Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Vietnam, Volume I

12. Despatch From the Chargé in Vietnam (Elting) to the Department of State¹

No. 343

Saigon, April 1, 1958.

REF

• Embassy Despatches 304² and 305³—Embtel 1848⁴

SUBJECT

• Country Team’s Civil Guard Study and GVN Counter-Proposals.

On the morning of February 27 the Ambassador sent President Diem a letter commenting on the Vietnamese Government’s new concept of the Civil Guard and generally concurring in the proposals of the Government for its organization except for the provision that the Civil Guard be attached to the Department of Defense. The Ambassador’s letter explained that the Country Team had made a careful study of the new concept and, as a result, recommended that the Civil Guard be placed under the full control of the Department of Interior.⁵ Finally, the letter stated that if the President approved the concept as revised in the Country Team study, the Ambassador would be in a position to request that the recommended arms, transportation, and communications equipment be made available to the Civil Guard.

The Ambassador saw President Diem on the afternoon of February 27 and discussed the Country Team study with the President and Minister Chau. The President told the Ambassador that for political and security reasons he felt it was essential that the Civil Guard be attached to the Department of Defense, but he agreed somewhat reluctantly to study the Country Team’s proposals further.

The subject was next discussed at a meeting of the Ambassador, General Williams and Mr. Barrows with the President and Mr. Chau on March 5. (See enclosure 1⁶). The President again outlined his reasons for wanting the Civil Guard placed under the Department of Defense eventually, but he said that for the present he wants the weapons and matériel the United States is prepared to give him immediately for support of a Civil Guard under civilian control. He said that although he did not want to accept this aid under false pretenses and wants the Country Team to understand his final goal, the essential thing is to get the money and to have the weapons right away. He said he hopes to reduce the Civil Guard below 55,000 eventually but that for the present this would not be possible.

The Ambassador replied that a Civil Guard of 55,000 men under the Department of Defense would be hard to sell in Washington for two reasons: (1) American aid to assist in the creation of police forces in various countries has been generally predicated on the concept that such police forces should be civilian controlled; and (2) sufficient funds may not be available for support of a 55,000 man Civil Guard. A related question is whether it might not be more advisable to use this same money for improving the economy of the country.

The Ambassador then said that if the President still feels strongly that he needs 55,000 Civil Guardsmen and extra equipment, he will explain the President’s position to Washington and request permission to use now the money available for the Civil Guard, while the Civil Guard is still a civilian organization.

On March 6 Mr. Chau sent the Ambassador a detailed T.O. & E.⁷ for the Civil Guard which he had promised on March 5 to provide. This document proved to be astonishingly unrealistic. It proposed a Civil Guard of approximately 55,000 men to include fifteen armored companies, twenty-one horse cavalry companies, and 225 light infantry companies. Among other things, it proposed that the Civil Guard have 1,900 horses, with gas masks for each, but made no provision for veterinary or remount service. It also called for more helicopters than are authorized for the Armed Forces, with no provision made for maintenance and support units.

In a conversation with the President on March 7 (see enclosure 2⁸) the Ambassador expressed his surprise at the type and amount of equipment in this T.O. & E., and said that a Civil Guard so equipped would, in fact, be additional armed forces with, in some cases, more firepower than the army. He pointed out to the President that if the Civil Guard were so armed and equipped and placed under the Department of Defense, it would be almost impossible to argue that the Civil Guard was a police force needed to maintain internal security.

The Ambassador then urged the President once more to study the Country Team’s proposal for the Civil Guard and to adopt it as a realistic, attainable solution to the pressing problem of internal security. He suggested that if, after two years experience, it became apparent that our concept was unsatisfactory, the matter could be reviewed. (See enclosure 2, page 2, paragraph 7.⁹)

On March 9, British Ambassador Roderick Parkes reported to the Chargé d’Affaires his conversation of the previous day with the President (see enclosure 3¹⁰). He said that the President had told him that he had to do what he believed was right and that even though he could get certain equipment right away if he went along with the Country Team’s proposal, it would not be proper or fair for him to do so.

On March 10 Mr. Chau saw Mr. Barrows and later the Chargé d’Affaires (See enclosure 4¹¹). Chau said that the President wished to withdraw the T.O. & E. submitted March 6 and to modify the GVN proposals so as to reduce the Civil Guard strength figure to 30,000, leaving the question of heavy arms for the future. Chau told the Chargé d’Affaires that the President stands by what he told the Ambassador were his plans for the Civil Guard, but the organization he envisages is for the future. For the present the Civil Guard will remain under the Presidency, Chau emphasized that the T.O. & E. was not intended as a request for aid, and he described it as an “unofficial document”.

