NOTE BY THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY
COUNCIL ON UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD YUGOSLAVIA
The enclosed draft statement of policy on the subject, prepared by the
NSC Planning Board, pursuant to
NSC Action No. 1495–b, as a revision
of NSC 5526, is transmitted herewith for
consideration by the National Security Council at its meeting on
Wednesday, January 18, 1956.
For convenience of reference a schedule indicating the paragraphs of 5526
which have been revised is attached.
A Financial Appendix is also enclosed for the information of the
Council.6
The enclosed statement of policy, if adopted, is intended to supersede
NSC 5406/1.
It is recommended that, if the Council adopts the enclosed statement of
policy, it be submitted to the President with the recommendation that he
approve it, direct its implementation by all appropriate Executive
departments and agencies of the U.S. Government, and designate the
Operations Coordinating Board as the coordinating agency.
Enclosure
DRAFT STATEMENT OF POLICY BY THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL ON
UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD YUGOSLAVIA
General Considerations
US-Yugoslav Relations
1948–1954
1. The Tito–Kremlin break of
1948 and the consequent departure of Yugoslavia from the Soviet bloc
served U.S. interests through (a) the continued denial to the USSR
of important strategic positions and other assets, and (b) the
political effects, on both sides of the iron curtain, of a break in
the “monolithic” Communist bloc.
2. In order to preserve these gains, the U.S. extended economic and
military aid to Yugoslavia. This aid was of crucial importance in
keeping the Tito regime
afloat under severe Soviet pressures and—by indicating U.S. concern
with Yugoslavia’s independence—in discouraging any Soviet
inclination to attack Yugoslavia.
3. A further U.S. purpose, as the military and economic aid programs
developed, has been to utilize them to influence Yugoslavia
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toward closer political,
economic and military collaboration with the West, and to encourage
such internal changes in Yugoslavia as would facilitate this
orientation. The military aid program in particular has been
directed toward achieving the eventual collaboration of Yugoslav
forces with NATO forces in the
defense of Yugoslavia and northern Italy.
4. The cumulative amount of U.S. military aid to Yugoslavia
programmed from 1951 through 30 June 1955 was $799.4 million, of
which $568 million in end-items had been delivered and $1.5 million
in training had been utilized as of May 31, 1955. Yugoslavia hopes
for and may expect delivery of the remainder ($229.9 million) on
terms acceptable to it, and may even request additional equipment,
especially of more modern types, beyond what is presently
programmed.
5. U.S. economic grant aid programmed since the Tito–Kremlin break totalled
$503,200,000 through June 1955, of which $485,400,000 had been
expended. Economic aid has fallen broadly into two categories: (a)
raw materials as defense support, and (b) food, to meet the problems
caused largely by serious droughts and chronic food deficit
conditions. In the last two fiscal years, economic aid programs have
consisted largely of food grants from U.S. surplus agricultural
commodities.
Soviet “Normalization“
Policy
6. After the death of Stalin, the USSR gradually undertook a campaign
to “normalize” relations with Yugoslavia, which since 1948 had been
characterized by Soviet dedication to the overthrow of Tito’s regime. About September
1954, the “normalization” campaign was intensified. Military and
political pressures against Yugoslavia were relaxed; trade, which
had been completely severed since 1948, was resumed; and the Soviet
propaganda line ostentatiously switched from hostility to acceptance
and even praise of the Tito
regime. In May–June 1955 the campaign reached a high point with the
visit, on Soviet initiative, of the top Soviet leaders to Belgrade
to confer, on a basis of equality, with those so recently excoriated
as apostates and traitors. This visit was marked by (a) a Soviet
confession of error in previous policy toward Yugoslavia, (b) a
joint communiqué providing a basis for settlement of outstanding
differences and showing a substantial identity of views on various
international questions, and (c) a rapprochement between the Soviet
and Yugoslav Governments and Communist parties, the ultimate extent
of which is still unclear. Early in September, the two countries
concluded agreements in principle on trade and credit arrangements
over the years 1956–8 which are both useful and favorable to
Yugoslavia.
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7. The ultimate objective of Soviet strategy toward Yugoslavia is
probably the reassertion in some effective form of Soviet control
over that country. For the shorter term, the Soviet objective is
probably the effective neutralization of Yugoslavia, so that it will
not maintain security ties with the free world and so that its armed
forces and terrain will be denied to the U.S. and its allies.
Development of Yugoslav
Policy
8. Consistently since 1948, Tito’s main purpose has been to preserve
Yugoslavia’s independence and his regime. In the period of extreme
Soviet pressure, he attempted to assure himself of military support
from the West in case of war and found it expedient to obtain
Western aid. Yugoslav military talks with the U.S., UK and France in
1953 and conclusion of the Balkan Alliance with Greece and Turkey in
1954 seemed to indicate the possibility of future Yugoslav
association with the NATO defense
system. Nevertheless, Tito
remained cautious and tried to maintain as much independence of
policy as his difficult external and internal situation allowed.
