Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Vietnam, Volume I

184. Memorandum From the Secretary of Defense’s Deputy Assistant for Special Operations (Lansdale) to Lieutenant General Lionel C. McGarr¹

Washington, August 11, 1960.

SUBJECT:

• Vietnam

This is a follow-up of our conversation yesterday. I will try to answer your written questions which have been referred to me,² and also give some personal comments. Then, I will add some copies of memos³ and talks which touch on various aspects of Vietnam, as some background reading you might find of interest. I am including one memo about a proposed Special National Intelligence Estimate (SNIE)⁴ written since talking with you.

Cambodian Border. Although there have been incidents concerning the exact location of the border, (one Cambodian charge some months ago was that a VN Army unit had moved a marker to give VN more territory), the main problem for you is that guerrillas cross over into Cambodia for refuge, or use Cambodian territory as the base for operations in Vietnam. These are not only the Communist Viet-cong, but also various dissident groups of Vietnamese who probably have some encouragement or help from foreign elements who hate Diem. It will take you some time to straighten out all these various groups, but most of them were close to French “colons,” have ambitions to seize power in Vietnam, and have remnants of sect armed bands (Hoa Hao, Binh Xuyen, and Cao Dai) which had been “suppletifs” or local militia of the French in the eight years Franco-Vietminh war.

Suggest that, after you get a briefing on this problem in Vietnam, you have a talk with Chief MAAG–Cambodia and the Army Attaché in Phnom Penh, and persuade them to do a first-hand look-see in the border regions in Cambodia for you.

Chinese In Cambodia. After you have been in Vietnam some time, you will start thinking that some of the U.S. officials in Cambodia are incredibly naive, particularly when it comes to questions about Chinese and Soviet Communist activities there. Just remember that these Americans are under continuing influence of some French who are hypersensitive about holding onto the last French “presence” foot-hold in Asia and that some of these French pride themselves on their ability to accommodate political philosophies and Asian “mystique.” Last year in Phnom Penh, I was shocked to hear some U.S. officials blandly talk about the Chinese Communists giving aid to Cambodian provincial governors, in the form of large cash money hand-outs, and try to maintain that this was only an aid program for the people. I can only presume that some of the governors have been bought, and in geographic positions south of the Bolovens Plateau and along regions bordering Vietnam of interest to you.

There is always the threat that, if the U.S. fails to give military aid to Cambodia, Prince Sihanouk might ask Communist China for military aid and then you would have a Chicom MAAG next door. It is our belief that Chicom military intelligence personnel have been over the ground, disguised as economic aid personnel and merchants, in provincial areas, particularly in the northeast. It is possible that there is liaison between whatever nets they established with both the NLHX of Laos and the Vietminh.

The Communists and some of the French apparently keep Sihanouk stirred up about a plot to assassinate him or to overthrow the government. At times, this is blamed on Diem or on me. Dap Chhu’on supposedly gave a death-bed confession that he was working for me, which he wasn’t. I merely mention this as a little alert to you, in case you and Mrs. McGarr go over to Siem Reap to visit Angkor Wat. Dap Chhu’on was the governor of the province there, and the Cambodians might suspect that you would be up to tricks with some of his former followers. So, it might be wise to let MAAG or Embassy in Cambodia know of your tourist visit prior to any trip to Siem Reap. Incidentally, I never worked with Dap Chhu’on and the story the Cambodians tell is a complete fabrication, although he might have confessed to anything under torture.

Non-Communist Dissidents. There are some remnants of sect forces in south Vietnam. If you ever get a chance for a private talk with Vice President Tho, ask him. He is probably better informed on this subject than anyone else in the government or armed forces. Also, “Big” Minh whom you met at Leavenworth is well-informed on the subject, he fought the “United Front” of Binh Xuyen and the Hoa Hao forces of both Soai and Ba Cut in 1955–56 making skilled use of political-military tactics.

The Viet-cong were in with Ba Cut’s forces at one time, and some of the remnants of his forces might be allied with the Communists today, although they are little better than bandits who rob the peasants. They operate in the trans-Bassac roughly from the border of Camau over to the Seven Mountains near Cambodia. Incidentally, they invented a novel means of torture to make peasants disclose hidden valuables: while holding a man on the ground, they drive a nail into his ear-drum. They probably still have connections with some of the French in Cambodia who once had great hopes of using Gen. Hinh⁵ (former Vietnamese Chief of Staff and now a colonel in the French Air Force) to take over the Hoa Hao forces and seize power in Vietnam.

