Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Central and Southeastern Europe, Volume XXVI

93. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, March 4, 1957¹

Washington, March 4, 1957

SUBJECT

• Situation in the Middle East

PARTICIPANTS

• U.S. Side>
• The Secretary of State
• Deputy Under Secretary Murphy
• Senator George
• Mr. Bowie
• Mr. Elbrick
• Mr. Sullivan—Defense
• Mr. Timmons
• Mr. Reinstein
• Mr. Creel
• Mr. Parker
• German Side
• Mr. Von Brentano, German Foreign Minister
• Dr. Krekeler, German Ambassador
• Professor Grewe, German Foreign Office
• Baron von Welck, German Foreign Office
• Mr. Von Kessel, Minister, German Embassy
• Mr. Harkort, German Foreign Office
• Mr. Limbourg, German Foreign Office
• Mr. von Lilienfeld, German Foreign Office

The Secretary opened the meeting by saying we were very happy to have Mr. Von Brentano here. He was sorry that his visit could not coincide with that of President Heuss as originally scheduled and regretted that the latter’s indisposition had prevented him from coming at this time. The Secretary referred briefly to his plans for leaving Washington on March 6 for the SEATO Conference in Australia,² and thereafter going to Bermuda for a meeting with Prime Minister Macmillan.³

Turning to the first item on the agenda,⁴ the Middle East, the Secretary said he would be interested in hearing the German views on this subject but he understood the Germans were primarily interested in hearing his own appraisal. Brentano indicated assent.

The Secretary said he had had some discussion of the Middle East with Mr. Von Brentano at the NATO Meeting last December and that he would proceed from that point. The United States had taken the position from the outset in the Middle East dispute that in accordance with the provision of the United Nations Charter disputes must be settled by peaceful means and force should not be used against the territorial integrity of another state. The Secretary said that most countries’ attitudes and positions in their international relations reflect their natural affinities rather than principles. The United States, however, felt that its position in the world today was such that it must base its policy on certain fundamental principles rather than let our position be governed by what countries we liked or by historic friendships. This was not an easy position to take and it was possibly the first time in history such a position had in fact been taken.

The United States had therefore supported the UN resolutions calling for withdrawal of the attacking forces.⁵ The British and French had complied but Israel had not yet done so, and there was feeling that pressure would have to be exerted on the Israelis. We had thought it might be easier for the Israelis to withdraw if the United States made a statement as to the position it would take on some of the fundamental issues, not in the nature of any promise or inducement, or by way of giving Israel anything to which it was not entitled, in the event of Israeli withdrawal. We therefore had given a memorandum to the Israeli Government on February 11⁶ setting forth our views on the international status of the Gulf of Aqaba and the Straits of Tiran. There was nothing new in our position and the Egyptian Government had itself taken the same position some six years ago. With regard to the Gaza Strip, it was under Egyptian administration pursuant to the armistice agreement but was not a part of Egypt. The Secretary pointed out that the area had no natural resources, not even water. The population consisted predominantly of the refugees who were being supported by the United Nations, with most of the money being furnished by the U.S. He drew the conclusion that there was a considerable reason, in view of these facts, for the United Nations to exercise responsibility in the Gaza area. The Secretary said he felt that our statement of these views to the Israeli Government had partly been responsible for the announcement last Friday of the Israeli decision to withdraw its troops.

At the moment Premier Ben Gurion had run into political difficulties at home and the present situation was obscure. The Israeli Government had requested further assurances from us, but we had replied we could give no assurances beyond what had already been announced publicly. He hoped that the Israeli Government would take a favorable decision today.