With the change in Soviet policies, he has been less concerned with
the possibility of Soviet attack and has interpreted Soviet moves,
including the visit of Soviet leaders, as signalizing Soviet
acceptance of Yugoslavia’s independent position and as contributing
to relaxation of tensions.
9. At the same time, Tito has
given no evidence of willingness to let Yugoslavia fall under Soviet
control; and it is improbable that Yugoslavia will do so, at least
so long as he is in power. However, it is not altogether clear what
limits Tito has set in his
relations with the USSR, how far the accommodation may go, or what
its ultimate effects may be, regardless of Tito’s personal wishes to keep the
rapprochement within safe bounds.
10. Yugoslavia’s “normalization” of relations with the Soviet bloc
has been accompanied by resistance to ties with the West closer than
those already developed, reflecting a desire for freedom of action
vis-à-vis both sides. This trend has been strengthened by (a)
greater realization of the meaning of the overwhelming nuclear power
of the U.S. and the USSR; (b) Tito’s attraction to the line taken by such
countries as India, Burma and Egypt, and his desire to play a role
on the world stage (evidenced by the furnishing of arms to Burma and
recently to Egypt); (c) Tito’s hope of influencing developments in the
satellites, which he thinks Yugoslavia can do better as an
independent communist state than as a close associate of the Western
powers; (d) Tito’s fear lest
the swing to the West go too far and become a danger to the
maintenance of Communist rule in Yugoslavia.
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11. Nevertheless, Tito will
wish to continue building up his own armed forces with such American
aid as he can get. He also continues to show a desire, as insurance,
to retain at least an indirect, if somewhat attenuated, security tie
with the West through the Balkan Alliance, and appears to wish to
count on military support from the West if the Soviet threat to
Yugoslavia should reappear. There is a possibility that he would
sacrifice these minimal security ties with the West, including U.S.
military aid, if events should cause him to question the continued
compatibility of these ties with this foreign policy of
non-alignment.
12. Current Yugoslav policy raises the question of current U.S.
objectives in Yugoslavia. The original limited objective of keeping
Yugoslavia independent of the Soviet bloc has been well served by
timely aid. The more far-reaching objective of tying Yugoslavia into
the Western system and ensuring its effective contribution to free
world power in case of war in Europe, chiefly through a larger-scale
military aid program and the growth of U.S. and Western influence,
has not been attained and there is no sound indication that it is
attainable. In case of general war, Yugoslavia will probably remain
neutral as long as the situation permits, and Yugoslav forces will
be used as the Yugoslav leadership deems appropriate to ensure the
regime’s own survival, rather than as a means of protecting northern
Italy or carrying out NATO plans.
Yugoslavia has recently given the U.S. high-level oral assurances
that it will never permit the passage of foreign troops over its
soil during any war in which Yugoslavia remains a non-belligerent.
Although Yugoslavia appears to recognize a common interest with us
in weakening the Soviet hold on the satellites, in its general
policy, Yugoslavia can be expected to follow a more neutralist line.
It will stress its independence while seeking the benefits of
friendly relations with the West and improved relations with the
Soviet Union. Accordingly, in pursuit of its own interests, the
Yugoslav position will continue to coincide on some matters with
that of the Soviets and on others with that of the West.
13. It is in the U.S. interest that Yugoslavia (a) maintain the will
and ability to resist Soviet domination, (b) continue to deny its
resources to the Soviet bloc and withstand Soviet economic
pressures, (c) use its potential for weakening the monolithic front
and internal cohesiveness of the Soviet bloc, (d) play a part in
deterring Soviet bloc aggressive, (e) maintain sufficient economic
strength and stability to enable Yugoslavia to do the above, and (f)
continue to hold to its Balkan Alliance with Greece and Turkey.
Yugoslavia requires the political and material support of the U.S.
more than the U.S. needs Yugoslavia. On the other hand, because of
Yugoslavia’s peculiar value to the U.S. in Eastern Europe, the U.S.
should guard against taking measures which would force Yugoslavia
into the Soviet bloc.
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The
general attitude of the U.S. in dealing with Yugoslavia and U.S.
consideration of Yugoslav requests for aid should take into account
the above factors.
Objectives
Short- Term Objectives
14. Maintenance of an independent Yugoslavia outside the Soviet
bloc.
15. Maximum Yugoslav effectiveness in encouraging separation of the
satellites from the Soviet bloc.
16. A Yugoslavia that does not actively further Soviet-Communist cold
war objectives.
17. Maximum possible utilization of Yugoslav potentialities on behalf
of U.S. and other free world objectives.
18. Without jeopardizing the above objectives, reorientation of the
Tito regime in the
direction of political and economic liberalization.
Long-Term Objective
19. Eventual fulfillment of the right of the Yugoslav people to live
under a government of their own choosing, which maintains peaceful
and stable relations with neighboring states, and participates fully
in the free world community.
