130. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State1
877. Overwhelming CDU victory attributable primarily to following combination of factors:2 Adenauer clearly dominated campaign, and his prestige and popularity gave CDU great advantage over opposition with colorless leader; prevailing prosperity so great that inclination to risk change minimized; CDU foreign policy had won Germany welcome role as respected member in family of free nations and appeared offer maximum security and most favorable position obtainable under present world conditions.
No single issue can be isolated as determining election outcome. Most important for many voters was extent of present prosperity; increased support for CDU in industrialized Ruhr perhaps best evidence that disinclination to risk upsetting present well-being outweighed traditional appeal of SPD as workers party.
[Page 308]Chancellor’s constant exploitation of fear that SPD policy on NATO would jeopardize German security undoubtedly convinced some voters that SPD program dangerous. Repeated overtures on behalf SPD by Communists in USSR and East Zone strengthened this impression in German public, which basically suspicious of and hostile to Communism. Furthermore, continued Soviet intransigence on reunification and general hard line in world affairs made SPD advocacy of new approach to USSR seem unrealistic if not dangerous.
Despite SPD promises to abolish conscription, defense policy was not decisive issue, with rearmament and compulsory service now taken for granted. SPD exploitation of fear of atomic bombs and campaigning against atomic weapons for German army won few new voters but failed convince majority that it offered Germany greater security in atomic age than CDU.
High level participation again favored CDU, which expanded beyond its 1953 base to capture lion’s share of 5 million Germans voting for first time as well as number of former supporters of smaller parties.
FDP losses were penalty for opportunism and refusal to take clear position on coalition intentions which, together with willingness demonstrated in NRW to form coalition with SPD, cost substantial bourgeois support. Fact that FDP won even 7.7 percent attributable in part to reluctance among many voters to see any one party become too strong. Losses of FDP constitute blow to prestige of “young Turk” leadership in Duesseldorf.
Insignificant vote for right radical DRP and left radical BDD with their programs of German neutralization and negotiations with Pankow again demonstrated that radicalism has no present appeal in FedRep and its supporters remain confined to lunatic fringe.
Most important result of election is firm mandate it gives to Chancellor, especially in foreign policy where he has free hand and Parliamentary strength to continue with past policies, especially on intimate alliance with West.
While size of victory certainly due in part to Adenauer’s stature, welcome feature of campaign for long pull was CDU emphasis on team of men around Chancellor, and we believe any inclination by journalists to interpret results primarily as proof of penchant for authoritarian leadership would be exaggerated. Democratic processes were fully operative. Campaign for most part was fought fairly and public decided it preferred status quo to risk of uncertain changes.
SPD failure to break CDU hold came as no surprise to opposition leadership, which had been reconciled to Adenauer’s continuation in office. SPD will probably be subjected to internal stresses with Ollenhauer’s uninspiring leadership getting much of blame. Wehner will probably claim good showing in Hamburg calls for acceptance [Page 309] of his more radical approach as standard party program. This effort will be hotly contested by right wing under Fritz Erler who will use extent of CDU victory to prove German public wants moderate policies. As first tentative estimate, we believe on balance SPD will not be radicalized as result of expected power struggle.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762A.00/9–1657. Confidential; Niact.↩
- On September 15, in West Germany’s third postwar election, Chancellor Adenauer’s party, the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and its Bavarian affiliate, the Christian Social Union (CSU), won 50.2 percent of the popular vote and gained an absolute majority of 270 of the 497 Bundestag seats.↩