The Secretary said that if the Israelis did withdraw, the focus of attention would shift to the Arab countries, particularly Egypt, and the Suez Canal. Egypt had not allowed the clearing of the Canal to be completed. In his own mind, there was no doubt that they were dragging their feet and using the Canal as a means for trying to bring about the withdrawal of Israeli forces. He spoke at some length on the adverse consequences, particularly to the countries of the Middle East and South Asia, if the Canal were not opened. He said that the Texas Railway Commission had authorized an increase in Texas production of 200,000 barrels a day and that, with the approach of summer, the immediate situation did not involve an intolerable burden on Europe, although the purchase of oil in the United States and Venezuela involved higher costs and a foreign exchange burden.

We therefore believed we should do all we could to get the Israelis to withdraw. Otherwise fighting might break out again and Soviet penetration of the Middle East would be facilitated. The Secretary felt our two countries were in the best position to influence Israel. He had had a talk with Ambassador Krekeler the other day and was pleased to learn that the German Government had made representations to the Government of Israel to induce withdrawal.

The Secretary then discussed briefly the matter of Canal tolls. A proposal had been put forward to the UN Secretary General that these tolls should be paid to some international institution such as the International Bank, with Egypt to get half the total amount and the other half to be impounded pending a final settlement. Fifty percent of the Canal tolls could considerably more than meet Egypt’s out-of-pocket expenses for maintaining and operating the Canal.

The Secretary said that Egypt had taken an equivocal position regarding the Six Principles agreed on last October and now claimed these were no longer applicable. He regarded this position as untenable, since the Six Principles were an expression of the application of the Constantinople Convention of 1888 and therefore had permanent and universal significance for all countries. Whatever the rights and the wrongs of the British-French action, there was no reason why other countries should be penalized for it. He pointed out that the Six Principles were all right as far as they go but they call for further implementation. Steps toward that end had been taken as reflected by the Hammarskjöld report on his talks with the British, French and Egyptians. Whether it would be possible to pick the matter up at that stage, he did not know. The time might not be ripe to attempt to bring the three governments together in the same room and Hammarskjöld might have to negotiate with them separately. The Secretary said that Egypt should be disposed to reach a settlement since it was in a bad economic position, but hints have come out that they don’t want to.

The Secretary said that there was a real danger that the Canal would be opened without a settlement. This would mean that there would be a de facto situation in which Egypt would get whatever it wanted. He expressed concern that everyone would be so eager to use the Canal that we might lose the possibility of safeguarding the longer-run interests of the user nations. He particularly was concerned that there be assurances against the use of the Canal as an instrument of national policy. The Secretary said there was no doubt in his mind that the Egyptians were using the Canal in this manner. He said we could not be acquiescent in this situation. Some machinery was necessary to prevent Egypt from blackmailing us in the future. He said that Hammarskjöld was hopeful that after the withdrawal of the Israeli forces, the Egyptians would be reasonable and flexible. He said this was the position which Fawzi was taking in New York but he was not sure that what Fawzi said was all backed up by Nasser.

Mr. Von Brentano thanked the Secretary for his appraisal. He said that as far as basic principles were concerned there seemed to be complete agreement between the two Governments regarding the assessment of the situation and of the measures to be taken. While Germany had no direct interest in the Middle East dispute, it did have three rather important indirect interests.

In the first place Germany had been an important user of the Canal and had a vital interest in the reopening of the waterway. He had made a statement on this subject at the London Conference, to which he felt it was unnecessary to add.

Secondly, there was a problem with regard to the Federal Republic’s relations with the Arab States. At the moment these relations were good and quite correct despite the fact Germany was making reparations payments to Israel. The Federal Republic was anxious to prevent any deterioration of the relations, owing to the problem of preventing the recognition of the so-called German Democratic Republic. There was a danger that if these relations should worsen the GDR might try to move into the vacuum in the interest of securing recognition or building up its own trade relations. The situation involved elements of blackmail. As for the British and French action in Suez, the Federal Republic had acted with restraint, although it regretted this development because it enabled the Soviet Union to pursue a policy of diversion in Eastern Europe.

