Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Central and Southeastern Europe, Volume XXVI

280. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State¹

Moscow, June 23, 1956—4 p.m.

2906. The negative features of Tito’s visit from the point of view Western policies and purposes are so obvious as to require little comment. There was little reason to expect any other result and, as Tito himself pointed out in his Dynamo speech,² it represents the logical continuation and development of last year’s Belgrade visit. Indeed long before visit it had been apparent that once Soviets were prepared to make confession of “ideological” error and accept Yugoslav position on relationship between Communist states there was literally no barrier to development solidarity in all respects between Yugoslavia and Soviet Union (Embtel 1533, March 12, 1955).³

Yugoslavia has in international affairs indeed rejoined Communist community and we can expect in future on all important international questions to find Yugoslavia lined up with Soviet column. In general, however, Tito has rejoined community on his own terms and there is not slightest indication in communiqué or declaration that Yugoslavia has lost, at least up to the present, its independence or has reverted to satellite status in regard to the Soviet Union, although by adopting publicly Soviet positions he has voluntarily limited his freedom of action. On the contrary, from every indication Soviets were scrupulous in their respect of independent and equal status of Yugoslavia both in governmental and in party discussions, and made no attempt, so far as I can ascertain, to reassert Soviet control or even right of guidance over Yugoslav Government or party. Fact that Tito’s return was voluntary and not dictated does not, however, change the basic fact that from Western point of view Yugoslavia has found common positions with Soviet Union on all major international issues and there is no reason to believe unless Soviets change current line or overplay their hand, which I doubt, that this will not continue to develop; and identification of Yugoslavs with Soviet Union will not go even farther.

While Soviets undoubtedly expect that Yugoslav rapprochement with Soviet Union will result in estrangement with West, especially US, there is no evidence that they made any such request or demand on Tito. Indeed, since they themselves are promoting idea of improving relations with all countries they were hardly in position to ask Tito to do the opposite. I do not know Tito well enough, nor the situation in Yugoslavia, to judge to what extent results of visit were in accordance with Tito’s desires, or whether in some degree he was outmaneuvered by Soviets during this visit. It would hardly seem likely that Tito left to himself would wish to return regardless of changes in Soviet attitude to a state of dependence on Soviet Union which would be natural result estrangement from West.

In sum, I cannot judge whether Tito has deliberately elected to line up with the Soviet Union with the inevitable deterioration of his relations with the US as a conscious act, or whether he still believes that he can enjoy the benefit of playing both sides of the street. I found particularly striking during his visit here fact that in none of innumerable statements and speeches which he made was there any favorable word for the Western powers in general, or the slightest recognition of the assistance he had received from them, especially US. On the contrary, he made no attempt to refute vicious Soviet attacks on the motivation of aid to Yugoslavia from capitalist counties which was particularly noticeable in Khrushchev’s Dynamo speech⁴ which, I understand, was submitted before delivery to Tito.

From Soviet point of view they have every reason to be very well satisfied with Tito visit, while wording of declaration on party relations and, particularly inclusion of even non-socialist “progressive” groups as eligible for consultation represents acceptance by Soviet Union of commitment to Yugoslav position on this point.⁵ I do not in the least believe it was forced on Soviets but reflects current Soviet policies in this field.

It has been clear for some time now that Soviets had fully recognized they could no longer continue to rule satellite or Communist world among Stalinist lines without Stalin and, therefore, apparent acceptance of Tito’s theories of relations between Communist countries and leftwing parties was done less as a gesture towards him than recognition on the part of Soviet leaders that relationships of this kind best serve Soviet interests in present phase of development. However, Tito’s direct involvement in this process may help the furtherance of a process which logically should result in ending of direct Soviet control over satellites and Communist parties abroad. Development of this nature which at best would take considerable period of time may, however, not be an unalloyed advantage to non-Communist world as Tito’s regression back in to Communist community reveals. There is in fact no reason to believe that the recapture of considerable measure of independence of action on the part of European satellites (or Communist parties abroad for that matter) would necessarily mean that their policies or attitudes would be more favorable to solution major international problems along acceptable lines, nor to any cessation of effort towards the “victory of socialism” in other countries.

The result of Tito visit, while it should not come as a surprise, or shock to anyone who has been following the main lines of development since the Belgrade visit, nevertheless does obviously pose very difficult problems for Western powers, particularly US. Abrupt cessation of aid, which would be more than justified on many grounds, nevertheless would provide basis to the Yugoslavs and before world opinion for charge that we had “forced” Yugoslavia into even greater intimacy and dependence on Soviet Union. On the other hand, continuance of aid would not, in my opinion, have any material effect in halting or even slowing down this process, since Yugoslavs undoubtedly received assurances from Soviets of large economic assistance. In addition, now that aberrations of Stalin period have been swept aside there is powerful gravitational pull between the two countries sharing as they do in the common Marxist-Leninist doctrine and with social, political and economic systems, whose similarities are greater than their differences. For immediate future I think we can anticipate, as Lederer⁶ forecast (Embtel 2893)⁷ series of gestures from Tito designed to offset the impression created in Western countries by his visit to Soviet Union.

Bohlen

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 768.11/6–2356. Secret. Repeated to London, Paris, Bonn, and Belgrade.
2. Reference is to Tito’s address delivered at a mass meeting in Dynamo Stadium in Moscow, June 19.
3. Telegram 1533 from Moscow reported on Tito’s recent speech and on the prospects for a Yugoslav-Soviet reconciliation. (Department of State, Central Files, 661.68/ 3–1255)
4. Despatch 31 from Moscow, July 31, reported that Khrushchev charged that Yugoslavia had obtained aid from the West in order to exploit Soviet-Yugoslav differences and to restore capitalism to Yugoslavia. (Ibid., 768.11/7–1356)
5. For text of the “Declaration on Relations Between Yugoslav League of Communists and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union,” Moscow, June 20, 1956, see Documents (R.I.I.A.) for 1956, p. 386.
6. Lajos Lederer, Eastern European specialist and correspondent for the London Observer.
7. Dated June 22. (Department of State, Central Files, 768.1/6–2256)