40. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, November 17–18, 19581
SUBJECT
- U.S. Aid to Viet-Nam
PARTICIPANTS
- His Excellency Vu Van Mau, Vietnamese Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs
- The Honorable Tran Van Chuong, Ambassador of Viet-Nam
- Nguyen Huu Chi, Director of Cabinet, Vietnamese Department of Foreign Affairs
- Nguyen Duy Lien, Counselor, Vietnamese Embassy
- Walter S. Robertson, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs
- Eric Kocher, Director, Southeast Asian Affairs
- Joseph A. Mendenhall, Officer in Charge, Viet-Nam Affairs
- Charles Sedgewick, Interpreter
Mr. Mau, who was visiting Washington for the first time, called on Mr. Robertson on November 17. Since time did not permit his talk with Mr. Roberston to be complete on that date, it was resumed on November 18. Subjects discussed were Cambodia, Laos, and U.S. aid to Viet-Nam. The first two subjects have been covered in cables to the appropriate field posts.
Noting the diminution in U.S. aid to Viet-Nam for the past three years, Mr. Mau requested increased aid on the following grounds: 1) In view of the present tendency of aggressive expansionism on the part of Communist China, it should be noted that Viet-Nam, with a frontier directly abutting Communist territory, stands alone against the Communist threat. In contrast, Korea enjoys UN support as well as the advantage of American military units stationed on Korean soil. Taiwan also has American troops to assist its defense, and is separated [Page 101] from Communist China by a body of water. 2) Economic aid, running now at $30 million a year, should in particular be increased in order to enable Viet-Nam to become independent of U.S. aid at some point in the future. 3) The economic competition between the free world and the Communist bloc also represents an important reason for increasing economic aid since no country in Southeast Asia could serve as a better example of the U.S. experiment in aid than Viet-Nam in view of its political and economic success to date and absence of corruption. 4) Viet-Nam occupies a key position of strength against the Communists in Southeast Asia. If it cannot hold against Communism, no other country in the area can. Therefore, in view of the Congressional limitations on U.S. aid funds, the extent of U.S. aid to certain neutral countries might be re-examined with a view towards increasing Viet-Nam’s share.
Mr. Robertson said that he was pleased Mr. Mau had raised these questions about U.S. aid since it provided an opportunity to clear up some misconceptions. He noted that SEATO was organized to resist aggression in Southeast Asia, and that Viet-Nam as a Protocol State is afforded the same protection that Taiwan receives under its Mutual Defense Treaty with the United States. He also said that there is a MAAG mission in Taiwan, but no U.S. troops.
Mr. Robertson stated that we have only as much money as Congress appropriates to use in the global struggle against Communism. The Administration’s request for aid funds were cut by the Congress for both FY 58 and FY 59. In the case of Viet-Nam, the FY 58 aid level was determined by removal of its loan component of $25 million because of creation of the DLF and by application of the pro-rata Congressional cut to the balance. Actually, late in FY 58, Viet-Nam received preferred treatment by being allotted an additional $5 million in aid. For FY 1959, Viet-Nam also received preferred treatment since its level of aid was cut only 7%, whereas the levels for most other countries were assessed the full 10% cut made by Congress. Mr. Robertson said there is a growing tendency within the U.S. Government to shift the financing of economic projects from grant aid to the DLF which was established for the purpose of financing sound economic projects. He added that we wish the Communist threat were such that we could shift much of our aid from financing Viet-Nam’s military budget to economic purposes, but no lasting economic development is possible without security against aggression.
Turning to the question of assistance to neutral countries, Mr. Robertson stated that its purpose is to help those countries maintain their national independence. If we were not to furnish them aid, a vacuum would be left which the Communists would be only too eager to fill. The resultant extension of Communist domination [Page 102] would greatly intensify the security problem of free world countries. We, therefore, believe that our assistance to neutrals is in the interest of other free world countries as well as the neutrals themselves.
Mr. Robertson expressed the greatest admiration for Viet-Nam’s accomplishments during the past four years. He said that there has been no decrease in our interest in Viet-Nam, and we shall continue to try to help as much as we can. But, to be candid about the future of our aid, we are confronted with expectations of Congressional reductions, not increases, in funds.
Mr. Mau briefly mentioned that the Vietnamese Ambassador had just received instructions from Saigon concerning the negotiation and signing of an agreement with the United States for assistance in the establishment of a nuclear research reactor. No further reference was made to this subject during the conversation.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751G.5–MSP/11–1758. Confidential. Drafted by Mendenhall.↩