288. Memorandum of a Conversation Between the President and the Secretary of State, White House, Washington, October 11, 1956, 9 a.m.1
I recalled that the President was expected to make his “findings” under the Mutual Security legislation by the 16th. I said that the Department had been intensively studying the matter for some time, and I had been giving it much thought and that there was a unanimity of view that the President’s findings should be affirmative.
I said that we did not know as much as we would like to know about the recent talks of Tito and Khrushchev. However I remained convinced that the Government of Yugoslavia was independent in the sense of not being subject to dictation by the Soviet Government or the Soviet Communist Party; that Tito jealously safeguarded this independence and that this view was shared by a majority at least of the Yugoslav Communist Party; that there was perhaps not the same need for building up Yugoslav military strength as had been the case heretofore, but that Tito was determined as a matter of pride to have some jet planes and would get them from Russia if not from us; and finally that the food situation in Yugoslavia was so desperate that unless we could quickly supply them with grain, they might have to go on their knees to Moscow and then might indeed lose their independence.
I went on to say it seemed to me that in the main our policy of backing Tito was paying off in terms of an increasing desire on the part of the satellites for independence from Moscow. There was evidence of considerable strains in this respect and of differences between Tito and Moscow and as between the Soviet leadership themselves. It would, I felt, be a great misfortune to our whole policy for Eastern Europe if Tito was forced to capitulate to Moscow under economic pressures. Mr. Hoover pointed out that the present legislation was so drastic that unless the President made an affirmative finding, everything in the pipeline would have to be cut off and even [Page 749] our assistance to a number of Yugoslav students who are in this country under an exchange program—they would be left stranded.
Mr. Hoover and I pointed out that there had been some suspension of any important military aid since Congress had acted last July and that this suspension could probably be continued for the time being without dangerous consequences, although the same was not true of the economic aid.
The President said he quite agreed that the facts justified affirmative findings. Commenting on the military aid, he said that the great importance of our giving that aid was that then the recipient became dependent upon United States ammunition and spare parts, and it would be much better if Yugoslavia had that relation with us rather than with Soviet Russia. Mr. Hoover also pointed to the value of our having a MAAG in Yugoslavia which of course would be cut off if we cut off all military aid.
I said that we were drafting findings along the line we had discussed, and I would expect to transmit them formally very soon. I thought it desirable that his report to Congress be finalized within the next day or two so that some of the Congressional leaders could be told of it in advance.