Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Vietnam, Volume I

20. Telegram From the Ambassador in Vietnam (Durbrow) to the Department of State ¹

Saigon , June 18, 1958—8 p.m.

2517. Reference: Icato 1609.²

Civil Guard

1. Elting sent Diem letter June tenth³ outlining points contained reftel, particularly those para 5, acceptance of which would make it possible contribute 5.1 million dollars to Civil Guard.

2. Since Diem did not react to Elting’s letter⁴ I asked for appointment 17th. Following are pertinent parts this discussion:

A. Diem stated had given careful consideration our suggestions Civil Guard be under civilian control and ultimate strength to be reduced to 32,000. Despite arguments we had used for some time, Diem believes as a matter of principle the Civil Guard should eventually be under the Ministry of Defense in order avoid friction and conflict which he believes would develop with two military forces in country under separate ministries. Diem again said in Asia not practical have two separately controlled military forces in country, citing Thailand as example. Despite arguments I had used re advantages civil control police force and fact that if Guard under Defense such move could be interpreted as hidden increases force goals, etc, Diem still indicated he most reluctant to have Guard remain in long run under Interior.

B. While Diem admitted situation might develop in the future so that 32,000 Civil Guards would be sufficient handle internal security, he most reluctant to undertake commitment to reduce Guard ultimately to this figure. He cited stepped up communist activities, including recent raids (Embtel 2497⁵) as reason for his reluctance. I argued well-organized, disciplined and properly armed Civil Guard of 32,000 with necessary communications equipment would be vastly superior to present ineffective fifty odd thousand Civil Guard. I added all agree present Civil Guard ineffective and necessary to start soonest building up effective well-equipped organization and if Diem accepted our basic concept Civil Guard functions, strength, control, we could immediately deliver some arms and equipment and start effective reorganization and training. I pointed out unless Diem could accept our concept in next few days would not be possible grant full 5.1 million dollars since 1 million dollars (FY 58 money) would probably lapse if project agreement not reached.

3. After discussing matter for over one hour Diem reluctantly stated he would think matter over again but obviously he was very perturbed. Diem’s adamant attitude raises question whether we should continue insist on civilian control and if we do not it raises question as to whether USOM or MAAG should do training and whether, if MAAG does training and Guard put under DOD whether[sic] arms for Guard would be subject ICC control, etc. In my estimation an effective Civil Guard is urgent need but I doubt that Diem will accept our concept.⁶ In the circumstances we probably cannot reach agreement on the use of available 1958 funds before the end of this month. An alternative plan for their use will be submitted Wash soonest. In fact, we may be forced to reconsider our position and extend our aid to a Civil Guard based on the President’s concept or withdraw our support. I would be most reluctant to accept Diem’s full concept, but we might have to do this in the long run in order to create effective force combat stepped up Communist activities.

4. Gen Williams and Barrows concur. Dept pass ICA and Defense.

Durbrow

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751G.5–MSP/6–1858. Secret; Priority. Passed to CINCPAC PolAd.
2. Not printed, but see footnote 3, supra .
3. Supra .
4. A memorandum of this conversation forms an enclosure to the despatch cited in footnote 1, supra .
5. In this telegram, June 16, the Embassy relayed inter alia a report from the Vietnamese Ministry of Defense regarding a border incident in the third military region along the frontier with Cambodia. (Department of State, Central Files, 651G.51H/6–1568)
6. With despatch 468 from Saigon, June 21, Durbrow enclosed a memorandum of this conversation. In a section titled “Comment” the Ambassador concluded: “Diem was obviously very much perturbed by what I said, although he did not show any anger. He kept referring to the matter of principle of having two armed forces under separate control in a country, a most dangerous concept, in his estimation, for Asian countries. In this conversation the President allowed me to talk at long length instead of giving his usual long exposé. I received the impression that he will not change his mind.” (Ibid., 751G.5–MSP/6–2158)