Thirdly, there was the matter of the Federal Republic’s relations with Israel. The Federal Republic wished to do nothing to upset reparations deliveries to Israel. He understood Ambassador Krekeler had made clear to us the Germans did not wish to suspend these deliveries even if a sanctions resolution should be voted in the United Nations. The German Parliament and people regarded this matter as a moral obligation rather than a political one. Any change in this policy would involve great difficulties and Brentano hoped that such a question would never be put to them. The Germans had informed the Israeli government that in view of their desire to maintain reparations deliveries they h oped they would not be confronted with a problem in this regard. He said he believed that the Israeli Government understood the viewpoint which had been expressed to them.

Brentano then referred to the memorandum he had given to the Secretary in Paris on the overall situation in the Middle East.⁷ As that memorandum had indicated, the Federal Republic was prepared to participate in any settlement of the problems of the area both because of its own interests in the area and the fact that such a settlement would help promote peace and stability in the world. The Federal Republic had welcomed the “bold and courageous” statement by President Eisenhower in setting forth his plan for the Middle East and was prepared to participate fully in this plan both from a political and economic standpoint.

Brentano said he wished to give one illustration of the Federal Republic’s difficulties in the face of the Suez dispute. For over a year the Germans had planned to participate in a trade exhibition in Cairo which was to open very shortly. The Egyptians had proposed that the German Minister for Economic Affairs, Mr. Erhard, should go to Cairo to open the German exhibit. The German Cabinet had decided that this would not be a good time for Erhard to go but there was some fear that the Egyptians might make this a question of prestige. While Brentano felt himself that someone else should go, he would be glad to learn the Secretary’s views on this point.

In conclusion, Brentano said the Federal Republic was quite aware of the difficult position of Israel and would be glad to make any contribution it could toward an overall settlement in the Middle East which would help this small country to acquire a feeling of security. He suggested that perhaps some guarantee with regard to the Gulf of Aqaba could be worked into the Suez settlement. He wondered whether the Arabs themselves did not feel that such an overall settlement was necessary for their own economic and political purposes.

The Secretary said he was glad to notice Brentano’s reference to the Eisenhower doctrine,⁸ since he himself felt it would be a constructive step to counter Soviet activities in the Middle East. He Pointed out that the United States cannot carry alone the responsibility of developing relations with countries in this area advantageous to the West and that we looked forward to useful participation by the Federal Republic in this effort. He felt that the Federal Republic could play an important role in helping to develop the economy of the Middle East.

As for the Erhard visit to Cairo, he agreed that this was not an appropriate time to send a high-ranking Cabinet Minister to Egypt, since Nasser could play up this move as an indication of support for his viewpoint.

Regarding an overall settlement in the area, we foresaw difficulties in proceeding quickly, in view of the high feeling between Israel and the Arab States. The United States was prepared to contribute in important ways to a settlement both economically and politically, as had been indicated in our statement in 1955, but it appeared doubtful whether an overall settlement could be reached within the next few months.

1. Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 62 D 181, CF 834. Secret. Drafted by Reinstein and Creel on March 11. Brentano was in Washington, March 3–7, for talks with U.S. officials on topics of mutual concern. For text of the joint communiqué issued at the conclusion of the Dulles–Brentano talks, see Department of State Bulletin, March 25, 1957, pp. 490–491. For Adenauer’s account of the visit, see Erinnerungen, 1955–1959, pp. 275–277.
2. For documentation on the third meeting of the SEATO Ministerial Council, March 11–13, see vol. XXI, pp. 181 ff.
3. For documentation on the Bermuda Conference, March 21–23, see vol. XXVII, pp. 704 ff.
4. A copy of the agenda is in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 62 D 181, CF 834.
5. For documentation on the Suez Canal crisis, including these resolutions, see volume XVI.
6. For text, see vol. XVII, pp. 132–134.
7. See footnote 4, Document 87.
8. For documentation on the American Doctrine for the Middle East (Eisenhower Doctrine), approved by the President on March 9,1957, see volume XII.