Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Central and Southeastern Europe, Volume XXVI

187. Telegram From the Commander in Chief, United States Army, Europe (Hodes) to the Embassy in Germany¹

Paris, February 4, 1957—4:30 p.m.

SX 1591. Refer State to Bonn 2075.²

1. The Soviet motives and objectives in imposing the present Berlin difficulties are not known to this headquarters. However, the Soviet pattern must be based on one of the two following premises and, in either of these cases, a compromise of the original allied position will be detrimental to our interest:

(A) The intention of eventually increasing their restrictive measures to the point at which they become unbearable and a blockade will result, or (B) on an opportunistic exploitation of any Allied weakness shown in resisting the restrictions.

2. While it is agreed that partial self-imposed blockade should not be instigated except for significant causes, and that it should be based on circumstances which will generate a sympathetic Western press reaction, it is believed that acquiescence in a series of Soviet imposed restrictions which mav each in itself be a border-line case under these conditions will ultimately render the cumulative effect of restricting free access to Berlin. Past experience indicates the Soviets will push at all points, accepting their gains where lightly opposed, but withdrawing in the case of determined opposition.

3. In view of the above, the following principles are believed to be paramount in the case at hand: (A) It is solely a United States right to determine who shall travel between West Berlin and the United States Military Command and diplomatic agencies in the Federal Republic of Germany. (B) The 1945 and 1949 agreements are best interpreted by usage since their adoption. This usage does not confirm Soviet restrictions recently imposed. (C) To maintain a right, it must be exercised to remain in effect.

4. Soviet imposed restrictions since 1 November 1956 which were considered objectionable consist of: (A) Soviet inspection of identity cards or passports of passengers on United States Berlin passenger trains. (B) Soviet seizure of Russian translations of travel orders on any of the passengers they consider objectionable. (C) Soviet insistence that a “Certificate of Status” stamp entry be in the passports of personnel traveling on United States orders by either train or autobahn to and from Berlin. (D) Soviet failure to clear a United States military convoy unless Soviet inspection of truck interiors was permitted. This Soviet position was withdrawn after the fact the convoy had been turned back was publicized. (E) Soviet refusal to clear United States military vehicle convoys without inspections of identity cards of enlisted personnel. (F) Soviet failure to clear a special command diesel train for 3 February unless the terminology of the letter conveying the request was to read “request permission.” (G) Soviet imposition of a thirty-minute stop in the Allied passenger train schedules at Marienborn in place of the former five-minute scheduled stop. (H) Soviet confiscation of temporary AGO card of United States train passenger. (I) Soviet failure to clear Embassy employees for autobahn travel to Berlin because of lack of “Certificate of Status” stamp and military orders. Soviets later withdrew from this position. (J) Failure to intercede in the case of detention and fining of two United States soldiers by the East German Volkspolizei for allegedly speeding on the Berlin–Helmstedt Autobahn.

5. In addition to the above, the following unacceptable Soviet statements or threats have been made: A. Soviet officers would occasionally enter Allied passenger trains at Marienborn to check travelers against nominal rolls. B. Non-entitled persons are being carried on Allied passenger trains. C. Interpretation of the 10 September 1945 Four-Power agreement³ and Zorin–Bolz letters of 20 September 1955⁴ to give the Soviets the unilateral right to introduce such control measures as they see fit over train and autobahn travel. D. Objectionable Allied train passengers passports will be subject to confiscation. E. Right of control over the traffic between Federal Republic of Germany and West Berlin of military personnel and freight of the garrisons of the United States, England and France quartered in West Berlin is exclusively within the competence of Soviet military authorities. F. Wording in letters requesting travel of special command diesel trains must be changed to include phrase “permission for passage.”

6. The actions and threats described above are considered as cumulatively threatening free Allied access to Berlin. It is, therefore, considered that both a straightening of the record and a course of positive action which accepts the possibility of partial self imposed Berlin blockade must be undertaken if threat and further Soviet restrictions are not to be accepted.

7. It is, therefore, proposed that: A. The American Ambassador for Germany during his farewell call on Mr. Pushkin set the record straight on the above emphasizing that the appropriate United States authorities will determine who shall travel through our rightful corridors to Berlin; that no agreement exists which properly permits the Soviet authorities to supervise or control this traffic; that a Russian translated travel order issued by appropriate United States diplomatic or military authority is sufficient documentation for this travel. In the future this translation is the only individual documentation which will be shown for passengers traveling on United States trains. In the case of military convoys the Russian translations will indicate all officers by name and will specify only the number of enlisted personnel traveling in the convoy. The existing procedures will continue to be followed for several days to permit the Soviets only sufficient time to disseminate appropriate instructions to their subordinate authorities. B. A tripartite agreement to return to the Allied positions prior to the onset of the Soviet restrictions last November be reached if possible. C. In event a tripartite agreement to the above cannot be obtained, a coordinated United States unilateral action to accomplish our objectives be undertaken.

8. It is again pointed out that should the proposal in “C” above be adopted, much less risk would be involved in testing Soviet firmness and intention by initially trying to break their insistence on inspection of identity cards of enlisted personnel traveling in military convoys. If a favorable solution can be reached on this matter, it should be a short step from there to a favorable resolution of the train problem; on the other hand, should failure result at this step, the loss would be small since the convoys have little purpose except to determine freedom of access to the autobahn and the entire matter could be re-evaluated prior to continuing.

9. I, therefore, recommend execution of the plan proposed in SX 1375⁵ without delay.⁶

Hodes

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/2–457. Confidential. Repeated to Berlin and Washington. The source text is the Department of State copy.
2. Document 185.
3. For text of this agreement, see Documents on Germany, 1944–1970, pp. 42–44.
4. See Document 218.
5. Not found in Department of State files.
6. In a memorandum to Beam, dated February 12, Reinstein pointed out that Hodes was not in complete agreement with the viewpoint of the Departments of State or Defense as indicated in telegram 2075 (Document 185). He noted, however, that Hodes had been informed on February 13 to guide his actions on the considerations set out in that telegram. (Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/2–1257)