Some of the Cao Dai, and their affiliates the Lien Minh, are in small bands of dissidents, although many of these forces were integrated into the Army and probably remain loyal. Those few in dissidence would be in the area between Tay Ninh and the Cambodian border. They used to operate into the Plaine des Joncs, but have found their best hiding place in the area north of Tay Ninh. Trinh Minh The,⁶ whom I believe was a great patriot and who led the Lien Minh until he was killed in the 1955 Saigon fighting, used to tell me that the Viet Minh made real use of the terrain north of Tay Ninh as a base for operations into the Tierre Rouge, where the big rubber plantations are north of Saigon. The workers on these plantations were organized and disciplined by the Vietminh; I know the French managers used to pay them “protection” money, just like in a gangster film. It is possible that a few Cao Dai dissidents are in with the Vietminh in this area.

None of these remnants are very large. However, the religious sect groups are a different problem. Each has political party interests and some political ambition. A lot of work was done in psychological operations to make them good citizens, but I suspect that some of this work has fallen off. “Big” Minh used to do excellent work along those lines. It would be smart for you to have a talk with Col. Chau who heads psychological operations now and encourage him to strengthen his work with the population in the 5th Military District. He is bright, energetic, and dedicated, but might require a little guidance on this. You might make sure that your U.S. adviser with Chau is getting across to him with sound advice.

One thing to keep in mind is that the sect forces were integrated into the Vietnamese Army in 1955 largely at U.S. insistence and with U.S. help. General O’Daniel, as Chief of MAAG, carried out the final negotiations with each of the sect military leaders. My own task had been in the initial negotiations, largely out in the boon-docks, which mostly followed a plan devised by a U.S.-French planning group under my chairmanship, which had been appointed by Generals Collins and Ely. As I recall, there were two regiments of one Hoa Hao group, a small battalion of another Hoa Hao group, about 10,000 Cao Dai under Gen. Phuong,⁷ and about 8,000 Lien Minh under Gen. The. One battalion of Binh Xuyen came over to join the government during the Saigon–Cholon fighting. Some of these integrated troops and their officers were treated rather shabbily by the Army, and a few went into dissidence. Other sect groups now in dissidence. Other sect groups now in dissidence are remnants of the forces that fought the Army in 1955: the Binh Xuyen, the Hoa Hao forces under Soai⁸ and Ba Cut,⁹ and some of the Catholic Militia which had joined the Binh Xuyen.

Popular Support for Diem. A number of U.S. officials are certain that there is widespread and growing popular distaste for Diem and his government. These opinions are based upon reports, methods of collection, and sources which have raised a serious question in my mind as to the validity of these views. In other words, the information reflects the wishful thinking of people and groups known to me and who have personal reasons for pushing these views which are useful to their ambitions. I have had a great deal of information to the contrary, from Americans, Vietnamese, and others, who have travelled out in the provinces. My own conviction is that there is some dissatisfaction, that it has been blown-up by skilled propaganda distortion, and that the countering psychological operation simply hasn’t caught up with the initial harm and erased it. If the U.S. is to help in this, largely via the Ambassador and USIS, with some collateral assist by MAAG through Col. Chau’s pschological group, then our help must be done with real spirit and not just as lip-service. This is a case where “actions speak louder than words.” The actions should be the government demonstrating that it is a good government through its deeds (including Army actions), and with effective publicizing of those deeds with the people. A good starting point would seem to be selling the merits of the “agroville” concept to the people.

Now, why would a Vietnamese farmer or villager help the Communist Viet-cong? He might be gradually talked into believing that Diem is no good and that the Viet-cong is the “wave of the future” and is about to take over the government. However, I believe there are damn few who would buy this, unless they saw convincing proof—such as weak or corrupt government officials, sloppy and cowardly Army troops, and so on. A larger number would be helping either through anger at the government or through fear of the Vietcong.

