Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Vietnam, Volume I

10. Memorandum From the Secretary of Defense’s Deputy Special Assistant for Special Operations (Lansdale) to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Sprague)¹

Washington, March 19, 1958.

SUBJECT

• Control of National Police

A current problem has arisen over U.S. aid to Vietnam’s Civil Guard. One aspect concerns who in Vietnam should control this national police force: civil authority or military authority.

Present U.S. practice is that a national police force, in a country aided by us should be under civil authority. While examination of U.S. policy documents did not reveal a basis for this, the practice has grown into a fairly rigid procedure.

As a rigid practice, our insistence on civil control of police in a foreign nation can help create a police state, help abet political corruption exploitable by communists, or help establish rival forces within a nation which will bring on internal instability. None of these end results, of course, seems to be a desirable U.S. objective.

Knowing your personal interest in the problem of internal stability in countries we are helping, I hope that you can take a careful look at the rigidity of our official position in this matter. My belief is that the U.S. should be flexible on this and tailor recommendations to fit the needs of each individual country. The following thoughts are offered for your consideration:

1. Our objective should be to help establish institutions, including a national police force, which will protect the rights of the individual citizen. The American concept of personal liberty, as expressed in our Bill of Rights and Declaration of Independence, remains our basic difference from our enemies, whether they be communist or fascist.

2. Thus, our objective should not be simplified to creating institutions in the image of U.S. institutions, including police forces under civil authority, but should be to attain the larger objective stated above. Although U.S. police forces are under civil authority, this does not automatically mean that the concept is a superior one. The police forces of the Soviets, of communist China, of Hitler and Mussolini, all under civil authority, show plainly that such a delegation of power by a people can be contrary to our strongest principles.

3. In brief, this means we should not confuse our true objectives in a foreign country with mere institutionalizing of our approach.

4. In Vietnam, President Diem is concerned about his lack of experienced and capable persons to assist him. Thus, he has wanted to put his national police, the Civil Guard, under his Minister of Defense,² whom he feels can handle such an organization with real competence, as demonstrated in his handling of the nation’s armed forces. We have opposed Diem in this. His only solution then is to place the Civil Guard under a Minister to whom he doesn’t want to give this power and authority, or to do it himself. He has chosen to add this burden to his multitude of other personal tasks. American officials have long been trying to get Diem to delegate much of his personal work load to others. Now we force him to add to it.

5. It is noted that the Philippines have reverted to placing their constabulary under their Department of Interior. The constabulary had been transferred to the Department of National Defense in 1950, not only to unify the armed forces of the nation to combat the communist Huks, but also to bring a stop to venal political control of the constabulary by some provincial governors and to resulting corrupt practices by the constabulary (which the communists exploited successfully). We have little guarantee now that U.S. funds will not be used for a force which can become, once again, the private army of corrupt politicians.

6. In Thailand, U.S. aid to formerly rival police and military forces provided a painful example of how U.S. personnel and programs can be affected and of resulting political instability.

These thoughts are only meant to say: we can do ourselves harm by taking the simple, easy way out. Instead of rigidly dividing police and military tasks between departments and agencies concerned in Washington with foreign operations, perhaps there is merit in studying the real needs of each individual country, and our objectives there, and then deciding how best to proceed.³

1. Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD/ISA Files: FRC 62 A 1698, 092 Vietnam. Secret. Notes on the source text indicate Sprague and Byers saw this memorandum.
2. Tran Trung Dung was Assistant Secretary of State for Defense. Diem held the Defense portfolio.
3. Lansdale sent copies of this memorandum to Stump and Williams. In a letter to Lansdale, March 24 (copy to Williams), Stump stated: “I could not agree with you more, and I think you have expressed yourself extremely well and that you are absolutely right in advocating that we take a look at each country individually and decide what is right in each particular case. It is perfectly stupid to do otherwise.” (Center of Military History, Williams Papers, Official Correspondence Jan–June 1958 (34))