Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, United Nations and General International Matters, Volume II

140. Circular Instruction From the Department of State to Certain Diplomatic and Consular Missions ¹

CA–10814

Washington , June 23, 1960 .

SUBJECT

• Participation of new African States in the United Nations

REF

• USUN 921²

INTRODUCTION

1. The fifteenth regular session of the General Assembly is scheduled to convene in New York on September 20, 1960. Up to fifteen newly independent states, including 14 from Africa, are expected to be admitted to the UN, i.e., 1. Belgian Congo, 2. Cameroon, 3. Cyprus, 4. Dahomey, 5. Gabon, 6. Ivory Coast, 7. Malagasy, 8. Mali Federation, 9. Mauritania, 10. Niger, 11. Nigeria, 12. Somaliland, 13. Togo, 14. Union of Central African Republics, and 15. Upper Volta. With this development the number of African members including the UAR but excluding the Union of South Africa would be twenty-three, making the African members the largest single geographic group in the UN, a position heretofore held by the Latin Americans. Moreover, there would then be an Afro-Arab-Asian membership of 45 out of a total of 97 members. Since an overwhelming majority of the new members of the United Nations in the next five years will come from Africa, the Afro-Asian group will probably constitute a majority of the UN Membership by 1965. The sub-Sahara Africans alone will probably be the largest subgroup, with as many as twenty-six members.

2. Given this vast increase in the African membership, it is axiomatic that the way in which these new members vote will be a major factor in US policy in the General Assembly. It is recognized that the geographic location of the prospective new members, their past experience and the outlook derived therefrom, and their state of political and economic development, together with the influence and pressures of some of the older African and Asian members may predispose them toward non-alignment. But if the Africans as a group abstain on key political votes at the 15th General Assembly, we will have considerable difficulty in subsequent General Assemblies in shifting their voting from neutralist patterns to support of Western positions on items most vital to us. We believe that the voting patterns adopted by the new African members at the 15th General Assembly will also have an important influence on the UN postures assumed by the many additional African members which are expected to be admitted to the United Nations during the next five years.

We are therefore faced with the important and essential task of developing at the outset, as far as possible, voting habits on the part of the new African members which will be most consonant with U.S. interests. We believe, therefore, that maximum efforts should be made to encourage them to play a constructive and responsible role in the UN and to seek their understanding and support for our positions on basic UN issues.

3. The United States has welcomed the admission into the United Nations of new states which are able and willing to fulfill the obligations of membership. The United States believes that the Charter of the United Nations, if supported by all members in its entirety, provides the best hope for genuine world peace and continued peaceful change.

With the increased tempo of the movement toward self-government and rise of independent African Nations, the United Nations has strengthened its interest in Africa and has adopted programs which are responsive to the evolving needs of the African continent. The United States has been a major originator of and contributor to these programs and will continue to accord them its support.

While the United Nations has made special efforts to serve the interests of the new African members, particularly in the economic and colonial fields, there is a corresponding obligation laid upon them to support the Charter in all of its aspects, including the political. We believe that the promotion of understanding by the new African members of our support for the United Nations, and an awareness that their interests are served by this support will be helpful in maintaining their orientation toward the West.

4. Efforts to influence favorably the voting of the new African members of the UN at the 15th General Assembly should initially concentrate on gaining their support for our position on a limited number of issues which are important to us. This approach seems preferable in view of the limited background of the new Foreign Offices on matters on the Assembly’s agenda. Moreover, the General Assembly agenda is long and of uneven importance, and an approach embracing too many items might be more confusing than helpful. By dealing with issues of only peripheral importance, we would risk diminishing our influence on major questions.

5. The Department has accordingly prepared (see Section A below) statements of its position on a number of key political items which will be before the 15th General Assembly. In addition, relevant material in the economic and colonial fields (Sections B and C) has been included to illustrate that our over-all UN policy is responsive to the interests of the new African members. These statements are designed for presentation to the new or provisional Governments at addressee posts either orally or in written form, tailored as posts deem most appropriate. It is hoped that this material will be useful not only for a single formal presentation but also for periodic informal conversations about the UN. Section D provides background material that can be used in informal conversation about the UN.

6. The attention of the posts is directed to 4 FSM 121.32³ pursuant to which each Mission is to designate an officer to be responsible for following and coordinating United Nations affairs. The names of the officers designated should be reported to the Department by separate despatch.

For African Posts: Unless you perceive serious objection, you should approach appropriate leaders of the new or emerging government on the political items contained in Section A below. At your discretion, you may draw on material contained in Sections B, C, and D to support your presentation. In the event you consider that some of the items in Section A should not be included in your approach or that they should be presented in substantially different terms, you should seek the Department’s instructions by airgram giving your reasons and, if appropriate, suggested substitute language.

