Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Central and Southeastern Europe, Volume XXVI

76. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State¹

Bonn, October 16, 1956—5 p.m.

1456. Eyes only for Secretary of State from Ambassador Conant. In response Department telegram 1024 October 12² signed Hoover, my appraisal Paris telegram 1711 repeated Bonn 83³ is as follows: Chancellor Adenauer undoubtedly believes he has grounds for serious grievance against U.S. and the Secretary of State personally. That he has justifiable grounds for such a grievance is widely shared by politicians all parties in Germany and was first aired during week July 16. Following editorial appearing Neue Zuercher Zeitung (usually highly favorable U.S. position) and reprinted Die Welt Saturday, July 21, sums up widespread reaction at that time.

“The change in American strategic thinking—a change which is due to election politics—has caused deep concern in Bonn. For months the West German politicians have been emphatically told by the highest authorities of NATO and by traveling military men from beyond the Atlantic Ocean that twelve German divisions are absolutely necessary and essential for the defense of Germany and of Europe; well-founded arguments, considerable evidence were offered for these claims. The Federal Government passed a conscription law to carry out its promise and to fulfill its defense obligations. The last echo of the bitter Parliamentary fight concerning this conscription law has hardly died out and the ink is hardly dry on the agreement concerning the support costs for allied troops, which Bonn conceded voluntarily, without any legal obligation. Now we hear from Washington a message from the military men, which was seconded by Secretary of State Dulles, that these twelve divisions will probably not be needed and that American troops are to be reduced in numbers. At the same time, it is reported that London is considering reducing troops stationed in the Federal Republic.

“The man who based his policy to such a high degree on the assurance and the loyalty of his Western partners must today have the painful feeling of having been disavowed. When one considers this policy, it is difficult, at the present moment, to keep from writing a bitter satire about the coordination of Western policy.”

Whether or not Chancellor justified in nursing this grievance, he has been undoubtedly airing the grievance publicly to a large extent in order to counteract anticipated criticism from U.S. and other NATO sources concerning his decision to institute 12 instead of 18 month draft. You will recall your conversation with Brentano in Paris in April [May],⁴ concerning disastrous consequences for NATO if Germans instituted only 12-month draft. Political situation here in Germany has made it extremely difficult Chancellor to put through 18-month proposal and undoubtedly news and discussions in newspapers July 16 to July 25 increased his difficulties. As explained to you in my personal letter in July,⁵ the case for 12 division German army has been based largely on Gruenther’s testimony that only with 12 plus present British, American, and French strength on continent could forward position be held. Therefore, what appeared to be reversal in this position on part of U.S., and was certainly an official doubt raised by British on or about July 20 by document read to NATO meeting, has been serious blow to Chancellor’s public position on defense matters. Reshuffle of his cabinet today with Strauss replacing Blank may well mean further delays German draft which in turn will bring forth further criticisms from U.S. and NATO partners. Chancellor and his friends will be inclined to blame U.S. still further for alleged change in strategic planning and failure to notify him at time of his visit to Washington last June.

Unless and until some of basic problems of strength and nature ground forces required in Europe can be discussed and settled in NATO, believe the U.S. and Federal Republic on uncertain basis in regard to cooperation in future development German army. Therefore, I hope U.S. will take the lead in fundamental discussions NATO on size and armament ground forces in Europe for the foreseeable future and relation the task of those forces to mission of SAC. Until situation clarifies here after Strauss takes over Blank’s position, would advise against any further communications to the Chancellor about misunderstanding last July on German defense efforts. Chancellor has already received a personal communication from Senator George which should have resolved his doubts.⁶

I shall be seeing Chancellor next week in connection with EURATOM⁷ and questions arising from Under Secretary Murphy’s discussion,and may have opportunity to learn further of Chancellor’s reaction on all these matters without opening subject myself.

Conant

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 740.5/10–1656. Secret; Priority. A copy of this telegram at the Eisenhower Library bears the President’s initials, indicating that he saw it.
2. Not printed. (Ibid., 740.5/10–1256)
3. This telegram reported that Adenauer was still not convinced that the United States was being frank with him, particularly about the existence of a “Radford Plan” for reducing military commitments to Germany. (Ibid., 611.51/10–1156)
4. See Document 51.
5. Document 63.
6. See Document 73.
7. Regarding Conant’s conversation with Adenauer on October 29, see vol. IV, pp. 480–481.