Courses of Action
20. Attempt to influence the Yugoslav Government and people to
continue to stand firmly for maintenance of Yugoslavia’s
independence in the face of Soviet pressures or blandishments. If
the Tito regime proves
unwilling to do so, revise U.S. policies accordingly.
21. In extending further military assistance:
- a.
- Review and revise the present military assistance program.
The goal of such revision should be a more austere aid
program, taking into account U.S. willingness to support
minimal military requirements for maintaining Yugoslav
independence outside the Soviet bloc, and the degree of
Yugoslavia’s cooperation.
- b.
- Complete the revised program, regulating the rate of
delivery of the major undelivered components thereof in a
manner calculated (1) to obtain assurance to Yugoslav
compliance with its agreements with the U.S. and (2) to
stretch out the revised aid program.
- c.
- In so far as is consistent with a and b above, continue in
the future to provide minimal training programs, spare
parts, ammunition and attrition items as required to
maintain U.S. equipment delivered to Yugoslavia in
reasonably effective condition.
- d.
- Make any further programming of military aid dependent on
the degree to which Yugoslavia provides better information
to the U.S. on its defense planning or participates with
appropriate NATO countries
in joint defense planning.
22. Recognize that political objectives justify the provision of
military assistance that would not be justifiable on strictly
military considerations.
23. Continue to furnish economic assistance in minimum amounts
necessary to assist Yugoslavia in maintaining sufficient economic
strength to support its defense effort at a level consistent with
U.S. objectives, and in averting any economic deterioration likely
to threaten Yugoslav independence.
24. Continue to furnish technical assistance to Yugoslavia directly
and through the UN program.
25. In extending military, economic and technical assistance:
- a.
- Avoid actions which could be interpreted as unreserved
endorsement of the Tito regime on the one hand or which, on the
other hand, would undermine that regime.
- b.
- Exploit the Tito
regime’s reliance on the West for assistance by seeking to
induce it to adopt policies which will contribute to the
attainment of U.S. objectives.
- c.
- To the extent possible, seek to influence Yugoslavia to
give greater play to free economic forces.
- d.
- Ensure access by the West to whatever strategic materials
Yugoslavia may be able to provide.
26. Consider Yugoslavia on the same basis as free European nations in
evaluating requests for export licenses so long as its export
policies are generally consistent with the objectives of the
multilateral trade controls imposed against the Soviet bloc.
Continue to permit the Yugoslavs to purchase in the U.S. military
equipment and supplies which add to the strengthening of their armed
forces, as long as satisfactory U.S.-Yugoslav political relations
continue to exist.
27. Continue to deny to Yugoslavia materials and equipment judged to
be for use in an advanced atomic energy program. However, give those
departments and agencies with export control responsibilities
discretionary authority as regards the licensing for export to
Yugoslavia of reasonable quantities of materials and equipment
obviously intended for:
- a.
- Basic research and instruction in the atomic energy field
(including cooperation under any eventually concluded
agreement for U.S. assistance in furnishing Yugoslavia with
a research reactor and fissionable materials
therefor).
- b.
- Source material (e.g., uranium) exploration.
- c.
- Medical or normal industrial use.
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Cooperate with Yugoslavia in a peaceful uses program
involving the exchange of non-sensitive scientific information and
the training in the U.S. of Yugoslav scientists in non-sensitive
fields.
28. While avoiding the appearance of encouraging the export of
Titoist Communism, use Yugoslavia’s unique position as an
independent Communist state in Eastern Europe to promote the
weakening of the Soviet grip on the satellite countries or their
defection from the Soviet bloc.
29. Exploit the existence and encourage the development of the Balkan
Alliance as a means of weakening Soviet power in the Balkans and
emphasize to the Yugoslavs the importance of effectively
coordinating their military planning with Greece and Turkey and
otherwise fulfilling the obligations of that Alliance.
30. Encourage closer political, economic, military, cultural,
tourist, individual, technical and scientific ties between
Yugoslavia and the nations of the free world, particularly those of
Western Europe. In the interest of building up influence within
Yugoslavia favorable to the attainment of U.S. objectives, explore
the feasibility and desirability of establishing both officially and
privately sponsored programs for an expanded exchange of U.S. and
Yugoslav students, intellectual leaders, military and technical
personnel and private individuals. In ways consistent with the
internal security of the U.S. seek to expedite procedures to effect
entry of suitable Yugoslav non-immigrants into the U.S. and seek to
eliminate legal impediments to such entry.
31. Direct information policy toward building Yugoslavia’s will to
combat Soviet encroachment and to encourage ties to the West, while:
- a.
- Avoiding endorsement of the internal policies of the
Tito regime and
taking account of the Yugoslav people’s hope for eventual
attainment of greater political and economic freedom.
- b.
- Avoiding antagonizing the Tito regime to the point of jeopardizing
realization of our immediate objectives or inducing
political aspirations among the Yugoslav peoples likely to
produce disorder, unrest, or internal divisions.
[Numbered paragraph 32 (4-1/2 lines of source text)
not declassified]
