Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Vietnam, Volume I

39. Memorandum of a Conversation, Seattle, November 11, 1958, 3 p.m.¹

Seattle, November 11, 1958, 3 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

• United States
  • The Secretary
  • J. Graham Parsons
• Viet-Nam
  • Dr. Vu Van Mau, Secretary for Foreign Affairs

SUBJECT

• Communist Military Threat to Viet-Nam and Viet-Nam’s Need for U.S. Aid Funds

Dr. Mau expressed his appreciation for the opportunity to call on the Secretary, who then expressed his admiration for Viet-Nam and for President Diem and said that he was glad to have this chance for an exchange of views.

Dr. Mau said that he wished to discuss the situation of Viet-Nam and Southeast Asia. He said that Viet-Nam had been able to establish itself more solidly although neighboring countries had not been too helpful. Lately, on October 26—the anniversary of the Constitution—the Chiefs of Staff of neighboring countries had paid Viet-Nam the compliment of coming to the celebrations, which proved that Viet-Nam had indeed become a certain focus of strength in the area. It had gained some of this strength from its experiences in the fight against the Communists.

Recently, also, the Vietnamese Government had noted an increase in activity to the North with further development of lines of communication between North Viet-Nam and China. It was wondered in Viet-Nam whether this increasing activity had any connection with the recent crisis in the Taiwan Strait. There had been detected, for instance, a number of Chinese soldiers in the North wearing civilian clothes so as to escape ICC notice. It was evident that they were at work building up the army in the North. Whereas in 1954 there had been but seven divisions in the Viet Minh Army, by 1956 there were 20. That was one reason why President Diem had wished Dr. Mau to talk to the Secretary and to call attention to the serious situation and urge that Viet-Nam be given appropriate priority for aid.

Continuing his presentation, Dr. Mau said that if the Communists were disposed to further aggression, they would not try in Korea because of the presence of United Nations forces. Nor would they be likely to attack Taiwan because the United States was strong there. Therefore, they might turn toward Viet-Nam where there was less force opposing them, no United Nations’ presence and a great hinterland beyond. It was, therefore, clear that aid to Viet-Nam, which constituted a possible point of attack, was more important than aid to some other countries. However, the President had noted that aid to Viet-Nam had diminished, there having been $5 million less programmed last year, and this perhaps indicated a lower priority for aid to Viet-Nam. Dr. Mau well knew our difficulties, but he appealed for a higher priority for his country. Moreover, aid to the forces in Viet-Nam was actually aid to Southeast Asia and not merely to his country because his country constituted a strong point.

Another factor to be considered was the unsatisfactory situation in Cambodia, which was well known to the Secretary, and the weakness of Laos. Furthermore, despite Viet-Nam’s cordial relations with Burma, it must be said that the situation there had not changed. From this viewpoint too, the Vietnamese position against the Communists was a key position.

Dr. Mau said that it was the conception of his President and his government that naturally aid could not be given indefinitely. Aid should be like helping a convalescent patient to get strong quickly so that he could stand on his own feet. It would be futile to give a convalescent just a little to keep him alive and it was just the same with economic aid. If Viet-Nam could receive a substantial amount for a few years, then there would be no need for further help and Viet-Nam could proceed on its own. At one point he mentioned the figure of about $30 million additional as necessary.

Continuing to discuss economic aid, Dr. Mau alluded to Chinese Communist aid being given to Cambodia with promises of various factories for wood processing and other enterprises which would help to lift the standard of living. In Viet-Nam there were several new factories projected such as a glass factory and a paper mill, to be established with government capital, but also with private capital including some French participation. Various difficulties had arisen and although funds from the budget and government credit were issued, there was a lack of foreign exchange for the imported components. The Vietnamese Government hoped that we could support these enterprises through ICA funds. Private capital would be forthcoming and purchase shares from the government if these enterprises progressed. If the Vietnamese people were to see factories financed by the Chinese Communists making progress in Cambodia while their own lagged behind, it would be bad propaganda. He had been asked to call this to our attention particularly.

The Secretary remarked that he was happy to have the observations of the President and Dr. Mau. As he had earlier said, he had great admiration for the accomplishments of President Diem’s administration.

