Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Central and Southeastern Europe, Volume XXVI

211. Paper Prepared in the Department of State¹

Washington, November 7, 1957.

CURRENT BERLIN STATUS AND ACCESS PROBLEMS

The present study was prepared in compliance with a request made by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Mr. Murphy on November 1, 1957² and with the President’s statement, after reading CIA report OCI No. 5535/57 of November 1, 1957,³ that he wishes to be sure that the State and Defense Departments have plans ready to deal with the situation in Berlin.

During the past few weeks there has been some concern about measures taken by the Soviets and the “German Democratic Republic” (GDR) and rumors or threats of further measures, which might have an adverse effect on Berlin’s status and communications. Four problem areas are involved:

1. A possibility of measures to incorporate the Soviet Sector (East Berlin) into the Soviet Zone under the GDR regime.

2. Interference with circulation between West and East Berlin.

3. Interference with German traffic between Berlin and the Federal Republic.

4. Interference with Allied access to Berlin by road, rail, and air.

There follow below, for each of these problem areas, summaries of (a) the action taken by the Soviets or GDR, (b) the counter-action taken by the Allies, (c) rumors or threats of additional Soviet or GDR action, (d) estimates of further developments which might be expected, and (e) Allied planning to meet problems which might arise. It should be emphasized that this paper deals only with Berlin problems which are active at this time or may be active in the near future. As far as estimates of Soviet intentions are concerned, it deals only with the present and the immediate future.

1. Incorporation of Soviet Sector into Soviet Zone

a. Action taken by Soviets and/or GDR:

No action has been taken by the Soviets or the GDR recently to complete the incorporation of the Soviet Sector (East Berlin) into the Soviet Zone (GDR) and to “seal off” West Berlin from East Berlin (as distinguished from intensification of controls). It should be recalled, however, that the de facto incorporation of the Soviet Sector into the Soviet Zone has been virtually completed since the split in the city in 1948 and that, for all practical purposes, all that remains of the unity of the city is substantial freedom of circulation between the West and the East. Although the Communists have over a period of years applied psychological pressures and sporadic controls on the Sector borders to reduce circulation between East and West Berlin, large numbers of persons continue to cross the Sector borders regularly.

b. Action taken by Allies:

In the absence of recent measures to incorporate East Berlin into the GDR there has been no reason for any Allied counter-action.

c. Rumored or threatened Soviet and/or GDR action:

Some intelligence reports have referred to GDR intentions to “seal off” West Berlin, but the measures which they describe indicate intentions only to intensify existing police and customs controls on the Sector borders (See 2 below), to dissuade Soviet Zone and Sector residents from entering West Berlin, and to route through traffic from the Soviet Zone to East Berlin around rather than through West Berlin.

d. Prognosis:

While there are indications that the Communists are increasing their capability of controlling circulation within Berlin, this does not necessarily mean that they intend to carry control measures to the point of completely “sealing off” West Berlin. In reply to a query by a Western journalist, a spokesman of the Soviet Embassy in East Berlin last week characterized as “pure speculation” recent reports that the Soviets contemplate changing the Four-Power status of Berlin in order to bolster GDR sovereignty.

e. Allied planning:

The Allies have had ready for some years plans for the reorganization of transportation, public utilities, and other essential services in the event of a final and complete split of the city so that the residents of West Berlin, including the Allies, would not be greatly hampered by the denial of facilities in East Berlin. The Allies would vigorously protest the sealing of the inter-Sector border and one could expect the Communist actions to be strongly denounced in the German and world press.

