Office of the Historian

317. Memorandum From the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Murphy) to the Secretary of State1

Washington, October 30, 1957.

SUBJECT

  • US Policy Toward Yugoslavia

You will recall that you recently approved certain modifications of US aid programs in Yugoslavia including 1) a delay in negotiation of the PL–480 program for FY 1956 and 2) suspension of deliveries of jet aircraft.2 Mr. Dillon subsequently called in the Yugoslav Ambassador to inform him of the PL–480 delay, and took the occasion to clarify certain press reports alleging that virtually all US aid was to be stopped.3 A copy of a memorandum of conversation is attached (Tab A).4 Mr. Dillon did not give notification of the aircraft suspension, as you will recall we planned to delay this until we had an opportunity to observe Yugoslav reaction to the break in diplomatic relations announced by the Federal Republic on October 19.

Our recommendation for modification of US aid programs had been prompted by Yugoslavia’s persistence in aligning itself with the USSR on virtually all important international issues despite clear warnings from us of the consequences of such a course. The Yugoslavs maintained, on the other hand, however, that they had not abandoned their policy of non-alignment, while on the other they claimed that where their positions did coincide with those of the USSR, this was desirable in order to support Khrushchev, who was regarded by the Yugoslavs as the Soviet leader most responsive to liberating forces and hence most deserving of support. On Hungary, for example, they pointed out that Yugoslavia’s condemnation of the [Page 800] first Soviet intervention still stands and that Yugoslavia’s recent vote in the UN does not indicate any change in their appreciation of the Hungarian situation. On disarmament, they proposed a resolution in the UN which incorporates a number of provisions at variance with the current Soviet position, although it appears on balance still more favorable to the USSR than it is to the US. As for Germany, there are numerous indications that Yugoslavia miscalculated the force of the West German reaction, and wishes now to avoid any further deterioration of relations with Bonn. For its part, the Federal Republic has now indicated that it intends 1) to maintain consular representation in Yugoslavia, and 2) to continue full economic relations, including implementation of the long-term “reparations” credit extended last year. Tito’s illness, announced yesterday, seems to indicate a reluctance on his part to project himself into the power struggle in Moscow, and may also reflect an awareness that he may have gone too far in his rapprochement with the USSR. Moreover, with respect to US military aid, the Soviet power struggle may well have increased Yugoslavia’s appreciation of its value while US press speculation over possible cuts may increase their apprehension and cause them to move now with greater caution. In short, some of the major objectives of the modifications in US aid which we proposed may already have been at least partly realized.

Ambassador Riddleberger’s return to Belgrade at this time provides an unusual opportunity for clarifying the present state of our relations with Yugoslavia, as reflected in the recommendations listed below:

Recommendations:

1)
That Ambassador Riddleberger be instructed to seek a meeting with President Tito immediately upon his return to Belgrade in which he would:
a)
reemphasize the concern with which we have regarded Yugoslavia’s apparently almost complete alignment with the USSR notwithstanding our admonitions on the difficulties this presents for us;
b)
write clarification of Yugoslavia’s present position vis-à-vis the USSR;5
2)
That we delay suspension of the jet aircraft deliveries for one more month, to enable us to assess Tito’s reply to the Ambassador and any other indications of Yugoslav reaction;6
3)
That similarly we defer opening PL–480 negotiations until after the Ambassador’s return;7
4)
That arrangements be made for Ambassador Riddleberger to call briefly on the President before his return to Belgrade (the fact that such a call has been made would in itself strengthen further the Ambassador’s position in his meeting with Tito).8

  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.68/10–3057. Secret.↩
  2. See Document 310.↩
  3. See Document 315.↩
  4. Not attached to the source text.↩
  5. Secretary Dulles crossed out the words “ask for” and “US” and wrote in “write” and “USSR” above them.↩
  6. Secretary Dulles wrote in: “But continue spare parts in any event” in the margin next to this paragraph.↩
  7. This paragraph originally read: “That similarly we defer a decision on opening PL–480 negotiations until after we have the Ambassador’s report.” Secretary Dulles made the changes by hand.↩
  8. Secretary Dulles initialed his approval of all the recommendations.↩