156. Memorandum of Discussion at the 444th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, May 9, 19601
Present at the 444th NSC Meeting were the President of the United States, Presiding; the Vice President of the United States; Mr. Livingston T. Merchant for the Secretary of State; the Secretary of Defense; and the Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization. Also attending this meeting and participating in the Council Actions below were the Acting Secretary of the Treasury (Fred C. Scribner, Jr.); the Attorney General; Mr. Elmer Staats for the Director, Bureau of the Budget; and the Acting Secretary of the Interior (Elmer F. Bennett) (Item 3). Also attending the meeting were the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission; the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; Mr. Robert Amory for the Director of Central Intelligence; the Acting Director, U.S. Information Agency (Abbott Washburn); the Assistant to the President; the Special Assistants to the President for National Security Affairs, for Science and Technology, and for Security Operations Coordination; the White House Staff Secretary; Assistant Secretary of State Gerard C. Smith; Assistant Secretary of Defense John N. Irwin, II; the Assistant White House Staff Secretary; Mr. Eric Hager, Department of State; Charles Haskins, NSC; the Executive Secretary, NSC; and the Deputy Executive Secretary, NSC.
There follows a summary of the discussion at the meeting and the main points taken.
[Here follows discussion of agenda items: 1. “Soviet Destruction of a U.S. U–2 Reconnaissance Plane,” 2. “Preparation for the Summit Meeting,” 3. “National Security Implications Involved in the International Oil Cartel Case”, and 4. “Significant World Developments Affecting U.S. Security.” The following extract is taken from item 4, which began with a brief discussion by Amory on the motivation of Khrushchev in exploiting the U–2 reconnaissance incident.]
Mr. Amory then reported that increasing troubles in South Vietnam were confronting Diem. For months Diem had been facing increased insurgent activity in the countryside similar to that which characterized the last days of the French regime. Moreover, Diem’s own ranks had been crumbling. Critics of his one-man rule were becoming more vocal at all levels of government. This criticism asserted that Diem’s administration had fostered corruption, condoned maladministration, and permitted dictatorial practices with the result that communism in South Vietnam was being promoted. Criticism of Diem was so far uncoordinated outside government circles but was becoming stronger, as indicated by a recent manifesto made public in [Page 447] Saigon by a group of former officials who called for extensive political reforms.
The President said he had received a stream of reports about South Vietnam. Heretofore we have been proud of Diem and had thought he was doing a good job. Apparently he was now becoming arbitrary and blind to the situation. Mr. Amory said one danger lay in the fact that Diem was not in direct touch with the people since he seldom went out into the countryside to see the people and talk with provincial leaders. He is inclined to leave this kind of activity, as well as the details of administration, to his brothers, who have all the evils and none of the assets needed to do a good job. The President wondered whether we were doing anything to try to persuade Diem to remain in closer touch with the people. Mr. Amory said our Ambassador to South Vietnam and General Williams were constantly advising Diem to keep in touch with the people.
Mr. Merchant said Diem was more and more coming to be surrounded by a small group. He was leaving administration to his two brothers and was losing touch with the grass roots. However, Ambassador Durbrow was keeping in close touch with Diem. Mr. Merchant hoped that what happened to Syngman Rhee in Korea would give Diem pause.
The President said Diem seemed to be calm and quiet and to have an attractive personality unlike Rhee. The President then asked Mr. Merchant to consider whether the situation might be improved by a letter from him (the President) to Diem.
Mr. Gates remarked that South Vietnam internal security forces were not well equipped to handle insurgent forces in the swampy areas where most of the trouble occurred.
The President said the U.S. ought to do everything possible to prevent the deterioration of the situation in South Vietnam. We had rescued this country from a fate worse than death and it would be bad to lose it at this stage. Mr. Merchant believed that South Vietnam was getting as much economic assistance as it could effectively absorb. The President recalled that when Diem had first been attempting to acquire power in South Vietnam, a recommendation had been made to the Council that the U.S. should oppose him. The President said he hoped the Departments of State and Defense and CIA would consult together to see what could be done about the situation in South Vietnam.
The National Security Council:
Noted and discussed an oral briefing by Mr. Robert Amory, Jr., for the Director of Central Intelligence on the subject, with specific reference to probable motivations of Khrushchev in exploiting the U–2 plane incident; and evidences of a weakening in the position of Premier Diem in South Vietnam.
[Page 448][Here follows discussion of the planned visit of Soviet Air Marshal Vershinin to the United States, and of the Soviet submarine program.]
- Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Drafted by Boggs on May 13.↩