313. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State1
822. Paris for USRO. While I am unable to judge the domestic considerations which may have prompted policy on aid to Yugoslavia set forth in Depintel October 23,2 I am sure this action will be pleasing to Soviets since it will doubtless greatly facilitate their efforts to tighten their hold on Yugoslavia. (In this connection it is assumed here that Tito will visit Moscow November 7.) Suggest any public statements should be carefully worded to mitigate harmful effects. This action will lend credence to Soviet propaganda that US was responsible for German action in breaking relations, that our aid program is based on political conditions, and that we are unwilling to allow Yugoslavia to follow an independent policy but are forcing them to join one camp or the other. In view of our action will be extremely difficult for Yugoslavs to make any pro-Western moves since these would be considered as a result of our economic pressure. Since Yugoslavia unlikely at any time break relations with East Germany would appear difficult for us in the future to renew aid, should this become desirable, if we go as far at this time as is indicated in reference telegram. In any event I would urge that so far as possible we refrain from specific public explanations. Also hope we could avoid spelling out difficulty to Yugoslavs as proposed last sentence reference telegram. Could we not merely tell them that embarking on any new aid programs at this time likely provoke congressional legislation barring any further aid to Yugoslavia?
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.68/10–2457. Secret; Priority. Repeated to London, Paris, Belgrade, and Bonn.↩
- In telegram 419 to Belgrade, repeated to Moscow, October 23, the Department of State provided instructions regarding the slowdown in economic assistance. (Ibid., 411.6841/10–2357)↩