Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Central and Southeastern Europe, Volume XXVI

279. Intelligence Brief¹

No. 1952

Washington, June 22, 1956.

TITO’s TRIP TO THE USSR

Tito’s visit to the USSR (June 2–20) brought Yugoslav-Soviet relations into closer harmony, but left Yugoslavia a fellow-traveler rather than a committed member of the Soviet bloc. Ideologically, Yugoslavia’s ties with the Soviet bloc have been strengthened. Politically, Belgrade appeared still to be occupying the same position of a would-be middleman between opposing blocs that it has long tried to assume and exploit.

Only two new developments emerged from the public statements during the visit:

(1) Reestablishment of party-to-party relations, a development only hinted at during the Soviet visit in Belgrade (May 26–June 2, 1955).

(2) Further Yugoslav alignment with the Soviet position on international questions as Tito for the first time publicly espoused Moscow’s view that general disarmament should not be dependent on prior settlement of political issues and seconded the Soviet call for direct negotiations between the two parts of Germany. Tito did not, however, commit Yugoslavia to recognize East Germany, despite reported Soviet pressure to do so.

Otherwise, the joint communiqué and Tito’s speeches revealed approximately the same close similarity between the Yugoslav and the Soviet positions as has existed for the past two or three years.²

There is no evidence at present that the talks reached any agreement on military matters, although the USSR sought to give the impression that the two countries would be allies in event of war. Yugoslavia thus apparently still looks only to the Western powers for military aid.

The joint communiqué called for a further extension of economic ties, but did not reveal any concrete actions. Economic relations have shown such a marked improvement during the past year, however, that presumably little additional action was necessary.

Both sides hailed the visit as a great success, and there is no evidence yet to indicate that the talks ran into any serious snags. The atmosphere of harmony was not complete, however, since Tito is said to have shown displeasure with Zhukov’s statement that the two countries would march shoulder to shoulder in any future war. (Tito denied that he made a similar statement in Stalingrad.)³

The Soviet rulers sought to treat Tito’s presence as a happy homecoming to the Communist family, and accorded him a welcome unprecedented in Soviet history. While the family reunion succeeded in reestablishing fraternal relations with a once-errant member, it did not reestablish the same parental authority that had once been defied. It seems unlikely, however, that Moscow had expected that the Yugoslavs could be induced to accept such an authority, since this would be tantamount to asking Tito to throw away much of the prestige and some of the power he had acquired over the past eight years.

At the same time, Moscow felt no restriction against implicitly inviting the West to give up its ties with Tito. Although the Soviet rulers in their speeches disclaimed any desire to injure Yugoslav relations with the West, they all leaned hard to give the impression that Tito’s visit had produced the closest possible alignment between the USSR and Yugoslavia. The Yugoslavs appeared aware of this Soviet maneuver, and leaned hard the other way to reassure that Yugoslavia’s welcome of the Soviet embrace did not mean the end of friendly relations with the West.

Moscow’s emphasis on Tito’s return to the family appears also intended for the satellites. Presumably they are expected to view this development as indicating that Tito is willing to acknowledge the correctness of current Soviet policy and to recognize the Soviet bloc as the mainstay of world Communism. Moscow is thus seeking to blur Tito’s independent status in satellite eyes. Nevertheless, the fact remains that the Soviet Union made the first move to heal the breach and has agreed to a special status for its relations with Yugoslavia.

What effect Moscow’s acknowledgment of this special role for Yugoslavia will have on Soviet relations with Communist China and the satellites remains to be seen. The Soviet regime has long accorded Peiping special treatment, and the Eastern European satellites are in no position to demand any improvement in their relations.

Since the Yugoslav position on most international issues has long been parallel to that of the USSR, the main visible concrete gain for Moscow from Tito’s trip is the agreement to establish party-to-party relations. Khrushchev had unsuccessfully pressed for such an agreement in Belgrade last June to lessen the appearance of Tito’s independence and to dramatize Moscow’s willingness to support united action with foreign socialists.

The Yugoslavs finally agreed, presumably because the relations were to be reestablished on Tito’s terms. These included a Soviet commitment to recognize the equality of the two parties, accept informal bilateral ties rather than a new institution (such as a replacement for the Cominform), and agree that both sides would enjoy freedom of action in contrast to the discipline traditionally required of foreign Communist parties. Under this arrangement, Belgrade could present the ties as no different from its relations with Western Socialist parties.

Moreover, the Yugoslav Communists are sufficiently self-confident to regard the reestablishment of party relations, especially if extended to the satellites, as providing them with a channel for seeking to increase their own influence within the Soviet bloc.

Whether Tito succeeded in inducing the Soviet rulers to complete the rapprochement by agreeing to further personnel changes in Eastern Europe would naturally not be revealed in the joint communiqué. Belgrade has been outspoken in its insistence that Hungary’s Rakosi be removed; it has shown displeasure that Albania’s anti-Tito leadership still remains in power; and it has apparently not been satisfied by Chervenkov’s dismissal in Bulgaria. It seems likely that Tito would have brought up the issue, but Moscow’s reaction will probably be revealed only by future developments within the satellites.

Only time will also tell what further impressions of the current Soviet rulers and their policies were acquired by Tito. He has been outspoken in contending that the post-Stalin regime has embarked on a new course, and the present Soviet rulers undoubtedly sought to strengthen his conviction in the expectation that he could serve as an acceptable reference for their claims.

1. Source: Department of State, PPS Files: Lot 66 D 487, Yugoslavia. Confidential. Transmitted to Secretary Dulles through S/S by Howard Furnas (R) under cover of a memorandum dated June 22. Copies were also sent to S/P and EUR.
2. An analysis of the speeches made by both Tito and Khrushchev and of the joint communiqué issued after the conference was sent to the Department of State in despatch 31 from Moscow, July 13, by John C. Guthrie, First Secretary of the Embassy. The despatch reported that in the joint communiqué the two governments expressed agreement on most international issues. (Ibid., Central Files, 768.11/7–1356) Additional analysis of the communiqué is in telegram 2886 from Moscow, June 21. (Ibid., 768.11/ 6–2156) The text of the communiqué is printed in Documents (R.I.I.A.) for 1956, p. 381.
3. See supra.