309. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, October 15, 19571

SUBJECT

  • Yugoslav Recognition of East German Regime

PARTICIPANTS

  • Mr. Selwyn Lloyd, British Foreign Secretary
  • Sir Harold Caccia, British Ambassador to the United States
  • Lord Hood, British Minister to the United States
  • Mr. Denis Laskey, Private Secretary to Mr. Lloyd
  • Mr. John Foster Dulles, Secretary of State
  • Mr. C. Burke Elbrick, Jr., Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs
  • Mr. William N. Dale, Officer in Charge, UK and Ireland Affairs

The Secretary stated that we have been told by the German Embassy here that, subject to US, UK and French views, the German Government has decided to terminate relations with Yugoslavia in retaliation for Yugoslavia’s recognition of the East German regime. The Secretary said that we are not disposed to dissuade the Germans since, in our opinion, the Yugoslavs have already proceeded too far into the danger zone in their relations with the USSR. He stated that by siding with the Soviets in the UN vote on the Hungarian Resolution, the Yugoslavs have eliminated the last point of difference between themselves and the Russians in the foreign policy field. The Secretary added that our intelligence sources have reported that the Soviet slogans designed for consumption in Yugoslavia are now identical with those used for the Eastern European satellites.

The Secretary also stated that our feelings about the Yugoslav action in recognizing the East German regime will be reflected in the attitude we take in our current economic negotiations with the Yugoslavs. While we are not disposed, he said, to cast the Yugoslavs into “outer darkness” we would expect to curtail the military, economic and PL 480 aid which they have been receiving.

Mr. Lloyd expressed agreement with this policy and pointed out that during his September visit to Belgrade2 he had warned the [Page 788] Yugoslavs that they are becoming too involved with the Russians. He said that they had replied that Khrushchev is very different from Stalin and that their eyes are wide open in their dealings with the USSR. [2 lines of source text not declassified]

Secretary Dulles stated that the Yugoslavs do not realize yet that Khrushchev is more versatile and actually more dangerous than Stalin. He said the Yugoslavs consider that with Stalin’s death and Molotov’s demotion they have won a great victory and are now safe.

Mr. Lloyd repeated his agreement with the proposed German action in breaking relations stating that it would be a real slap in the face to Tito. Mr. Elbrick said that the Germans were quite prepared to make their own decision to break relations but would like to know in advance that they would have our support.

Mr. Dulles said that he believed that we were all agreed in this matter.

  1. Source: Department of State, Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199. Secret. Drafted by Dale.
  2. Lloyd visited Belgrade September 4–8 for talks with Tito and other Yugoslav leaders.