For USUN: The Mission should inform UK, French, Belgian and Italian Delegations of approaches and their general nature.

[Here follow Sections A–C, containing background information and U.S. positions on “A. Political”: 1, “Advancement of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,” 2, “Disarmament,” 3, “Chinese Representation,” 4, “Measures to Repel Aggression,” and 5, “Peace-Keeping”; “B. Economic”: 1, “Capital Assistance,” 2, “The Expanded Program of Technical Assistance (ETAP) and the Special Fund,” 3, “OPEX,” 4, “Other U.N. Technical Aid Programs,” and 5, “ECA”; and “C. Colonial.”]

D. General Observations

At their discretion, posts may find appropriate occasions to make certain additional observations orally about the nature of the United Nations system and the general environment of UN activities. Since some of these observations are capable of misinterpretation, and since some may have connotations about which the African states are particularly sensitive, posts should observe due caution in making any such remarks, and should choose an opportunity to make the points informally and should not make them as a part of an official governmental approach.

1. The U.S. is one of the strongest proponents of the UN system, including the various specialized agencies. The U.S. Government took a leading role in creating the system and has made constant efforts to strengthen it. We believe that the UN provides great advantages for the smaller nations of the world and that it is capable of playing an increasingly stronger role in the maintenance of world peace and in promoting international political stability and economic progress.

2. One of the frequently negative factors in the operation of the UN has been the attitude of the Soviet Union and its satellites. While the members of the Soviet bloc participate in the UN and most of its specialized agencies, there is little evidence of a sincere desire to cooperate toward achieving the objectives of the Charter. The Soviet Union, for example, has repeatedly hampered the work of the UN through the exercise of its veto in the Security Council, and has frequently disregarded or flagrantly defied all recommendations of the General Assembly which seem contrary to the interests and ambitions of the Soviet Government. It has also refused to pay its assessments for programs which it opposes such as UNEF, and has given only limited support to UN technical assistance activities.

While largely disregarding the UN insofar as its own policies are concerned, the Soviet bloc has increasingly sought to make cynical use of the UN system to promote its imperialist ambitions, thereby applying a double standard. It seeks to aggravate and exploit the inevitable conflicts which arise between nations and regions of the Free World.

The U.S. believes that the UN can be developed and improved as a channel for resolving differences and relaxing tensions between the Soviet bloc and the Free World. However, we are concerned over continued evidence of a double standard applied by the Soviet bloc within the UN. This is harmful to to the UN.

The Soviet bloc has attempted to win the sympathies of the new African states by appearing to take an interest in matters of direct concern to these states, and by siding with them almost automatically in all disputes with nations in Western Europe and other parts of the world. It seems clear that a major objective of the Soviet strategy in the UN is the development of a permanent “habit of alignment” with the emerging nations of Africa and Asia.

3. The UN is required to deal with a great many political, economic, social, legal and administrative issues of varying degrees of priority and complexity. Sometimes the competence of the UN to deal with such issues is challenged. As a matter of principle, the U.S. takes a generous attitude toward the problem of UN competence. In other words, we are inclined to give the UN the benefit of the doubt whenever the competence question is raised, and prefer to err on the side of permitting issues to be discussed rather than inhibiting their discussion. At the same time, the U.S. is anxious that the UN and its various specialized agencies devote primary attention to those matters with respect to which UN discussion and action may be expected to make constructive contribution.

There are some issues which the U.S. believes the UN is competent to consider, but concerning which there may be considerable doubt that UN action will produce constructive results. UN consideration is not always the best way of dealing with delicate international issues. For example, the U.S. abstained last year on the final version of the resolution on Algeria,⁴ not because the U.S. had any reservations concerning the specific content of the resolution, which called for self-determination in Algeria, but rather because the U.S. was convinced that a UN resolution of this kind would not contribute to an actual solution of the Algerian problem. It should also be noted that there are certain issues which may be very appropriate for one UN body to consider, but highly inappropriate for consideration elsewhere. Thus, we believe it is highly important that the Security Council and the General Assembly devote continuing attention to the problem of disarmament, but we have generally opposed the efforts of the Soviet Union to raise the disarmament question as a purely propaganda issue in other UN organs, e.g., the Economic and Social Council, and in such agencies as the WHO, UNESCO, and ILO.

