61. Letter From the Chief of the Military Assistance Advisory Group in Vietnam (Williams) to the Commander in Chief, Pacific’s Chief of Staff (Riley)1
Dear Herb: When I arrived in Vietnam late in 1955, I found it was contrary to Vietnamese policy for U.S. or French Advisors to enter into operational planning or accompany troops on operations against the sects. I was told this policy was adopted because Vietnamese were convinced operation plans known to Advisors leaked to hostile sects. After the withdrawal of French Advisors, the same policy continued in force without, however, it ever being brought up for discussion. Consequently, my verbal orders of long standing are that no MAAG or TERM personnel will accompany units on combat operations but will accompany them on all other type moves, maneuvers, marches, training exercises, etc.
The Vietnamese are no longer conducting operations against religious sects but against guerrilla bands reportedly led by Viet Cong cadres.
In my opinion, recent anti-guerrilla operations show marginal results in view of number of troops and effort involved. Evaluation of information available to me only after an operation indicates marginal results attributable to one or all of following: inadequate planning, logistical snarls, lack of aggressive execution of plans, failure to use proper chain of Command, lack of aggressive leadership.
I am unable to gain first hand information or completes information of actual problems involved during an anti-guerrilla operation. This is some times embarrassing to me, especially when Diem asks my recommendations when I’m sure that neither he nor I have full information on the situation under discussion.
Therefore, under these conditions it could be said I do not fully carry out OCB operation plan course of action 612 which charges Defense with responsibility of training Vietnamese for their internal security role, including pacification and anti-guerrilla operations.
If conditions do not soon improve in the Delta area, it is possible that in the near future a General officer will be directed to take charge of all anti-guerrilla operations in the Fifth Military Region and clean it up. If that is done, the General will certainly ask for and probably get an Infantry Division to assist the 11th Division and other units in that area now. If close guidance is not given by MAAG Advisors, such an affair could drag out for months.
[Page 179]It is common knowledge that U.S. Advisors accompanied Greek forces operating against communist rebels and more recently are remaining with Chinese on Quemoy. Further, there is some indication of growing opinion among Vietnamese officers that MAAG Advisors should be allowed to accompany their units on anti-guerrilla operations.
I’m now of the opinion I should bring this subject up for discussion with President Diem and recommend to him that for increased efficiency MAAG Advisors, down to include Infantry Regimental level and Artillery, Armored and separate Marine Battalion level, be allowed to participate in operation planning and to accompany their counterparts on those anti-guerrilla operations that do not take place in areas immediately adjacent to national boundaries.
CINCPAC’s views on this matter would be appreciated.
Kindest regards,
- Source: Center of Military History, Williams Papers, Official Correspondence January–July 1959 (54). Confidential.↩
- See paragraph 61, Document 47.↩
- Printed from a copy which bears this typed signature.↩