Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Central and Southeastern Europe, Volume XXVI

79. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State¹

Bonn, November 16, 1956—7 p.m.

1887. I accompanied Senator Green on his call on Chancellor Adenauer today. Chancellor expressed himself very forcefully about present international situation, future of NATO, and forthcoming Parliamentary conference on NATO which Senator is attending.² Chancellor said recent events had caused such a split in NATO that he felt Parliamentary conference about to be held in Paris was without point and could do no good. Later in conversation he made it clear reason for this view is Chancellor’s belief that for a period of time situation in Near East is so critical and sensitive that US can not take lead which it should in reconstructing NATO, for to do so at this moment would be to give Russians an opportunity of claiming NATO was being strengthened as an instrument directed against the Soviet Union. However, Chancellor believes in a few months US must take leading role in reconstruction of NATO. He emphasized again his belief NATO must have strong political and unified basis for its military plans.

In presenting this point of view Chancellor went into history of past few months at some length. He was highly critical of US in regard to our policy in Near East and, while not defending recent action of British and French in Egypt, stated in his opinion US Government had failed understand British position in Near East and French position in Algeria. He stated Algeria was not a colony but an integral part of France and he was very worried lest in defense of this part of France the French would go under. He went into some detail of his analysis of events leading up to Nasser’s seizure of canal and was critical of US policy both in regard to Aswan Dam and subsequent proposals about Suez Canal. Since I was not in command of all pertinent facts I did not feel I would interrupt and challenge his very critical analysis of US policy in Near East.

Chancellor was also critical of our attitude in NATO. He repeated what he has said on previous occasions, namely, that he has been told by his NATO Amb Blankenhorn that US Amb to NATO has more than once been without instructions when important issues were on agenda. Chancellor said if US representative in NATO Council has no instructions there is no US leadership; without strong US leadership NATO can not be made strong as it should be.

Chancellor further added that US had failed to appreciate extent to which Soviets had turned their strategy towards building up strength in Near East and Egypt in particular, referring to amount of arms and equipment which French and British reported they found in Egypt. He was further critical of both US and Great Britain for their readiness to believe during last year of so that there had been a real change in attitude of Soviet leaders. Events in Hungary,³ Chancellor said, were evidence enough that US and British had been deceived.

In conclusion, just as we were leaving, Chancellor spoke strongly about what he said was basic error of US foreign policy, namely, a shift last summer from US previous attempt to have controlled nuclear disarmament to policy based on assumption that US would be no. 1 in nuclear atomic military power, Soviet Union no. 2, and thereby the peace of world would be secure. This was an unrealistic position, Chancellor said, and the root of present difficulties.

At this point I ventured to interrupt and challenged Chancellor’s statement that US had altered its policy in any such way as he had indicated. We had a rather vigorous exchange of views on this subject. I asked whether he wanted to have the US no. 2 in atomic superiority rather than no. 1. He said of course not but change of policy which had taken place meant we were no longer concerned with attempts to have atomic disarmament. I pointed out difficulties over the years in this field. He replied that the difficulties were not so great as to cause US to abandon our attempts. I denied that we had abandoned our attempts, to which Chancellor answered by saying our new policy of giving up conventional weapons made it impossible for US to consider atomic disarmament. Here again I challenged him as to his interpretation of our policy; he merely referred to an alleged statement of Standing Group and conversation came to an end as we were on point of leaving.

Senator Green’s responses to Chancellor’s remarks in general were simply to agree that NATO should be strengthened. He made few comments in regard to substantive points Chancellor raised.

In connection with Chancellor’s critical attitude toward American foreign policy in Egyptian affair, I might point out that I have never had any instructions on basis of which I could attempt to present US side of case to Chancellor. It seems to me quite clear that British and particularly French sources had been quite active in presenting their side of argument. It further is clear Chancellor is confused about our military policy and the whole atomic military picture and its relation to US foreign policy. If I may venture the comment, it is my belief that it is Chancellor who is unrealistic and this is due to his fundamental lack of knowledge of realities of atomic age in which we live. I should welcome a directive from Washington which would enable me to present this whole picture in greater detail to Chancellor.

Conant

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 740.5/11–1656. Secret; Priority.
2. The second conference of NATO parliamentarians was held at Paris November 19–23.
3. Regarding the Hungarian uprising and the Soviet military intervention in November 1956, see volume xxv.