2. Freedom of Circulation within Berlin

a. Action taken by Soviets and/or GDR:

In connection with the East German currency reform of October 13, 1957, the East Berlin authorities interrupted travel between East and West Berlin and between Berlin and Western Germany for the better part of one day and subsequently intensified police and customs controls on the Sector borders in order to prevent the “smuggling” of currency. These controls have been only partially successful. While the controls are still severe, they are less stringent than when first imposed. The GDR has also reportedly forbidden GDR government employees living West of Berlin to take S-Bahn trains through West Berlin. (The S-Bahn is an East German operated rapid transit railway which serves not only Berlin but also the surrounding Soviet Zone area.) As far as West Berlin use is concerned, both S-Bahn and U-Bahn (city subway) service are operating as usual, but there have been intensified spot-checks in the East Berlin S-Bahn stations closest to the Sector border.

b. Action taken by the Allies:

The Allied Commandants in Berlin have protested to the Soviet Commandant against the interference with free circulation between West and East Berlin and between Berlin and Western Germany.

c. Rumored or threatened Soviet and/or GDR action:

Intelligence reports have been received indicating that the East German authorities will discontinue through trains from the Soviet Zone via West Berlin to East Berlin, routing them around West Berlin instead. Reports have also been received indicating that arrangements are being made to interrupt S-Bahn service at the Sector borders in order to facilitate the further control of passengers from East to West Berlin, a measure which could affect S–Bahn service in West Berlin. The East Berlin authorities and press have also threatened punitive action against some of the 38,500 East Berlin and GDR residents who work in West Berlin.

d. Prognosis:

The measures mentioned in the foregoing paragraph have been threatened or rumored in the past without the East Germans carrying them out. Arrangements for the total control of S-Bahn traffic, for example, were made and then abandoned a couple years ago. In view of the technical as well as political problems involved in a complete check of all passengers, it is doubtful that the East Berlin authorities will actually attempt a total control. On the other hand, the re-routing of S-Bahn through trains to by-pass West Berlin is more likely. Action may be taken against certain East Berliners employed in West Berlin, but a sweeping action against all border-crossers is less likely. The severity of controls on the East Berlin side of the Sector border is likely to fluctuate as heretofore. At times, for example while the GDR is still carrying out its currency reissue, during the Christmas season, or when large fairs and exhibits are held in West Berlin, these controls will be quite intense. At other times they will slacken off. The physical problem of controlling the Sector border is such that the East Germans will have to continue to rely on spot checks coupled with threats and other psychological pressures.

e. Allied planning:

There are no specific Allied plans for dealing with restriction of freedom of circulation within the city as distinct from the plans mentioned above for dealing with the “sealing off” of West Berlin from the Federal Republic or East Berlin, but increased restriction of circulation within the city will be met by Allied protests at appropriate levels.

3. German Interzonal Traffic Between Berlin and the Federal Republic

a. Action taken by the Soviets and/or GDR:

In connection with the East German currency reform, the GDR temporarily interrupted German travel between Berlin and the Federal Republic on October 13, 1957. The GDR began October 17, 1957, and is still continuing to detach a number of parcel post cars from the German interzonal trains from Berlin to the Federal Republic and to search their contents. They have seized a number of parcels, mostly containing balloons or propaganda materials. These materials, which were shipped by German and anti-Communist Russian organizations [1 line of source text not declassified] were apparently being sought specifically by the Soviets. The Soviet Commandant in Berlin protested to the Allied Commandants against “illegal” shipments on the interzonal trains. For two weeks after October 13 there was also stringent control and some delay of German truck travel from Berlin to the Federal Republic.

b. Action by the Allies:

The interruption of German travel on October 13 was promptly protested by the Berlin Commandant. Shipments of propaganda materials by interzonal trains have been discontinued. The Allied Commandants countered the Soviet protest by protesting in turn against the interference with interzonal postal shipments but adding that they will investigate the Soviet complaint and take any appropriate action.

c. Rumored or threatened Soviet and/or GDR action:

There have been no rumors or threats of further Soviet or GDR action against German interzonal road and rail traffic. The volume of interzonal traffic, especially of travel, has been exceptionally high and, except for the instances cited above, it has been for some time relatively free of harassment. The GDR authorities have hinted in the course of current interzonal trade negotiations that some documentation requirements for Berlin exports might be relaxed.

d. Prognosis:

The GDR will no doubt continue to search parcel post shipments until they are satisfied that the items to which they object are no longer being sent. However there is no evidence that any other new or unusual interference with interzonal traffic is imminent.

e. Allied planning:

Any further interference with German interzonal traffic between Berlin and the Federal Republic will be met by Allied protests at appropriate levels. A stockpile of food, fuel, and raw materials has been built up capable of supporting the city at somewhat near present levels for a period of about six months. Tripartite plans, which have been coordinated with the German Federal Government, also exist for the operation of an airlift if necessary. A tripartite study has been made in Germany to determine the feasibility of using limited force to test Soviet intentions or to attempt to reopen access to Berlin, [4 lines of source text not declassified]. Basic American policy guidance exists to meet a situation which would arise if the impeding of Berlin’s communications with the West should become tantamount to a blockade.

