Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Vietnam, Volume I

73. Telegram From the Ambassador in Vietnam (Durbrow) to the Department of State¹

Saigon, May 19, 1959—6 p.m.

2439. This is Country Team message recommending replacement F8F aircraft in VNAF by AD4’s.²

Part I

FY 60 MAP, approved by CINCPAC, includes 25 AD4 for VNAF which would replace old F8F now on hand. FY 61 MAP, also approved by CINCPAC, repeats item of 25 AD4 and additionally programs 6 RT–33A photo reconnaissance aircraft as replacement for RF8F’s.

Part II

AD4 possesses following advantages over F8F for use in Vietnam:

1. AD4 carries larger load of either bombs or ammunition than F8F, and has considerably larger fuel capacity, thereby providing longer time over target.

2. AD4 is more rugged, more easily handled. Comparable this respect to C47 transport with Vietnamese highly efficient.

3. AD4 is still operational and spare parts stocks and replacement aircraft far more adequate than F8F. This condition expected continue foreseeable future.

4. AD4 has demonstrated it is substantially better for close ground support than F8F, an extremely important consideration as close ground support is primary mission of VNAF.

Part III

AD4 possesses following advantages over jet fighters for VNAF:

1. AD4 much more adaptable to close ground support than any U.S. jet fighter known to us.

2. Considering fuel, bomb, and ammo carrying capacities, AD4 can stay over target to degree one AD4 equivalent in close ground support to coverage provided by four to six jets.

3. AD4’s can use existing airfields in Vietnam, where no jet fields now available nor adequate numbers likely to be for some time.

4. Existing aviation ground environment in Vietnam more adaptable to early general use AD4’s than to jets without extensive and expensive improvements or modification.

Part IV

RT–33A aircraft included in FY 61 MAP do not enter into current discussion of F8F versus AD4. These unarmed jet trainers modified for photo recon have no other tactical capability. They would be operated from projected commercial Tan Son Nhut jet runway at Saigon, but because of Geneva Accords may be impossible introduce even such jet trainers.

Part V

Country team convinced President Diem would react most strongly if required to continue F8F’s in service by cannibalizing old F8F’s discarded by Thailand, same time Thais being equipped with new jets.

Part VI

Maintenance capability of VNAF steadily improving as result of continued intensive instruction in maintenance procedures, ground crew training, stock control techniques, and increasing VN knowledge of English. For example, in-commission rate of C47’s in VNAF, for which adequate maintenance support exists, now comparable to USAF standards. In-commission rate of F8F’s has increased substantially over past nine months, in face of maintenance difficulties related to their ever increasing age. MAAG advisors confident VNAF capable of receiving and maintaining AD4’s satisfactorily.

Part VII

Urge all possible action obtain approval FY 60 May [?] item to provide U.S. Navy AD4’s for VNAF with view change over earliest possible date.³

Durbrow

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751G.56/5–1959. Secret. Repeated for information to CINCPAC for PolAd; sent with instructions to pass to the Department of Defense.

2. In an official–informal letter to Durbrow, April 20, Kocher suggested the following course of action to overcome opposition at the Department of Defense, particularly from Shuff, to programming AD–4’s for the Vietnamese Air Force:

   “We believe that, if you could send a cable (preferably joint Embassy–MAAG or one stating General Williams concurs) embodying the following points, we would then have a clear basis for trying to get higher level State intervention with Defense with a view toward obtaining a favorable decision on programming the AD–4’s:

   • “1. A statement to the effect that AD–4’s are better suited to the VNAF’s mission than either jets or F8F’s and an explanation of the reasons for that view. (If possible, such a statement should be reconciled with the inclusion of jets in the MAAG FY 61 submission since that may be raised here in Washington.)
   • “2. Reiteration of your point that President Diem would react most strongly if Viet-Nam’s F8F’s are kept in operation by cannibalizing Thailand’s F8F’s which at the same time are being replaced by jets.
   • “3. If correct and justified, a statement to the effect that Viet-Nam is capable of maintaining AD–4’s satisfactorily. (This would be designed to meet a point expressed in some quarters of Defense that Viet-Nam is not yet ready for AD–4’s.)

   “With a cable to this effect as ammunition, we could then make an effort to obtain programming of the AD–4’s. It is probably too late to expect their inclusion in the FY 59 program, but it ought to be possible for us to press for their placement in the FY 60 program.” (Ibid., Vietnam Working Group Files: Lot 66 D 193, Jet Aircraft)

3. In a copy of a subsequent letter from Parsons to Irwin, undated, Parsons referred to telegram 2439 from Saigon, stated that it was the view of the Department of State that the Joint Chiefs of Staff concurred in the replacement of F8F’s by AD–4’s, and presented the following as the Department of State’s thinking on the matter:

   “While the military necessity or desirability of replacing the F8F’s at this time must, of course, be judged by your Department, political factors point strongly to the desirability of early action looking toward their replacement. In view of the exposed position of Viet-Nam as a divided country, President Ngo Dinh Diem would strongly object to our leaving Viet-Nam with aircraft inadequate for the mission of the Vietnamese Air Force when we have been equipping other countries in the area with much more advanced military aircraft. Similarly, he would react most strenuously if Viet-Nam’s F8F’s were continued in service through the cannibalization of F8F’s in another country in the area and the F8F’s in that country were replaced by jets.

   “If a decision is reached to replace the F8F’s in Viet-Nam, we also have a political interest in the type of aircraft selected for replacement. Under the terms of the Geneva Agreements of 1954, which the United States has to date respected for political reasons though not a signatory thereto, the introduction into Viet-Nam of jet engines and jet weapons is specifically prohibited. We see no likelihood during the foreseeable future that it will become politically feasible for the United States to ignore that provision. If we introduce jets into Viet-Nam, we would be widely accused of increasing international tension in the Indochina area, we would greatly embarrass our allies, the United Kingdom and Canada, because of their Geneva Agreements roles as Co-Chairman and member of the International Control Commission, respectively, and we would adversely affect our relations with India, the Chairman of the International Control Commission. Accordingly, we do not expect to be able during the next few years to consider jets as the replacement aircraft for Viet-Nam’s F8F.

   “We would, however, concur in the choice of a more advanced type of propeller plane to replace the F8F’s. The exact type is, of course, a military decision. We are sure you will have noted the arguments advanced in Saigon’s Telegram No. 2439 about the advantages of AD–4’s as well as the statement that the Vietnamese Air Force is capable of receiving and maintaining them satisfactorily.

   “We are aware that no final decision about programming replacement for Viet-Nam’s F8F’s in FY 1960 can be made until the Congress has completed action on the aid appropriations for that year. However, leaving aside the funding aspect of this question until it can be decided, we should appreciate knowing the views of the Department of Defense on the substance of the problem.” (Ibid.)