Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Central and Southeastern Europe, Volume XXVI

216. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany¹

Washington, December 27, 1957—7:31 p.m.

1709. Bonn’s 1965 rptd Berlin 389 USAREUR 361.² Although Berlin access problems are being closely followed in Washington all existing contingency planning on this subject is not now under review here. NSC papers on Germany are under review and will shortly be taken up by NSC. It is proposed that present NSC paper on Berlin,³ which establishes our general position on access problems, not be altered. We have been studying certain problems, particularly in field of air access, on which there is no established policy. You will shortly receive instructions on planning for eventuality Soviets withdraw from BASC or attempt to substitute East German personnel for Soviet personnel in BASC. We have now received papers on problem of GDR flights in air corridors and will consider on priority basis. We have not considered it necessary up to now to review established policies in existing contingency plans. If you feel general review is desirable, would appreciate your comments on aspects to which you believe consideration should be given.

Dept has impression from reports received from Bonn and Berlin that principal objective of measures recently taken in East Zone is to consolidate Soviet position by improving standing of regime and establishing greater control over population. (Berlin’s 559, 608 and 654 to Bonn, rptd Department 601, 658 and 707)⁴ There seems little evidence to suggest likelihood of major interference with movement of German traffic between Berlin and Federal Republic. However, efforts by GDR to secure greater recognition as “sovereign state” could well impinge on Allied movements and lead to collision involving us.

We are keenly aware of nervousness which has existed in Berlin in recent months and doubts which have been expressed regarding firmness of our intention to defend Berlin. It appears to us that these doubts stem from mistaken view that American attitudes toward USSR have been affected by Soviet missile capabilities and that US would hesitate to react to attack on Berlin or for that matter FedRep itself, because of German idea that US is for first time within reach of direct Soviet attack. We hope these misapprehensions have been removed by President’s statement in Paris⁵ and by NATO communiqué.⁶ We have also noted allegations of weak Allied attitude toward various Berlin problems although we are not clear at what this criticism is directed.

Action to be taken in event of substitution of GDR for Soviet personnel at check points on recognized train and Autobahn routes was worked out by High Commission in 1954 following announcement by Soviets that they would regard GDR as sovereign. This planning, which was approved by Governments in August 1954, has been under review by three Embassies in Bonn (which have been in frequent touch with Three Governments) since Soviet-GDR agreements of 1955 and Bolz–Zorin letters.⁷ As we understand it, this review is virtually complete. While it has resulted in alteration of details as to some points, it does not change basic approach adopted in 1954 report.

Agreed tripartite policy is that, if Soviets substitute GDR personnel for their personnel at check points, we will insist on exercise of our rights under quadripartite agreements in accordance with existing practices. We would at same time make clear to Soviet Government that we continue to hold it responsible for implementation of Four Power agreements and for our free access to Berlin. This basic position is in line with Foreign Ministers Declaration of September 1955 and notes sent by Three Governments to Soviet Government in October 1955.⁸ We would in effect treat GDR personnel as agents of Soviet authorities. We would show them same documents which we now show Soviets as evidence that we are exercising our rights. We would not allow GDR personnel to control our movements, in sense of going behind our documents and making decisions as to what personnel could travel on trains or autobahn or what goods could be carried, just as we would not permit Soviets to make these decisions. There is therefore no question of recognizing “authority” of GDR officials at check points.

Basic theory behind this position is that, if there is to be interference with our right of access to Berlin, we would act as far as possible to force on Soviets or GDR responsibility for actual physical interference with our movements in preference to stopping movements ourselves (“self-imposed blockade”). Various factors have entered into establishment of this position and perhaps reasoning on part of all who have been involved in process is not identical. It does however represent carefully considered and agreed tripartite position which has been followed consistently in our planning and in our communications with Soviets. As you are aware, there are other possible situations where we would favor turning trains back rather than submit to Soviet demand. These would include, for example, Soviet demands which would allow them rather than us to determine who could travel on trains. In such cases we would not be prepared to acquiesce after an initial protest.

Specific issue which you have put up to us, as we understand it, is whether in event GDR personnel are substituted for Soviet personnel at check points, we should for some limited period refuse to deal with GDR personnel and turn trains back in hope of causing Soviets to reverse their position. (Same issue would of course arise on Autobahn.) If this action were not effective, we would after 72 hours or possibly somewhat more, acquiesce in situation. Whether action would be effective in making Soviets back down could not be known unless it were tried. We have some doubts as to whether it would be effective if substitution of personnel resulted from announced Soviet-GDR agreement or had otherwise become publicly known with effect of committing Soviet prestige. Question at issue is whether we should risk loss of standing which would be involved in ultimate acquiescence if our initial stand were not successful in bringing about change in Soviet position. We think we would be better off if we insisted on exercise of our rights, even though this involved dealing with GDR personnel at check points as Soviet agents, than if we publicly took position we would not do so and abandoned it in short time.

Believe it would be desirable however to obtain considered view of German government on this subject. Request you concert with British and French on approach to Foreign Minister to solicit his and Chancellor’s views at earliest feasible date.

Dulles

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/12–2257. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Reinstein; cleared with Lisle, Creel, and Eleanor Dulles; and approved by Elbrick. Repeated to Berlin and USAREUR.
2. Supra.
3. Document 213.
4. These telegrams reported various measures taken in the Soviet Zone to control the flow of refugees and further communize East Germany. (Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/11–1657, 661.62B/11–3057, and 762B.00/12–1257, respectively)
5. For text of President Eisenhower’s statement at the North Atlantic Council meeting, December 16, see Department of State Bulletin, January 6, 1958, pp. 6–8. In his statement, the President said that the rights of the Western Powers in Berlin must be maintained.
6. See footnote 4, supra.
7. See Document 218.
8. For text of the statement issued on September 28, see Department of State Bulletin, October 10, 1955, pp. 559–560. For text of the U.S. note, dated October 3, see ibid., October 17, 1955, p. 616.