Allied planning for the imposition of economic countermeasures involves the cooperation of the Federal Republic, for example in the field of interzonal trade. It is unlikely that the cooperation necessary for working out effective plans can be obtained in advance except in circumstances impressing the Federal Republic as being of serious character.

4. Allied Access to Berlin

a. Action taken by the Soviets and/or GDR:

(1)Surface access:

About a year ago, the Soviets complained that “unentitled” persons were using the Allied military trains between Berlin and the Federal Republic and travelling over the Berlin-Helmstedt Autobahn under Allied orders and insisted that all travellers have “proper documentation”. Some time later they also requested more detailed documentation for baggage and freight cars on military passenger trains. The Soviets have also insisted that not only the officers but also the enlisted personnel of American truck convoys show their identity cards at the Autobahn checkpoints. (The British and French had always done so.) During the past year, the Soviets have frequently resorted to minor harassments and to threats (which usually turn out to be bluff) to back up their contentions and demands.

(2)Air access:

The Soviets recently attempted to obtain Allied flight safety clearance for an East German plane to fly in the Soviet Zone portion of one of the Berlin air corridors. East German publications have also printed articles regarding “air sovereignty”, claiming that existing arrangements for Allied aircraft flying to Berlin are temporary and exceptional, and that the Western Powers have violated these arrangements by using the corridors for normal civil as well as military flights.

b. Action taken by the Allies:

(1)Surface access:

Under protest, the Allies have shown to Soviet control officers the travel orders and identity documents of passengers on military trains. The Allies have also entered into a series of discussions with the Soviets regarding the documentation of Allied travelers. It is hoped the new procedures will be put into effect shortly and will be found satisfactory by both the Allies and the Soviets. Although the advertising of military leave tours to Berlin has been discontinued, there has been no significant change in the nature or volume of Allied travel. In order to put ourselves in the best legal and moral position for meeting effectively any Soviet challenge, we have ceased carrying on military trains non-official shipments of printed matter (known as “HICOG–12” shipments) and refugee baggage. The American military authorities have protested to the Soviet military authorities against the latters’ demand that the identity cards of enlisted personnel be shown, although in practice they have sometimes shown the cards under protest and sometimes turned the convoy back to avoid doing so.

(2)Air access:

The American controller in the Berlin Air Safety Center (BASC) refused to accept the flight plan submitted by the Soviet controller for an East German flight in the corridor. Tripartite interim instructions have been given to the Allied controllers to refuse to accept such plans in the future. A study of certain legal questions raised about the use of the corridors has been begun, and definitive instructions will be issued when this study is completed.

c. Rumored or threatened Soviet and/or GDR action:

(1)Surface access:

It is possible that the Soviets may insist on the removal of German mail cars from the Allied (American) military trains.

(2)Air access:

In connection with the submission of a flight plan for an East German flight, the Soviet BASC controller stated that he would in the future notify BASC of proposed East German flights in the corridors and would not accept plans for Allied planes wishing to fly at the same time and altitude. Some time ago, the Soviet controller also made a jocular remark which might indicate a Soviet intention to make a distinction between normal civil aircraft and those serving the needs of the Berlin garrisons.

d. Prognosis:

There is little indication that the Soviets intend any serious interference with Allied access per se at the present time. Their willingness to engage in discussions regarding Allied documentation suggests that they do not intend entirely to repudiate their obligations under Four-Power agreements on access. The Allied right of access, the Soviets argue, applies only to persons who are members of the Berlin garrisons (or members of the households of such persons), to persons travelling to or from Berlin on official duty and to the freight shipments consigned to or from the Berlin garrisons. By implication their position is that the clearance of all other travelers and shipments is a matter for the GDR. It appears from the Allied-Soviet documentation talks, however, that the Soviets are probably willing, as a face-saving device, to accept a documentary formula which will permit all Allied official personnel now travelling to Berlin (including those on leave) to continue to do so. While it is quite possible we may have to face continuous annoyance and minor harassment of the type experienced in the last year, there is at present no conclusive evidence that there will be any significant change in the existing surface and air access situation.

e. Allied planning:

(1)Surface access:

Any interference with Allied access to Berlin will be met by Allied protests at appropriate levels. A stockpile of food, fuel, and raw materials has been built up capable of supporting the city at somewhat near present levels for a period of about six months. Tripartite plans, which have been coordinated with the German Federal Government, also exist for the operation of an airlift if necessary. A tripartite study has been made in Germany to determine the feasibility of using limited force to test Soviet intentions or to attempt to reopen access to Berlin, [4 lines of source text not declassified]. Basic American policy guidance exists to meet a situation which would arise if the impeding of Berlin’s communications with the West should become tantamount to a blockade.

The Allied Embassies at Bonn have agreed on detailed procedures for coping with the situation which would arise if the Soviets should allow the GDR to exercise control over Allied travel documentation or to impose customs currency controls or highway tolls on Allied travellers.

(2)Air access:

The Allied Embassies at Bonn have begun to plan for the contingency of an attempt by the Soviets to evade their responsibilities in BASC. A report on air access problems will shortly be submitted to the OCB⁴ and an instruction to the Embassy at Bonn furnishing guidance for planning purposes has been drafted and will be sent when OCB approval has been obtained.

Conclusions Regarding Soviet Intentions

A review of the situation described suggests that, while the Soviets have not abandoned their ultimate objective of undermining the Allied position in Berlin and eventually absorbing free Berlin into the GDR, they are concentrating on building up the GDR and appear for the moment to be resigned to tolerating most aspects of the Berlin status quo. The Soviets are no doubt deterred from taking drastic action against Berlin by their realization of the Allies’ (and especially the United States’) determination to maintain the status of the city and free access to it, by their awareness of preparations (for example the stockpiles) to meet increased harassment of the city, by their experience of the Berlin blockade and airlift, and by a realization of the impression they would make on German and world opinion. Violations of Berlin’s status and harassment of Berlin access will be regular features of Berlin’s life as long as the Communists retain control of East Germany, and they may be expected at times to create critical situations. The situation described above is not yet, however, one with which the Allies and the German authorities cannot cope on the basis of existing procedures. The problems which are actual or appear imminent may be said to involve the annoyances which are part of the price of maintaining Berlin as an “outpost of democracy” in the Soviet Zone rather than a prelude to a Communist attempt to swallow up Berlin.

Conclusions Regarding Allied Planning

There have been no developments in the Berlin situation which raise any question as to the correctness or adequacy of basic United States policy regarding Berlin. Appropriate plans exist or are being developed to meet all present or imminent problems. The possibilities of planning in detail for all contingencies are limited. There is an infinite variety of forms in which problems may arise reflecting the inherent complexity of our position in Berlin. The extent to which general policies can be implemented is conditioned by the tripartite nature of our position in Berlin. [1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] As far as more serious problems which might ultimately develop are concerned, present planning or that now under way seems to be as adequate as it can be made at this stage. The implementation of plans to meet a grave situation would necessarily involve decisions which could only be taken at the highest level in the light of all the circumstances obtaining at the time.

1. Source: Department of State, OCB Files: Lot 61 D 385, Germany. Secret; Limited Distribution. The source text is Annex A to a 10-page study prepared by the Departments of State and Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency, dated December 13, entitled “Possible Soviet Refusal To Cooperate in the Berlin Air Safety Center.” The study was attached to a memorandum of transmittal from the Operations Coordinating Board, dated December 13.
2. See supra.
3. This two-page paper reviewed the Berlin traffic situation. (CIA Files)
4. Presumably the paper referred to in footnote 1 above.