4. While the UN has already made a substantial contribution to the protection of international peace and security, it is evident that given the attitude of the Soviet bloc, additional instrumentalities are required for this purpose. For this reason, the U.S. and more than forty other nations of the Free World have joined together in regional security arrangements designed to provide one another mutual assistance in deterring and resisting military aggression from whatever quarter. The Soviet Union, of course, has repeatedly denounced these defensive arrangements and has described them as “aggressive military blocs”. Soviet propaganda on this issue ignores several vital considerations, including: (A) the fact that the UN Charter in Chapter VIII makes specific provision for regional collective security arrangements; (B) the fact that these arrangements were developed directly as a response to Soviet-sponsored military aggressions, after the Soviet Union had hampered effective functioning of the UN; (C) the fact that none of these regional systems has yet committed a single act of aggression nor made an aggressive threat against any nation, and (D) the fact that many of the acts of direct and indirect aggression which have occurred during the past 15 years have involved nations and areas not covered by these regional security arrangements. In brief, the overwhelming preponderance of evidence indicates that these regional security systems afford a powerful supplement to the efforts of the UN to maintain international peace and security, and that world peace would be gravely endangered by their elimination or deterioration.

5. The future of the UN must necessarily depend upon the attitudes, policies and actions of its individual members. The UN cannot be regarded as a “dumping ground” for difficult international problems, nor as a magic fountainhead of solutions. Through the UN individual nations may discuss problems with one another and agree on various forms of collective action. While it is altogether natural that each government should approach the issues arising in the UN primarily in terms of its own national interest, it is also important that each government take account of its national interest in the successful application of UN principles and purposes to the entire international environment. The efficacy of the UN will depend in large part upon the ability and willingness of individual governments to consider each particular issue upon its merits, and not merely to follow the voting behavior of other nations or blocs. It cannot escape notice, for example, that various members including a number of African, Asian and European states, which were justifiably concerned about racial violence in South Africa, and which took a strong stand on this question, nevertheless chose to abstain upon UN resolutions directed against the even more violent suppression of human rights in Hungary and Tibet.⁵ The U.S. is convinced that the maintenance of international peace and the protection of human rights and human dignity can be achieved through UN channels only to the extent of the principles governing these matters have universal application. We also believe that those nations which automatically vote as a part of a “bloc” regardless of the merits of particular issues, or which choose to avoid taking a stand upon vital questions of principle, are doing a disservice to their own international influence and to the effectiveness of the UN system itself. It may sometimes require fortitude for member nations to “stand up and be counted” in the midst of critical controversies, but the manifestation of this courage is an essential ingredient of a strong and useful UN.

6. Finally and most importantly, the great extent of the United States commitment to the United Nations system and the purposes and principles of the Charter should be stressed. We have consistently supported the United Nations in all its undertakings and have constantly sought to improve its ability to discharge its responsibilities. We have led in United Nations actions to preserve human rights and freedoms, to settle by peaceful means disputes among states, to resist aggression, and to preserve the independence of small states. A striking evidence of United States support for the United Nations is the fact that although no one Member state is assessed more than 33% of the regular budget of the United Nations, the Specialized Agencies and their special programs, the United States has voluntarily contributed well in excess of 33% of total United Nations expenditures. In 1959, out of total United Nations expenditures of approximately $241 million, the United States contributed approximately $106 million. For example, last year we contributed 50% of the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) and 40% of the budgets of both the United Nations Expanded Technical Assistance Program (ETAP) and the Special Fund.

[Here follows Annex I, containing a breakdown of the vote on the U.S. proposal not to consider the question of Chinese representation at the 14th regular session of the U.N. General Assembly.]

Herter

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 303/6–2360. Confidential. Drafted by Newlin, Eisendrath, Buffum, Nunley, and OES; cleared by Green, Dorman, Bacon, Wallner, and CA; and approved by Wilcox who signed for Herter. Sent to 8 diplomatic and 3 consular posts in Africa, and repeated to 12 diplomatic and 7 consular posts in Africa and Europe and to USUN.
2. Telegram 921, March 17, transmitted Lodge’s suggestions for dealing with the new African nations in the United Nations. (Ibid., 303/3–1760) This instruction incorporated many of his points.
3. Reference is to the Foreign Service Manual, which contains the body of regulations for the Foreign Service.
4. Reference is to a draft resolution submitted by Pakistan and considered by the General Assembly on December 12, 1959. The resolution failed to gain a two-thirds majority and was not adopted. For text, see U.N. doc. A/L.276.
5. For text of U.N. General Assembly Resolution 1454 (XIV) on the question of Hungary, see U.N. doc. A/4354. Regarding the 14th General Assembly resolution on Tibet, see footnote 2, Document 102.