Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Central and Southeastern Europe, Volume XXVI

272. Telegram From the Embassy in Yugoslavia to the Department of State¹

Belgrade, March 23, 1956—7 p.m.

1123. Paris pass Knight and Wallner. Rome pass Maffitt. Embassy telegram 1113, and Department telegram 752.²

1. I have now been able to discuss Khrushchev speech³ with Kardelj, Pi jade, Acting Foreign Secretary Prica and Nenad Popovic while Embassy officers have seen Brkic, Kos and other lesser officials. Tito and Foreign Secretary are out of town and Vukmanovic still on Warsaw trip. For these conversations following are main Yugoslav points:

(a) Yugoslavs have, if not complete text of Khrushchev speech, detailed summary which they are convinced is accurate and complete although they deny that Vidic or any other non-Russian delegate was present on February 25;

(b) They believe summary has been given to all satellite leaders and to most CP leaders outside of bloc with uneven results to date;

(c) Yugoslav Government reaction to speech has clearly been established and is now reflected in all conversations with leaders here;

(d) This reaction embraces great satisfaction with substance of speech, emphasis on its importance both for present and future lines of Soviet policy and a not unnatural pride that Soviets have adopted number of Yugoslav ideas;

(e) General admission that speech showed development in Soviet internal policy that went farther and faster than Yugoslavs had expected;

(f) Yugoslav Government conviction it is impossible to make this strong attack on Stalin without concomitantly attacking entire Stalin system;

(g) Belief that Khrushchev and Bulganin feel strong enough to adopt new line in spite of latent opposition and expressed belief that they will succeed with most far-reaching internal consequences and eventual modification of Soviet foreign policy for establishment of real peace;

(h) Necessity for West not to lose this opportunity to negotiate realistically with Soviets …⁴ not to do so would enable Soviets later to claim they had been rebuffed.

2. In elaboration of foregoing, Kardelj told me he was “astounded” at how far and how fast Khrushchev had gone. Yugoslav Government had expected changes, but not of this magnitude or tempo. Already substance of speech was being given to Soviet Party organization with instructions to spread the word. Prica said Yugoslav Government was sure that 6 to 7,000 persons had been released from prison or rehabilitated, including Maisky, and Soviet commission was working on thousands of other cases with same end. “A number of NKVD personnel were being imprisoned”. Kardelj, Pi jade and Prica all thought text of speech would eventually be published in USSR, particularly as Soviet leaders now realized Stalin system was contrary to their own interests and Russian people must be convinced that reforms were coming. Larger degree of decentralization was necessary and was clearly indicated by Khrushchev’s speech. It was beginning of “democratization” of Soviet system, from which many changes would inevitably follow.

3. All leaders here professed ignorance re developments in Georgia, although Prica compared Georgians to Montenegrins as people who would not relish losing a favored position.

4. Kardelj, Pijade and Prica all said flatly that Yugoslav Government had no foreknowledge that Khrushchev would so sharply attack Stalin. Kardelj said that during visit last May when Yugoslavs criticized Stalin, Soviet leaders still defended him and blamed Beria. Therefore obvious that decisions of paramount importance had been made between last May and CPSU Congress and that eventually full scope of these decisions must be revealed. Kardelj thought we would shortly see more developments, but would not specify nature.

5. In satellites, all agreed that reaction had been uneven. Brkic thought that time was propitious for loosening of control over satellites but was cautious in predicting when any real freedom might develop. There was slight difference of view respecting future of Cominform but all agreed that its importance would greatly diminish. Kardelj thought Cominform would wither away but Prica expressed personal opinion that it would be formally abolished. In Poland and Czechoslovakia there are already indications of liberalization of policy particularly with respect to freer expression of opinion, less rigid party discipline and recognition that other points of view must be given consideration. In Hungary, developments were still uncertain and it would be difficult to predict how matters would go there. Both Kardelj and Prica expressed the firm belief that in one way or another Rakosi would have to go and that he could not survive indefinitely. In Bulgaria, Chervenkov’s personal position was somewhat better but he too would have eventual difficulties in surviving the changed situation.

6. Re China, Yugoslav leaders were more uncertain. Brkic thought that it was not clear yet how Mao would deal with Khrushchev speech. In spite of press speculation that Mao was faced with difficult problem, Kardelj expressed opinion that these developments would not embarrass Mao who would readily adapt himself to new line. This was particularly true as he thought Western countries had never fully appreciated extent of Chinese independence from Moscow.

7. In response to my query how in their opinion Western world should react to Khrushchev speech, both Kardelj and Prica strongly urged that US particularly should display a maximum of good will and not neglect this opportunity. Kardelj thought that the three specific fields in which progress could be made were (a) disarmament, (b) increased contacts, and (c) trade relations. Kardelj thought that we would shortly see an improved Soviet attitude re disarmament. Both he and Prica emphasized the high desirability of visits by Soviet leaders to Western countries. Both hoped that the forthcoming visit to the UK⁵ would have good results. They also hoped this would be followed by increasing contacts and agreed that Soviet leaders were exceedingly ignorant of Western world. This ignorance could only be overcome by greater contact and knowledge. They hoped the US would take the lead in this connection as it was doing in the disarmament question.

8. While I was primarily a listener in these conversations, I did take occasion with Prica to issue a general caveat respecting the difficulties which the Western world would experience in accepting Soviet statements at their face value in view of our experiences. I said it would not be forgotten that however much we might want to encourage developments in the Soviet Union in a direction which both the US and the Yugoslav Governments wished to see, nonetheless caution was indicated and the West could not lower its guard until more adequate proof of Soviet intentions was forthcoming. It was furthermore necessary that public opinion in the US be convinced of the reality of change in Soviet policy. I said these comments also applied equally to US-Yugoslav relations and that our public opinion was sensitive to Yugoslav decisions which seemed to indicate larger cooperation with Soviet front organizations. I cited the WFTU and the question of enlarged Communist Party relations as cases in point. Prica said that Yugoslav Government was cognizant of these problems but put in a strong plea to the effect that the power and prestige of the US was so great it could afford to adopt an imaginative approach and take chances for the preservation of peace. This was particularly true inasmuch as he thought Soviet leaders had now realized that third world conflict was impossible for any country to sustain.

9. Department pass Moscow as desired.

Riddleberger

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 761.00/3–2356. Confidential. Repeated to London, Paris, and Rome.
2. Neither printed.
3. Reference is the “secret speech” made by Khrushchev at a closed session of the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union on February 25, 1956, in which he criticized Stalin and his policies.
4. Ellipsis in the source text.
5. Soviet leaders Bulganin and Khrushchev visited Great Britain, April 17–27.