Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Central and Southeastern Europe, Volume XXVI

91. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State¹

Bonn, February 18, 1957—2 p.m.

3171. On occasion of my farewell call on Chancellor this morning, he read me draft of his proposed letter to Bulganin stating that official copy of it would be transmitted to Embassy through Foreign Office, but did not indicate whether or not we should be asked for comments.² He agreed that I could telegraph substance of letter and I am so doing.

Chancellor stated he and Foreign Minister had not been in agreement as to form of letter but were in complete agreement as to its contents. He had insisted letter must take friendly and soft tone, otherwise Social Democrats would throw in his face in election his alleged refusal to have good relations with Moscow.

As I listened to reading, note seemed to me friendly in its tone, but in substance a reaffirmation of Federal Republic position. He stated his willingness to consider negotiations for furthering trade, pointed out that considerable trade was already going on. As to attack on NATO in Bulganin letter, he reminded Bulganin of his statement in Moscow on Chancellor’s visit that while they did not like Germany’s entry into NATO, they were realists and accepted it as a fact. Chancellor in this letter suggests it would be well if they returned to this realistic position.

On reunification issue and Bulganin’s reference to two German Governments, Chancellor formulated what seemed to me a by-pass of essential issue; namely, status of Pankow. He said something to effect that in Moscow it had been agreed that reunification was responsibility of four powers and he expected Soviets to live up to this promise of their responsibility. Then note ended with discussion of Germans still held in Russia.

In connection with his dealing with reunification, he stated that in note which would be sent later, position of his government as being only legitimate and authorized spokesman for all Germany would be emphasized. I suggested to him this was matter of some importance as there was misunderstanding in some circles in United States on this point. Chancellor expressed opinion that there was no danger that any considerable portion of German opinion would demand negotiations with Pankow at any level. He agreed Socialist opposition was as clear on this point as he was.

On looking to future, Chancellor was optimistic about election prospects for his party. His worry for long term was that if Socialists came into government, right radical tendencies still existing in Lower Saxony would once again become active.

Conant

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 661.62A/2–1857. Confidential; Priority.
2. On February 8, the Soviet Ambassador in Bonn delivered to Adenauer a letter from Bulganin dated February 5. In a memorandum to Dulles on February 11 concerning the letter, Elbrick noted that the Soviet letter contained nothing new. He continued: “What is striking, however, is the unusually conciliatory and almost cajoling tone of the letter, which may indicate that it is primarily designed to embarrass the Chancellor and to bolster the position of the SPD in the coming elections. It constitutes a strong bid for bilateral negotiations concerning trade, cultural and consular relations. It hints at the possibility of bilateral discussions on disarmament and European security which must in any event, according to the USSR view, be settled before progress on reunification is possible.” (Ibid., 762A.00/2–957)

   For texts of Bulganin’s letter and Adenauer’s reply, dated February 27, see Moskau Bonn, pp. 233–240.