On March 12, Mr. Chau invited General Williams to call at his office (see enclosure 5¹²). He showed the General a new document in which the GVN listed what Chau said were the ‘indispensable’ requirements of the Civil Guard for the current year. He reiterated that the T.O. & E. submitted March 6 had been intended only as a statement of plans for the future and that the President, upon learning of the Country Team’s reaction to that T.O.& E., had ordered it withdrawn to avoid misunderstanding. Chau asked General Williams’ opinion of the new document, saying he wished to know in advance whether it would evoke the same reaction from the Country Team as had the previous one.

General Williams replied that the main question in the Country Team would be whether the Civil Guard (or National Guard as the President is now calling it, although the Vietnamese name, Bao An, has not been changed) is to be a police force or a military force. He said that at first glance the new document appeared to be more balanced that the earlier T.O. & E.

This new document was presented to the Chargé d’Affaires later in the day of March 12 by Chau who said that the President wanted Mr. Barrows to have a copy to take to Washington. The Chargé d’Affaires pointed out to Mr. Chau that the new document would have to be studied by the Country Team working group, which had prepared the Country Team study.(See enclosure 6¹³)

Attached to the document was an unsigned statement which said:

“The object of the present communication is solely to give concrete information on the equipment that the Bao An (National Guard) needs immediately to be more effective.

“It is not a question of a reorganization project but of a request for aid.”

The new document is more realistic than the previous T.O. & E. and proposes organization and equipment for a force of approximately 32,000 men. However, it proposes larger companies than had been envisaged by the Country Team study (158 men versus 100 men) and calls for different amounts and types of equipment for each company. This document is now being studied by the Country Team working group.

Howard Elting, Jr.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751G.5–MSP/4–158. Secret. Drafted by Alan L. Campbell.
2. Despatch 304, March 1, contained the text of a letter from Durbrow to Diem, February 26, enclosing the Embassy’s Country Team comments on Vietnam’s concept of a Civil Guard. These comments are summarized in the first paragraph of the despatch printed here. Enclosed with the despatch was a Country Team Staff Study, entitled “The Civil Guard in the Future,” February 28. (Ibid., 751G.5–MSP/3–158)
3. In despatch 305, March 5, the Embassy enclosed a memorandum of conversation among Durbrow, Diem, and Chau on February 27 which included discussions on the Civil Guard. (Ibid., 751G.5–MSP/4–158) This discussion is summarized in the second paragraph of the despatch printed here.
4. Telegram 1848, March 11, contained a report of a discussion among Diem, Durbrow, Chau, Williams, and Barrows on March 5. (Ibid., 751G.5–MSP/3–1158) This discussion on the Civil Guard is summarized in the third paragraph of the despatch printed here.

5. In the letter cited in footnote 2 above, Durbrow gave the following reasons for placing the Civil Guard under the Department of the Interior:

   • “a. Since, under the concept presented in Mr. Chau’s letters, the Civil Guard is to be placed at the ‘disposal of’, and presumably is to be under the operational control of, the Department of the Interior, we see no reason why the Civil Guard was shown to be ‘attached’ to the Department of Defense in that concept.
   • “b. Since the Civil Guard is a civilian police force, and not a para-military organization, it should be placed under civilian control in accordance with usual practice.
   • “c. The work of the Civil Guard in peacetime, will of necessity be closely linked with that of the other police agencies, and it should therefore be attached to, and controlled by, the same department as are those agencies.
   • “d. American aid given to assist in the creation of police forces in various other countries has been predicated on the concept that police forces should be civilian controlled and not ‘attached’ to, or tied in with, military forces. Moreover, certain funds have already been appropriated to support the Civil Guard on the assumption that it is to be a civilian police force. If it should now become necessary to seek Washington’s agreement to support a Civil Guard under the control of the Department of Defense, difficulties and long delays must be foreseen.”

6. Attached, but not printed. Another memorandum of this conversation is in Center of Military History, Williams Papers, Conversations with Diem 28 Dec 57–29 May 58 (160).
7. Table of Organization and Equipment. [Footnote in the source text.]
8. Memorandum of conversation attached, but not printed.

9. Paragraph 7 of this enclosed memorandum of conversation reads as follows:

   “Based on the study of the Chau paper, and our concept, it seems that we were basically in agreement on the mission of the Civil Guard; that is, a national police force. Our police and military experts are convinced that if he should accept our concept, the Civil Guard could be made into a very effective organization to control internal security. I therefore urged him to adopt our concept, try it for two years, and if at that time, based on experience, it became apparent that his concept should be adopted, the matter could be reviewed.”

10. Memorandum of conversation attached, but not printed.
11. Memorandum of conversation between Elting and Chau attached, but not printed.
12. Memorandum of meeting attached, but not printed.
13. Attached, but not printed.