68. Memorandum of a Conversation Between the President of Vietnam’s Adviser (Ladejinsky) and the Ambassador in Vietnam (Durbrow), American Embassy, Saigon, April 24, 19591
In an after-dinner conversation on April 24 with Wolf Ladejinsky, the latter expressed considerable concern regarding the methods being used by the GVN to control stepped-up Communist activities.
Ladejinsky told me in confidence that in conversations with Vice President Tho and Minister of Agriculture, Le van Dong, these officials [Page 189] had individually expressed deep concern regarding the almost exclusively military methods being used to suppress increased Communist activities in Viet-Nam. The Vice President, who, according to Ladejinsky, very seldom comments on the activities of the President’s brother Nhu, stated he had serious misgivings about the advice given Diem by Nhu to the effect that he should basically use armed force to suppress these Communist activities, rather than try to combat this menace by efforts to win over the peasants, who are being influenced by Viet Cong cadre. The Vice President admitted that it was necessary to use a certain amount of armed force in this connection but he is worried that this method, rather than appealing to the people and taking positive steps to assist them, would be counterproductive. The Vice President believes that discontent among the peasants will increase unless the government recognizes and faces up to the psychological factors, which are important in this matter. A show of military force is not the full answer to the peasants worries. The Vice President stated that he had tried unsuccessfully to induce Diem to take additional steps to ameliorate the plight of the peasants but that Diem, on Nhu’s advice, is convinced that he must depend primarily on armed force to suppress Communist activities, and once this has been accomplished the government can increase its efforts to better the lot of the peasants.
In discussing the same question later on with Dong, he expressed the same concern as Vice President and added in this connection that the peasants in the South, for instance, resent the fact that many of the newly-appointed Province Chiefs in the South come from Central Viet-Nam and are followers of the President’s brother Can. Officials from Central Viet-Nam do not understand the mentality or problems of the southerners and this is one of the causes of discontent in the Delta. Dong went so far as to state that peasant resentment against Central Vietnamese officials has gone so far that they are now stating, “We have been occupied by Central Viet-Nam.” When Ladejinsky asked Dong whether he, as a prominent member of the Can Lao Party, could not convince Diem that he must make positive gestures to better the lot of the peasants, Dong replied, “I have tried but the President has been convinced by Nhu that he must first bring security by using armed force to suppress guerrilla activities.” Dong explained that the Party under Nhu’s and Can’s guidance does not try to work with the people as the Communists do, but lays down the law from on high without taking into consideration the sensitivities of the masses or trying to win them over by direct grassroot contact and taking positive action at that level to better their lot.
Ladejinsky reports that he told the President a few days ago that he is quite concerned about the peasants’ attitude in the South and [Page 190] suggested that the President should not rely on reports from Province Chiefs but bring several peasant leaders from each province to Saigon to discuss frankly with them their grievances. Diem did not react one way or another to this suggestion, but Ladejinsky hopes that the President might act on it.