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  4. Document 134

134. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, April 8, 19601

Washington, April 8, 1960

SUBJECT

  • Security Situation in Viet-Nam

PARTICIPANTS

  • His Excellency Nguyen dinh Thuan, Secretary of State for the Presidency of Viet-Nam
  • General Cabell, Certain CIA Officers
  • Chalmers B. Wood, Officer in Charge, Viet-Nam Affairs

During a two hour conversation lasting through and after a luncheon given by General Cabell in honor of Secretary Thuan, the following were some of the points of interest emphasized by Mr. Thuan:

1.
The situation in Southern Laos was completely rotten (“completement pourri”) and the Communists were in control of much of the area.
2.
The recent reports from the French representative in Hanoi describing troop movements from Vinh to the west and from other points were connected with the Communist rumor that a division of ARVN troops had deserted to the North. This rumor was a smoke screen to facilitate infiltration of Communists from the North to the South under the pretext that they were deserters from this division who were returning to South Viet-Nam.
3.
Given the ease with which Viet Minh agents could infiltrate by various routes, the most important objective of the GVN is to win over and retain the confidence and loyalty of the population. This is why the President attaches primary importance to the “agroville” [Page 384] program. The first “agroville” was a success and so many applications had been received that it would be possible to populate the additional 15 “agrovilles” due for completion in June.
4.
In considering reports of insecurity in Viet-Nam it should be remembered that most activities centered in three areas: Ben Tre [?] province, An Xuyen province, and the Tay Ninh area.
5.
In dealing with the guerrillas, communications equipment was particularly important. Due to its present inadequacy, Vietnamese troops often arrived at the scene of guerrilla activity too late. Pursuit planes would also permit GVN forces to react more promptly. Admiral Burke had promised to expedite this program and had informed his subordinates that the delivery of AD–6 planes in August 1960 was not fast enough.

  1. Source: Department of State, FE Files: Lot 62 D 26, MC—Vietnam. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Wood.↩