documentation on the collapse of the summit meeting in Paris, May 16–17, is scheduled for publication in volume IX.
4. At this point in the source text, the following sentence was deleted before transmission: “We also distressed some Icelanders could see fit to boast conference failed because of Icelandian vote.”
5. Telegram 6 from Reykjavik, July 6, reported that the information regarding the U.S. position on Thors’ candidacy and at the Law of the Sea Conference had been given to the Icelandic Foreign Minster, who had stated he thought the United States would not need to campaign against Nosek, and had accepted without argument the explanation of the U.S. position at the Law of the Sea Conference. (Department of State, Central Files, 320/7–660)