Farmers and villagers get angry at the government, in a situation such as that in the 5th Military Region, primarily from the actions of troops—whose uniforms identify them openly as “government.” If there is killing of innocent civilians by the troops, (such as would happen in indiscriminate shelling of “suspected” areas), rough manhandling of civilians by troops in their security screening operations or at checkpoints on the roads, or commandeering of dwellings, poultry, cattle, or other possessions at gun-point, then the civilians get mad and retaliate at “the government,” meaning the Army, by helping the enemy with manpower, labor, money, food, or intelligence information. It takes an alert commander, and constant supervision, to ensure the proper behavior of troops under the vexing conditions of counter-guerrilla operations. The VN Army has been, by and large, rather good at this in the past. But, this is worth some personal checking by you.

The “fear” is a result of terrorist action, properly exploited by the Viet-cong. It only needs a few “horrible examples” of sudden and awful death as punishment for non-compliance with Viet-cong wishes to enforce a discipline of this nature upon the population. The way to overcome this, of course, is to protect the people. If the Army and police do not have a full capability for giving complete protection, then they must get across the thought that they need the people’s help, will act in warm friendship with the people, and that they will win out over the enemy soon. If the man in uniform looks and acts like he knows what he is doing, and goes out of his way to be on a friendly footing with the civilian population, then the people will have hope that the military can lick the enemy and will be encouraged to risk helping. This is the beginning of the end for the enemy.

The Diem government has an ambitious program, which is pushing through aggressively, to resettle the farm population in “agrovilles”—agrarian villages which can be more readily defended and having a garden plot for each family, schools, medical facilities, a public meeting place, a good market, and good water. In other words, this is a considerable up-grading of present living conditions. 40 of these “agrovilles” are due to be in being by this summer. The program was started this Spring. In addition, you will find President Diem is pushing through a grand resettlement program all along his border regions, using the Army for security and civic action. There is a lot of imagination, good planning, and hard work going into this.

Candid Talk. One of the wisest acts I have ever seen a MAAG Chief do was one of the early ones by Gen. Williams. He had Col. Don¹⁰ come in and talk at the monthly Advisors’ Conference, when unit advisors would come in from the field to meet in Saigon. Don would tell the Americans what the Vietnamese officers thought of them, tactfully pointing out methods and mannerisms which needed correcting. Don had great skill at doing this and it was a most constructive action. I don’t know whether this is being continued. With so many officers always newly arrived, you might consider keeping this up—if there is still a Vietnamese officer who can do this in the proper spirit.

Thuan. If you and Mrs. McGarr like children, I urge you to get to know the Thuan family. He is Secretary of State for the Presidency, in his 30’s, highly intelligent, trusted by President Diem, and is the real executive right-arm of the President who makes the government work. He used to be number 2 man in the Ministry of Defense and you will find his knowledge of military problems, his candor, and his common-sense really refreshing. I hope you become close friends. He has a large record collection loves music—including the latest dance tunes. My team in Vietnam used to join him getting down on the floor and setting up an electric train set for his youngsters.

After you get known Thuan well enough, I recommend that you discuss the Vietnamese officer corps with him. You will have some conflicting opinions about various officers which you will have to sort out for yourself, and I believe you will find his judgement to be wise, fair, and constructively helpful. As I said in our discussion, President Diem is informed in intimate detail about many of these officers, and has strong opinions. You will be getting other strong opinions about individuals from your MAAG advisors, from our Embassy people, from foreign officials (British and French mostly), and from various Vietnamese. Some of this is going to be strongly conflicting, and can be hard to sift out false stories and gossip to get at the truth.

Partisan Politics in the Army. You will hear a great deal about the harm to the Army caused by cliques of officers belonging to the Can Lao, the government party. Some of this is true. However, you will have a great influence in keeping promotions and assignments on a merit basis, just as Gen. Williams did—and President Diem will listen to you on this, if you ever get worried about it. I recommend strongly, though, that you check your facts thoroughly before discussing such a matter with him. Gen. Williams is in a position of influence, in large part, because he was damn careful of his facts before talking and earned the reputation with Diem and other Vietnamese of being worth listening to. Other Americans haven’t been so careful and, although the Vietnamese officials have sat politely through their talk, their advice was judged valueless and was not heeded. We seem to produce a lot of these well-intentioned but impulsive Americans for positions in Vietnam. If the Vietnamese start listening to you instead of them, they are going to become mighty jealous of you and show it in a lot of rather petty ways. I advise that you just take this in your stride.

