Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Central and Southeastern Europe, Volume XXVI

274. Telegram From the Embassy in Yugoslavia to the Department of State¹

Belgrade, April 19, 1956—5 p.m.

1277. Pass Defense. Embtel 1152, 1232, and 1271 paragraph 17.²

1. At his request I saw Prica today to discuss future military aid. He was informed of my conversation with Tempo yesterday, and said he realized Yugoslav Government had been slow in responding to our conversation of March 28. He said this resulted partially from his illness but more importantly from complex problems which this question raised in changed circumstances. Viewpoint of Yugoslav Government was as follows:

2. Changes in USSR had undoubtedly made military aid matters less urgent. New possibilities in disarmament were emerging and threat of military aggression had indubitably lessened. This did not mean the Yugoslav Government would give up its military power and it certainly did not want to abandon its military cooperation with US. Nonetheless we would perhaps agree that military aid problems did not have same urgency as before. Yugoslav Government hoped that US would not insist upon linking military to economic aid and that two governments could proceed to discuss latter at early date. Yugoslav Government was definitely interested in future military aid but realized that political overtones existed which would have to be clarified. He remarked that discussions between Yugoslav military and AMAS were now underway which would establish exact status of approved programs. In these circumstances, Yugoslav Government would prefer to postpone a definite answer until present technical talks were concluded.

3. I replied that as I had said yesterday to Tempo we were not pressing Yugoslav Government for immediate answer. [Garble] was impelled to observe that Yugoslav Government was now largely formed of items of 1950-55 program, time was passing and future programs had to be prepared well in advance of Congressional action. From our previous discussion, I was certain Prica realized military aid could not be supplied in a vacuum and some basis of planning was required. Prica said these points were understood and would be taken into account by Yugoslav Government.

4. It is clear to General Waters and me that Yugoslav Government does not want to embark upon discussions until it has extracted all available information it can respecting our intentions. Yugoslav Government now informed of all items 1950–55 program expect revalidation Air Force fiscal year 1955 program. Essential elements F– 86E delivery program for necessary pre-delivery training have been released with AMAS recommendation to EUCOM to start deliveries in July. No information on fiscal year 1956 as yet given on Army, Navy, or Air to Yugoslav Government. We thought advisable to hold up release of revalidated Air Force fiscal year 1955 program and three fiscal year 1956 programs. Both General Waters and I also believe that political considerations are behind Yugoslav desire to postpone discussions on military aid which would inevitably raise questions of adequate information and planning. If Yugoslav Government is unwilling to engage in realistic discussions at this time, there is probably no point in forcing the issue. Therefore recommend that we leave matters as they are pending further consideration inside Yugoslav Government.

Riddleberger

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 768.5–MSP/4–1956. Secret.
2. In telegram 1152, March 28, and telegram 1232, April 10, Riddleberger reported on earlier contacts with Prica on the aid issue. In telegram 1271, April 19, Riddleberger reported on a meeting he and Killen had with Tempo on economic matters. In paragraph 7, Riddleberger noted that the Yugoslav Government was reluctant to enter into discussions concerning future military aid. (Ibid., 768.5–MSP/3–2856, 768.5–MSP/4– 1056, and 768.5–MSP/4–1956, respectively)