30. Memorandum From the Chief of the Military Assistance Advisory Group in Vietnam (Williams) to the Ambassador in Vietnam (Durbrow)1

SUBJECT

  • The Civil Guard
[Page 78]
1.
This Headquarters has reviewed the letter submitted by Mr. Thuan on 16 August,2 and the “Memorandum of Conversation” between the Ambassador and Mr. Thuan on 18 August.3
2.
It appears from these two documents that GVN’s present position is so nearly parallel to the one held by the Country Team, that there is an adequate basis for detailed discussions concerning reorganizing, training, and equipping the Civil Guard with U.S. standard equipment. Specifically, the GVN previous position has now changed with respect to logistic support, promotions, control and budgetary responsibility.
3.
Even though Mr. Thuan has left a loophole for change from this new position, in two or three year’s time, the statement of such a possible change is weak, and may very well be simply a face-saving comment. In any event, the revitalization of the Civil Guard continues to be critically needed, and GVN has agreed to the Country Team’s proposed principles of operation for at least the next two or three years. It probably will take this long to complete the Country Team approved program of reorganizing, re-equipping and training the Civil Guard with U.S. equipment and by then the Guard should be firmly established under the Ministry of Interior.
4.
It will be recalled that the Country Team is restricted by radio Icato 1609, of 31 May,4 to obtain agreement by GVN to an ultimate strength figure of no more than 32,000 in the Civil Guard. In view of the fact that GVN has changed its original views so basically, it is believed that with adequate safeguards to prevent attenuation of U.S. support the U.S. could accept a larger Civil Guard provided U.S. support only 158 companies of it. Such a proposal would, I presume, have to be referred to Washington.
5.
In considering the very recent proposal at a Country Team meeting to substitute French rifles for M–1 rifles in order to save costs, it should be remembered that this would continue the complicated ammunition supply problem in Vietnam. It is desirable to use the U.S. automatic rifle and MG, as previously agreed by the Country Team. These weapons use the same ammunition as the U.S. M–1 rifle, whereas the French MAS 36 would require issue of French [Page 79] 7.5mm ammunition. In addition, the Civil Guard has reported to MSU instances when 30 to 50% of their old French ammunition was defective.
6.
Accordingly, it would appear more desirable to re-equip more slowly, but to retain the proposed equipment previously agreed to by the Country Team, with transportation, signal equipment, automatic weapons, etc having first priority and M–1 rifles as a late [last?] priority. If the program for 158 companies was to be extended over a three year period, and headquarters units were equipped later, the program should be executed for about $3,315,000 per year.
7.
This MAAG recommends that:
a.
The GVN position be reported to Washington.
b.
It be proposed to Washington that the restriction of size on the Civil Guard be lifted, so long as adequate safeguards can be provided to ensure proper control of U.S. support for the Civil Guard of only 32,000.
c.
GVN be informed that we agree to the principles lately enumerated by Mr. Thuan and be informed of our proposal to Washington.
d.
GVN be provided with tables of organization and equipment approved by Country Team 31 March 1958,5 for consideration, approval, or comment.
S.T. Williams
Lt Gen, USA
  1. Source: Center of Military History, Williams Papers, Civil Guard (97). Confidential. Addressed also to Nicholas A. Natsios, First Secretary of Embassy, and Chester H. Opal, Public Affairs Officer.
  2. In this letter to the Ambassador, Thuan stated that the government had decided to place the Civil Guard under the Department of the Interior except in states of emergency (as decreed by the President of the Republic) or in combined operations as mutually agreed between the Departments of Interior and Defense, that it would in principle have its own system of logistics, and that its salary scale would not be coordinated with or equal to that of the ARVN. (Ibid.)
  3. In this conversation, Thuan confirmed to the Ambassador some of the provisions of the letter dated August 16 and then pointed out that Diem conceived that in 2 or 3 years it might become advantageous to put the Civil Guard under the Department of Defense. (Ibid.)
  4. See footnote 3, Document 19.
  5. Not found.