So far as the military threat was concerned, it could, of course, come in any of many different places. He agreed an attack on Korea was less likely but there remained Taiwan, Burma, Iran—no one knew what point might be chosen. It was, however, certain that if an attack come, wherever it came, it would not be regarded by the U.S. as just an attack against that country or point but against us too, for we knew we were the ultimate target. It was the United States which the Communists wished to destroy. Our military took good account of the threat and we were, we thought, well prepared to take care of it if it should come.

The Secretary added that the Minister had referred to the presence in Korea of the United Nations forces which were essentially U.S. forces. The real reason for the safety of Korea now is that the Chinese Communists know we would destroy their industry in Manchuria if they attacked. Our troops were perhaps not the essential element in this situation although their presence was important for psychological and other reasons.

The Secretary also noted that our power is mobile. We had moved a substantial force into Lebanon in a few hours and the presence of the 6th fleet was quickly achieved. It was our determination to resist any Communist attack anywhere and this was a determination that was solid. Force in being at a particular spot was not the essential thing. At any rate, he assured the Minister that we were watching and it should not be felt that we were indifferent or unprepared.

The Secretary said he shared Dr. Mau’s concern about Cambodia and Laos, neither of which were solid like Viet-Nam. In Laos the situation seemed now somewhat less precarious and the Communists had not succeeded in capitalizing as much as we had once feared on the arrangements for their integration into that country. There was perhaps a high degree of probability that the anti-Communists in Laos would be able to maintain control.

In Cambodia, the course was somewhat erratic due in part to various unstable individuals. This indeed justified a measure of concern by Dr. Mau and ourselves. It seemed to us that there was not adequate awareness of the danger of Communist infiltration and we agreed that this was a situation which we must watch.

At this point, Dr. Mau injected that he had an observation to make. He had just lunched with the Foreign Minister of Laos who had asked why was the United States so friendly to the French and why did it seem to bless the French presence in Laos and the neighboring countries. Dr. Mau said that he had the same impression of the U.S. attitude towards the French and he wished us to know that the French in Cambodia and Laos had not yet given up their former designs and some French elements were trying to keep up their influence. Behind the ostensible goal of a pool of Western power for the good of these countries, the French had their secret intentions and sought to use us for their advantage. The Vietnamese were distrustful and they felt they had good information. He alluded in this connection to the small French base at Seno, to the collapse of French morale after the defeat at Dien Bien Phu and the ineffectiveness of the French military presence at Seno. The young government of Laos was concerned that we seemed to support French projects in Laos and French Embassy activities. Dr. Mau appeared to be conveying the thought that he expected the French to doublecross us.

The Secretary reverted to the size of our aid program in Viet-Nam. He said it had indeed gone down somewhat, but not through any lack of confidence on our part in the Government of Viet-Nam. It was a fact that Congress had appropriated less and we must spread the reductions and try to do the least damage, distributing our aid on an equitable basis. He personally was not familiar with the matter of the specific projects, such as the glass factory to which Dr. Mau referred but when the latter was in Washington² perhaps he would like to look into this through the ICA.

In closing the conversation, Dr. Mau said that he wished to bring to our attention informally and confidentially that his government had been surprised that our Embassy at Paris had given a visa to enter the United States to Nguyen Huu Chau,³ who had formerly been Secretary of State at the Presidency. This man had had no exit permit to leave Viet-Nam but, we had nevertheless accepted his application although he was not properly documented. Mr. Parsons said that he would make a note of this matter and look into it in Washington. The Secretary expressed his regrets that he could not dine with Dr. Mau this evening. Dr. Mau then took his leave.

1. Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 63 D 123, CF 123. Confidential. Drafted by Parsons on November 12.

   Dulles headed the U.S. Delegation to the Colombo Plan Ministerial meeting in Seattle, Washington, November 10–13.

2. Mau was in Washington later in the month. See infra.
3. Chau was interviewed by Embassy and other officials in Paris on November 25 and December 22. A report of the first meeting is in despatch 1005 from Paris, December 5. (Department of State, Central Files, 751G.00/12–458) A report of the second meeting is in Document 46.