President Diem, his family, and some of the Defense officials you deal with, have some deep emotional scars from the politics in the Army. They want to make sure that it is loyal. Thus, they cannot whole-heartedly buy the idea that Can Lao membership is harmful, because to them this will mean that Can Lao officers are loyal. The only way you can lick this is to induce the U.S. concept of loyalty with patience and with careful education.

The emotional scars about loyalty come from the French-provoked plots by the former chief of staff, General Hinh, to pull a coup d’état in late 1954, and some of the questionable conduct of the French military with Vietnamese officers during 1955 combat against the Binh Xuyen and Hoa Hao. Hinh is actually a French Air Force officer. His strongest supporters came from Vietnamese units under the control of French intelligence and clandestine services. There was bitter, under-the-surface strife in the Army, including murders, kidnappings, secret arrests, and other acts of terrorism. Many Americans think this was mostly fiction—but then they weren’t on the scene when the grenades were thrown, when bribes were given, when highly-placed French officers (like Salan)¹¹ openly preached revolt in night clubs, or when French armored units were moved against loyal Vietnamese units. The President remembers some of these things strongly, deep down, although he has since forgiven the French much as they have sent wiser and more mature representatives out to Vietnam.

However, President Diem and the others know that some of the top officers in the Army, including some whom you will judge to be damn good professional soldiers, were once agents in the pay and control of the French intelligence and clandestine services. There will always be a little feeling of unease about trusting such officers all the way. This unease is kept alive by the strange alliance of some sections of the French intelligence and security services with Communist Vietminh and Chinese, as well as with Vietnamese dissident groups. Many U.S. officials have been incredibly naive about this and simply refuse to believe it, which is why Diem has stopped talking to them about it. I believe it, though, based on credible evidence, including first-hand observation.

The Chinese. Cholon is really a Chinese city, and the Chinese under French rule had a highly privileged position in the commercial life of Vietnam. Diem has acted to force these Chinese to declare their citizenship, either as Vietnamese or as Chinese Nationalists. When he started this action in 1956, many of the Chinese Communists fled to Phnom Penh in Cambodia, and are still there. Some of those in Cholon are still disgruntled that they were jarred out of a privileged position where they were exempt from many taxes and exempt from military service. You might keep this in mind as you start meeting them. I like the Chinese in Cholon very much. They are charming hosts, have wonderful food, and have a lot of practical ideas. You will be meeting quite a few of them.

[Here follows information on Vietnamese and foreign personalities.]

Vietnam. I have gone into many things here, in addition to our long talk, simply because I believe you are moving into the really responsible slot in a country which is our best bet to keep S.E. Asia free of Communism. Although the people, customs, and surroundings are about as foreign as can be, there is great respect for honesty, moral courage, and a sincere intent to understand local problems and people—which is why some of your American military friends have found service there so rewarding in the response of the Vietnamese. President Diem is a man of real courage and honesty. I feel sure you are going to cotton to him-—and that this feeling will be returned by him.

Finally, I would like to pass along an operating rule which I have used personally as my “passport” throughout Asia: remember to smile in a friendly way. It will make Asians want to do things your way. It will get you out of tight spots. It will open the door to understanding, help break deadlocks in negotiations, and will increase the stature of your authority. There is a responsiveness to a friendly smile in Asia which is a unique and wonderful thing—and you deserve this rich experience!

1. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, Lansdale Papers: FRC 63 A 1803, Vietnam Correspondence 1960. Secret; Personal. General McGarr had been designated as Chief of MAAG, Vietnam; he assumed his duties at the end of August.
2. Not found.
3. None found attached.
4. Apparent reference to a draft of SNIE 63.1–60, infra.
5. Nguyen Van Hinh, Chief of Staff of the Army of the State of Vietnam, 1953–1954.
6. A Cao Dai general who rallied to Diem in February 1955; killed in the fighting in Saigon, May 1955.
7. Nguyen Thanh Phuong, Vietnamese Minister of State from December 1954 to May 1955; a Cao Dai commander.
8. Tran Van Soai, Minister of State from December 1954 to March 1955; a Cao Daist commander.
9. Ba Cut (General Le Quang Vinh), a Hoa Hao dissident leader; executed July 1956.
10. Possibly Tran Van Don, who was promoted to general by Diem for his support during the sect crisis, April–May 1955.
11. Général Raoul Salan was Commander of French Forces in Indochina, April 1952–May 1953, and had temporary assignments in Vietnam after that time.